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ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN



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GREATER AMERICA

BY

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
WITH MAPS



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PREFACE

IN calling this book *Greater America*, the author is aware that he challenges comparison with a far more important, studied, and weighty work. No other title, however, conveys so successfully the main idea of this book.

It is not only the territorial magnitude of Greater America, her innumerable problems of race and policy, and her resources, wealth, and progressive theories which are the motive of this book—it is rather Greater America as a world-power, the American peoples, and the American ideal in the cosmogony of the world.

An attempt is here made—it is believed for the first time — to present American evolution as a whole, to treat her history from the stand-point of its wide national significance, to show to what point she has progressed, to indicate what her future may be. To do this in one comparatively short volume involved an amount of compression and elision which must, perforce, lead to a certain abruptness; it was impossible, in many cases, to do more than indicate a line of thought or suggest a train of ideas.

What does Greater America mean?

PREFACE

If we could answer that question succinctly, if we could estimate the direction in which this huge dynamic force will be exercised, we should be able to take a long look into the future. But America — so it seems to the author — is at a critical period in her history. Very much depends on the spirit infused into her national life, both at home and abroad, during the next few years.

As these lines are written comes the news of the final burst of the war cloud in the Pacific, and although long expected, we are not yet able to estimate what it may mean to the rest of the world. Nearly twenty years ago the writer of these lines predicted the shifting of the centre of gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.¹ Ten years later he embodied the same idea in a book which urged the cutting of an isthmian canal under American auspices.² Finally, in his last book, published two years ago, he was able from personal knowledge to describe the principal features in that change which already had come over the Pacific.³

The three great factors in the transformation of the Pacific are the advance, overland and over-sea, of the two great expansive powers, Russia and America, and the regeneration of Japan. We see the embroilment of two of these in a struggle

¹ R. U. S. Institution, 1885.

² *The Key of the Pacific*, 1895.

³ *The Mastery of the Pacific*, 1902.

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which may have far-reaching consequences, not merely for either or both, but for the whole world.

What part will Greater America play in the drama?

It is with intention that the writer has to a certain extent ignored domestic politics in this study of Greater America, and has dealt chiefly with problems of imperial importance, which affect not the United States alone but Greater America as a whole. The questions of foreign relations, of alien peoples, of national defence, of government of dependencies—these are the matters which are of vital importance to the future of a great expansive nation, but on one domestic question—that of efficiency and purity in the administration—so many of these wide questions ultimately depend that it must be given a foremost place. The character of such a work as this is rather critical than descriptive. It is less of a travel-book than any yet attempted by the author, although he has visited, and in some cases revisited, almost every part of Greater America. If he seems, at times, to be bent on picking out weak spots, he asks his reader to believe that it is in no unfriendly spirit. A nation imbued with so many elements of greatness as the Americans, and with so large a measure of success behind them, needs criticism far more than lesser peoples.

In writing both for the British and American

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publics, the author was met by a difficulty in avoiding what might, at times, seem unnecessary explanation, since matters which are simple to the one are often cryptic to the other. The American reader must, therefore, exercise indulgence in reading such chapters as that on "How Greater America Is Governed," while the Briton will perhaps forgive the dissertations on our Civil Service and the government of India, when he reflects that these are frequently the subjects of misconception on the part of even enlightened Americans.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that, in using the term "America" to the exclusion of the qualifying prefix "United States of," the author is not only avoiding circumlocution but is technically correct. The citizens of the United States of America must be called Americans, since they have no other word to express their nationality, whereas the Canadians, Brazilians, or Mexicans, geographically Americans, have a distinct national name. The term United States, so frequently used, might be with equal correctness applied to other than the North American States, but there is no other people who claim the name Americans, and no other country which could be spoken of as America. It may not be out of place to mention here that, although some of the subjects raised in this book are not new to the author, they are all studied afresh in the light of the most recent developments, and that no

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part of the book has appeared previously in any form on either side of the Atlantic.


In conclusion, the author wishes to thank the many friends, British and American, who have assisted him in his task in various ways, and more particularly the courteous officials at Washington, who gave him every assistance in their power in obtaining information.

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GREATER AMERICA

CHAPTER I

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

WHILE it is impossible, in the scope of this book, to deal adequately with a subject so vast and so complex as that of the American people, it is essential, in order to appreciate what "Greater America" means, to glance briefly at the composition and tendencies of the nation.

It is a well-known fact that even the Early English were hardly so mixed in race as the modern Americans, and although the different elements may be politically fused, physically, morally, and socially they are still, to a great extent, distinguishable. This is inevitable when we consider the steady stream of immigration which since 1830 has been pouring into the country. Before that date it was not considerable, nor did it reach its greatest volume for some years. The Irish famine and political conditions in Germany provided a stimulus in the forties, and simultaneously came the discovery of gold in California and the be-

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ginnings of steam communication. The main stream of immigration until 1880 was from northern Europe, which had supplied so many of the pre-Revolution colonists, and from the first the bulk of immigrants naturally avoided the South and settled in the Eastern and Northern States. The tendency from that date was to increase the urban population.¹

The growth of cities in the last quarter-century has, of course, been infinitely more rapid than in the preceding era. In 1880 only one city—New York—had a population of over one million; in 1900 there were three, and three others had more than half a million each. New York had a population of nearly three and a half millions; Chicago one and three-quarter millions; Philadelphia one and a quarter millions. After 1880 a fresh element in immigration was introduced. Hungarians, Italians, Armenians, Roumanians, Russians, and Poles began to flock in, until, in 1902, they formed seven-tenths of the total immigration. In 1903 the great bulk of European aliens came from the three countries of Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia. The aggregate immigration was 105,000 in excess of that reported for any pre-

¹ In the century between 1790 and 1890 the urban population rose from one-thirty-third of the total to one-third; and while the total population increased sixteen times, the urban population increased one hundred and thirty-nine times. These figures include the preponderance of the rural population in the South, where agricultural interests still claim 87 per cent. of the population.

vious year. In New York over one-third of the population is foreign-born. There are over 300,000 Germans, 275,000 Irish, 155,000 Russians, 145,000 Italians, 150,000 Austro-Hungarians; the balance from the other countries of Europe, Asia, Canada, and South America. A great number of these are, of course, Jews expelled from their adopted countries. Others, like the Italians, are Latin people; while the Hungarians, Roumanians, Russians, and Armenians bring a strain of Eastern blood. Hitherto the United States has had no real difficulty in combining all the immigrants into a coherent whole. The admiration with which we view this achievement should not blind us to some of its features. While the bulk of the immigrants belonged to stocks kindred to that of the original Americans, the process of race fusion was in reality little more remarkable than that accomplished in the early history of Britain. With the introduction of Latin and Slavonic elements, however, a serious problem arises. They are not brought in contact with a pure, homogeneous people, but with a nation, one, perhaps, in political principles, but heterogeneous in many other respects. It is usual to speak of American national character as if it were some outside influence which envelops and subdues the immigrant as soon as he becomes an American citizen. The fact is, of course, that immigration has moulded the national character and will continue to do so.

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It was recognized from early times that the native-born would have a difficulty in holding his own, not only racially but politically. The attempt to found a national party was met with ridicule and the title of "Know-nothings," but it was a sign of a very general desire to perpetuate the influence of the old colonial stock, and finds an echo in the writings of a modern American statesman, Mr. Roosevelt, when he speaks of "communities where the native-American elements are largest" as most promising from the point of view of social evolution.

It is natural that Americans should be proud of their colonial ancestors. Early colonization provided the United States with a sturdy, steady, and yet enterprising stock, wedded to the principles of hard work and civic liberty. In this element we fail to find the seeds of the social problems of modern America, which chiefly centre round the worship of the golden calf. It is probably true that a purely native—that is, colonial—American community would be free from the most objectionable features of American democracy. But such a community is hard to find after nearly a century of unrestricted immigration, and it is impossible that a country whose resources have made it the rendezvous for the speculators and adventurers of Europe should have failed to show their influence in its political and social development.

If a vague uneasiness was felt concerning peo-

ple of kindred stock, it was certainly justifiable as regards aliens; but as to one class of immigrants, the peculiar circumstances of their coming and their English speech have blinded most people to the fact that they are essentially an alien race. The Irish immigration was a factor in national life which the United States was far from wishing to reject; but as introducing a Celtic people into the midst of a nation largely Teutonic it has been a fateful experiment. The quickness of the Celt, his natural eloquence, vivacity, and love of politics have enabled him to usurp on the American continent a position of much power. The "Irish vote" is more influential in American than in British affairs, and has had frequently a baneful influence on the welfare of the nation. In municipal life especially the Irish element has made for corruption and intrigue, the natural weapons of a people who have never won for themselves, or enjoyed as their birthright, the exercise of national rights. They have also used their influence on many occasions for the redress of their private grievances rather than for the true welfare of the community at large. Altogether, this Celtic element has been fraught with serious consequences, and it has retained its essential peculiarities while developing nominally on the lines of democracy.

But if the less desirable class of Teutonic immigrants from northern Europe and the Irish Celts have proved not unmixed blessings to the land of

their adoption, what shall we say of a later stream? Although it is generally assumed in America that the national digestion is strong enough to enable her to assimilate anything, there are already signs of uneasiness in some quarters, and laws are aimed at regulating this stream, which comes chiefly from southeastern Europe. At a time when unskilled labor is not so much in request, when the whole question of labor is involved in a struggle to maintain the highest standard of remuneration, it is specially undesirable that large numbers of foreigners, with a much lower standard of living, should be admitted. But the racial question is of even graver importance; and with the practical stagnation of the native-born and the rapid increase among the poorest aliens, it is of the highest moment that steps should be taken to preserve the ascendancy of the Anglo-Saxon type of American. In Japan there are two races which have lived so long together that their origin is forgotten. One is aristocratic, the other plebeian. Outwardly they are unmistakable, and yet it is practically impossible to find the actual line of cleavage. One would not desire to see a similar state of affairs in America, nor is it possible under a democracy; but the conditions might well be similar if the American nation should become superimposed with an alien and inferior stratum. Strong as is the assimilative power of this young country, which has been turning out young Americans from all sorts of material, she will find the assimila-

tion of her new citizens a difficult task. It is often boasted that the naturalized American and his children are more patriotic even than the native-born—*plus royaliste que le roi*. This statement the writer has seen justified by a quotation from a speech made by a naturalized German in one of the Western towns. He concluded a fiery oration with the sentiment: "America, our country, against the world! America, right or wrong!" This may, of course, be with some people the idea of patriotism, but it is not enlightened patriotism, and it illustrates most forcibly what a perverted jingoism may lead to. The native-born, it may be believed, would have too much sense of national honor, too profound a respect for the heroes of his race, and too true an understanding of the country's best interests to utter so shallow and so mischievous a sentiment. However this may be, if unrestricted immigration from southern and eastern Europe continues on a large scale despite the restrictions now established, and if the native-born continues to increase so slowly, an undesirable modification of national character will take place. Already a very considerable change is noticeable, not altogether due to industrial development. This has been chiefly in the direction of quick-wittedness and adaptability. There is nothing in the climate which could affect a race to such an extent; the modification is greatly due to the constant immigration to America of the keenest and most ambitious spirits. This was the land

to make money in, and to it flocked those to whom worldly success was an ideal.

It is a fact whose significance has seldom been appreciated that the flowering period of American literature was that immediately before the civil war, preceding the great industrial development and the era of millionaires. It is easy to understand why there should have been little literary life up to this period; but the comparative poverty of American achievement since the New England school died out is hard to explain. There are modern American writers by the score, a few American painters of reputation, and still fewer musicians; but modern America has become the home of mediocrity—she produces talent but not genius—nor is there to be found to-day in any part of the United States that peculiar literary or æsthetic atmosphere which is so often the cradle for genius. It was, and is not.¹

The solution lies to a great extent in this question of immigration. Ever since the forties Europe has been pumping in hard-headed men of business, keen, ambitious, inartistic. The compe-

¹ Unlike any other civilized country, America lacks a national capital, a fact which is undoubtedly contributory to the peculiar condition of her intellectual and æsthetic development. There is a dispersion of intellectual activity, a lack of focus in education and of fixed standards or ideals. Despite this fact, it might have been possible for one or other of the great cities to become the intellectual centre, as Boston was at her best period. At present, however, there is no such concentration, and literary and æsthetic life finds no rallying-ground.

tition, under circumstances in which no one is handicapped by birth, territorial possessions, or tradition, as in the Old World, is tremendously keen. There has been a constant sharpening-up of wits and faculties and an ever-increasing acceleration in the pace set, until American life has become one continuous whirl—a never-ceasing struggle to be first in an endless race. The impression given is that every one wants not so much to make money as to make more money than his neighbor; but the truth probably is that to relax would mean to be thrown out altogether. This high tension among business-men has undoubtedly had its origin largely in the fact that a great many of them were, and are, fighting for life in a country foreign to them; but it has now become a habit—a national characteristic. The man who hasn't made much is absorbed in plans for making more, and the millionaire dies young as the result of overstrain, and leaves his fortune to his children.

Here, at last, then, we have a leisured class—a cultured class, too, for most of the millionaires' children enjoy, besides the excellent education of their own country, a polishing process in Europe. Here should be the *milieu* for literary and artistic life, the cradle for the fine arts, the forcing-bed for the efflorescence of American civilization. But, alas! despite the appreciation of European art, which has led Americans to buy up wholesale the museums of the Continent, it must be confessed that the leisured class of Americans is the very

last among which the Muses would be likely to make their home. They do not want a capricious and extravagant patronage, and, indeed, while far from aristocratic in their preferences, they are peculiarly averse to *parvenus*.

Much the same causes which have led to a certain barrenness in the realms of æsthetic achievement have affected the public life of the nation. While it is generally admitted by all the best Americans that their government leaves much to be desired, very few will sacrifice time and inclination in order to put things right. And yet public service was as traditional with the colonial Americans as it is with us, and in the early days of the nation's history a man of character and talent saw no better way to employ them than in the service of his state. What a distance has been traversed from then to now, when a gentleman will hardly "soil his hands" with politics! This is so much the case that the conditions of public life in England are hardly understood in America. It is almost inconceivable to an average American that there are hundreds of men in England who spend not only their lives but their incomes on a career which offers them practically no material advantages or preferments. Social ambition is a strong incentive to some, but many are placed above even such a temptation. It would, perhaps, seem impossible to an American that a great territorial magnate—a duke or an earl—should spend part of his time in discharging the functions of a

provincial mayor; but this does not seem to us a surprising self-sacrifice on his part. We are accustomed to regard devotion to unremunerative public duty as the natural field of energy for any man who can afford it.

The case is, of course, different in a democracy. Owing to circumstances which must be dealt with later, politics have become a trade—and not an honest trade, either; but the natural love of the Anglo-Saxon for plain, straightforward government would have secured the constant co-operation of the best citizens and their devotion to public life but for one factor.

This factor was the constant influx of fresh and turbulent elements. While the business-men began at once that struggle to wrest a fortune from the new land, the political outcasts of Europe—the theorists, demagogues, malcontents—who were assured of complete liberty, and even license, in their new home, became gradually fused into the American democracy and soon learned to control it. Jobbery, intrigue, party tactics of the most unscrupulous kind were weapons which could not have been used to such deadly advantage but for the fact that a low moral standard had been allowed to establish itself. This is not the standard of the countrymen of Washington and Lincoln. It owes its inspiration to the gutters of Europe.

Some American writers point proudly to the ebullition of national feeling—the “birth of the nation”—when first the West made its weight

strongly felt in the Union, and Jackson became President, bringing the roughness of frontier life into the polished circles of a government which had been framed by a Washington and a Hamilton. Jackson, however, inaugurated the "spoils system," whose baleful influence has retarded the moral growth of the United States more than anything else. Who knows to what heights of judicial and administrative perfection America might not have attained but for this rude interruption of her settled and ordered development. There was no question of a relapse into hereditary institutions; but there was every question of profiting by the experience of the Old World and of framing society on a model at once fresh and mellowed with borrowed experience. The frontier element proved too strong. It undoubtedly breathed a keener and more belligerent spirit into the Union, but it pervaded the whole political and social life with an element of crudity and unscrupulousness which still remain.

Since the time of Jackson and the earliest incursion of the Westerner into political life a great change has undoubtedly been creeping over the country west of the Alleghanies. The most recent phase of this is the development of the great Mississippi Valley and the rolling of the tide of prosperity and progress southward to New Orleans. The Federalists, anxious to secure the supremacy of the Atlantic States in the Union, opposed the annexation of Louisiana, and their prognostica-

tions have been verified, for to-day the West, with a minority of electors, has an overwhelming majority of Senators.¹

The Westerners, it must not be forgotten, were not the first type of American, and it may be questioned whether they were the finest. Before the industrial immigration of the thirties most of the immigrants were not absorbed by the Eastern cities, but spread westward into newer districts, settling mainly on the land. They were far rougher and cruder as communities, and intensely democratic. It was a long time before they made themselves heard in the Union, for, during the period of storm and stress, when the East and South were fighting the battles of the young republic, winning her a place in the comity of nations, arranging her internal affairs, and rehabilitating her finances, the West, shut off by mountains, was developing on its own lines. Isolated by its position from the influences of the Old World, the Westerners grew up with a sturdy independence and an entire ignorance of world conditions. The dominant note which they brought into the Union was an aggressive desire for an entire separation from European

¹ The total population of the United States, according to the twelfth census, is 76,305,387. The population of the forty-five States is 74,181,336. New York has nearly 10 per cent. of this figure, Pennsylvania about 8 per cent., Illinois about 6½ per cent., Ohio about 5½ per cent., Missouri about 4½ per cent., and Massachusetts over 3½ per cent. These six States have altogether about 38½ per cent. of the total population of the States, but their combined voting strength in the Senate is only twelve out of ninety.

interests, and, with true provincialism, they believed it possible that the American nation could be all sufficient to itself. They joined heartily in—if they did not initiate—a policy of expansion which would eliminate Europe from the American continent. They have ever been in the van in fighting. Size has a natural fascination for a people living in such a vast country, and the Westerner was perhaps the first, though not the last, American to make an ideal of bigness rather than goodness.

With the civil war came a *rapprochement* between East and West, and in recent years the growth of industrial life has helped to assimilate the South as well as other sections to the dominant type of Americanism. With the growth of cities a change has come to the West. The Western type is no longer that of the frontier-man farmer, but includes the business-man and speculator. A tendency to a cleavage of interests between agriculture and industrialism is showing itself. The former, once the life of the country, feels itself left behind in the promotion of interests. The farmers see themselves supplanted by industrial immigrants and political adventurers, just as they supplanted the colonial American. Physically, the old type of Westerner is superior to any other of the present day, though not to the old colonial stock; mentally and morally, he has advanced considerably since facilities of communication and education gave his civilization an upward turn. It is to a race bred on the soil and in pure air that every

nation must look for constant renewal, and this the West supplies; but the evil tendencies of political evolution are so serious in their action on communities still raw and crude that it is to be feared that American national life may be poisoned at the very source from which it should draw its supplies of moral as well as physical renewal.

Where in this constant recasting of the national type do we find the true birth of the American people? It is customary to speak of Washington as the first American, but it would be hard to imagine a greater contrast than would be presented were he to stand beside a modern American, whether of the Eastern or Western cities. By right of priority the colonial stock may be regarded as the first Americans, and the country owes to them not only its constitution, but many of its truest elements of greatness. In the shock of contact with the virile West this type lost many characteristics. Traditions and ideals, good or bad, went overboard, and only a few little social backwaters—like Concord, New England—remained for a time. Then to the influence of the stranger from over the mountains was added that of the stranger within the gates, and with the industrial wave which swept over the country the original Americans were either submerged or carried away.¹

¹ Within recent years we have seen the practical elimination of one of the oldest and most forceful of American types. With the migration of the sturdy New England yeomen disappears one of the last strongholds of the native American.

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A significant feature of modern Americanism is the wide-spread movement among descendants of colonial times to band together for mutual recognition and support. Ridiculous as may seem in a democratic community the self-conferred distinctions of societies of the Cincinnati, Colonial Dames, Sons and Daughters of the Revolution, and kindred societies; incongruous as may appear the prestige attached to a "Knickerbocker" family—these are all signs of the times which cannot be overlooked.

The fascinating study of sociology in America is altogether outside the scope of this book. It has been treated at length by many abler pens. The writer is inclined to believe, however, that the importance of the modifications in what, for lack of a better term, we may call the national character, which are due to a constant influx of two distinct types of immigrants, has been somewhat overlooked. These modifications are going on under our eyes. The race fusion of which Americans speak with pride has not been a constant assimilation of all elements to the American type, but the steady modification of that type by fresh elements. How else can one account for the heterogeneous nature of American society, the dissimilarity visible between State and State, or even city and city? Americans not infrequently boast that the city from which a man comes is betrayed not only by his clothes and speech, but by his very face and manner. One has only to

read the classic descriptions of De Tocqueville to realize how much more truly homogeneous was the democracy of his time, though even then he saw elements of incongruity and danger. No modern traveller could give an account of the American people which would be at once so simple and convincing. Bryce, who devoted to the task abilities of the highest order, gives us a study marvellous for detail, but leaving the reader who does not know America without a mental picture. The reason is not far to seek. One cannot correctly paint a chameleon; one cannot fix on paper what is forever changing. It might have been possible for a sympathetic observer to catch the spirit of American life, to translate into words the soul of the nation—there are books on other countries which do this without any attempt at social or political dissection—but is there, in truth, any such element in American life? If it exists it is smothered from sight by the excrescences of an evanescent modernity.

This is why all writers who have attempted to give a picture of the American nation have failed. Either they take local conditions or some of the excrescences and magnify them out of all proportion, or they fall back on some period of history—preferably the civil war—and draw a picture which has long been out of date. The writer has failed, in an exhaustive search, to find any book, small or great, which gave at once a pict-

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ure of the American people and the key to their peculiar and complex civilization. Few Americans care for the study of themselves. Like Topsy, they "guess they growed"; and it is only the more thoughtful who are beginning to have misgivings as to the tendency of that growth.

What is the bearing of this difficult and complex subject on Greater America? In the first place, it has been the primary factor in insuring the constant expansion by which Greater America has been built up. Not only the quantity but the quality of the immigration at various periods has been directly contributory to this. First, the adventurous pioneers who helped to win the West; then the industrial element, which devoted itself to commercial affairs and stimulated expansion by a constant demand for fresh markets; then the Western element, also expansionist in spirit, from a desire to insure complete divorce from Europe and to secure an outlet on the sea-coast. So on in a circle runs the current of American evolution: immigration leads to industrial development, and that to further expansion, calling for fresh immigration.

At last a halt seems to have been called in this course of development. Chinese and Japanese immigration is discouraged; a general disinclination is shown to bring into the Union Territories where the foreign element predominates; and immigration from Europe is to be closely restricted.

At this period also the United States finds herself at the head of a great colonial empire, the centre of a governmental system with many variations, and pledged to a career very different to the isolated splendor she had once marked out for herself.

It is, at first sight, a curious comment on the universal truth and wisdom of the democratic principle that America should be the mistress of not one but many alien races, to whom she cannot, or will not, give those individual rights which she claims as the heritage of every man. The present writer would be the last to question the wisdom of this reservation. He hopes to show in succeeding chapters some of the salient features of these outlying parts of Greater America, and how they affect, and are affected by, the national ideals and idiosyncrasies of the United States. What are the probabilities that all these dependencies may be by degrees assimilated to the American ideal, and that democracy may triumphantly vindicate itself by becoming the basis of every government under the Stars and Stripes?

Misgivings may well arise in the mind of the ardent democrat when he recollects with how little success he has dealt with the internal problem of adjusting the relations of races of different color and varying degrees of civilization.

With the Indians he has attempted to deal more or less paternally—if, indeed, a course of action

can be deemed paternal which is so demoralizing for those on whom it acts. The Indian has never been regarded as fit for the exercise of rights like the white American. First a bitter foe and then a conquered and submissive vassal, the one aim has been, while depriving the red-man of his stake in the land, to keep him apart from his conqueror and to secure to him just enough ground and just sufficient money to prevent his feeling the pinch of want, which might drive him to a more strenuous life. Immured, therefore, in reservations, in which the tribal organization, meaningless under modern conditions of civilization, has been artificially preserved; deprived of the only stimulating occupations he had ever known—war and hunting,—the Indian might have declined in numbers and died out, slowly but respectably, had he been strictly and wisely governed within the limits of the reservations. Here we find, however, the baneful effect of the Spoils System. No permanent department has the interests of Indians at heart. If there is any subject which should be totally outside party politics it is this, in which is involved the welfare of so many helpless beings without any interest in party government. The Indian Bureau, however, has become a mere political machine, and its members are appointed on party grounds, and not for their knowledge of, or sympathy with, Indians. It is not surprising, therefore, that incompetent and unsuitable men have sometimes been appointed to

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oversee the reservations,¹ and that, seeing dishonesty, ignorance, laziness, and even intemperance among the men whom they are taught to regard as examples, the Indians, incapable of the virtues of American civilization, have lapsed into the vices.²

In any case, the reservation system, with or without political influence, is a bad one under a democracy. To maintain a truly paternal rule over these communities scattered from Minnesota to Mexico and from Michigan to California is a practical impossibility for the federal government. Then, too, land in America is already getting precious; immigrants press in on the reservations, and against energy and enterprise the Indian sloth and carelessness can make little stand. From the circumstances of their lives—their dependence on the government, lack of incentive to work, and general degeneracy—the Indians in their reservations have become, too often, plague-spots on American society, centres of depravity and vice. At the best, they afford a dismal spectacle and an evil example. It is now strongly urged that the reservation system should be gradually broken

¹ "The officials . . . work under hard conditions, and also under conditions which render it easy to do wrong and very difficult to detect wrong. Consequently they should be amply paid on the one hand, and, on the other, a particularly high standard should be demanded from them; and where misconduct can be proved the punishment should be exemplary."
—*Message of the President*, 1902.

² Lyman Abbott, in *North American Review*, 1898.

up, and the red-man allowed to mix with his fellow-Americans—on the same plane, at all events, as Poles, Hungarians, and Italians. The Indian race cannot survive as a separate entity; the one hope for it is fusion with the dominant Anglo-Saxon; but whether, after a long course of demoralization, it will prove a desirable element in the nation is more than doubtful.

A decaying and enfeebled race like the Indians, however, forms but a minor problem beside that of the negroes and their place in American society. Although the black people are not increasing at a ratio which, so far, threatens white supremacy (while white immigration continues), yet they are increasing steadily, and, moreover, are segregating in what is known as the black belt in the Southern States. This movement is one that cannot fail to cause uneasiness to Americans. Scattered throughout the Southern States (with a sprinkling in the North), dominated morally and mentally, if not numerically, by the whites, the negro race was a problem but not a menace. Even now the situation is not so grave that it may not be retrieved. The leaders of the black race have no other ambition at present than to raise their people to a higher level in the cosmogony of America. It is as citizens of the American Republic that they desire to face the future. And yet overwhelming public opinion denies them this position, is pushing them slowly but surely away from it, and is making their segregation more and more inevitable.

The vital importance of this question to Greater America cannot be overestimated. With the burdens, as well as the glories, of world-greatness upon her, America needs above everything to assure to herself internal unity and progress. The negro problem has already assumed proportions which make it possible that the whole policy of the nation may turn on a point of race prejudice. The unhealthiness of this condition must cause the gravest uneasiness to every thoughtful man. While it is impossible in this book to enter with any fulness into this most difficult subject, it is necessary to summarize briefly the main points in the controversy.

On the one hand, a large majority of whites, especially in the Southern States, feel that any attempt to place the negroes on the footing of American citizens would, owing to their numerical superiority in certain districts, secure to them the government not only of themselves but of the white minority. Apart from the question of whether that government would be good or bad, there is, in the white man's breast, an ineradicable aversion against being dominated by a black, or even colored, people. This is partly race prejudice, partly the result of terrible experience in the reconstruction period. In any case, it is too strong a sentiment to be rooted out or disregarded. On this foundation any schemes for the future must be laid.

The writer must confess that to him this prej-

udice, while natural in its original form, is now carried to an excess; but to a Briton, secure in that form of government which makes black and white alike free, but alike bound to obey a superior authority (always white!), there is not that lurking dread of the power of a black democracy. If the American would acknowledge freely and honestly the break-down of the democratic system, would accept his position as the dominant factor in a great republican empire, would cease to endeavor to square his theory with his practice, he might still advance along the paths of progress, might achieve the freest and most liberal form of government, but would still not be debarred from dealing justly with alien and subject races.


The negro is a subject race. There is no proof of its incapacity to rise to higher things; there is every proof that at present it is, as a mass, on a lower level of civilization than the white American. Instinct, which is stronger than logic, and common-sense, which is better than theory, tell us two things about the negro. First, that race-fusion between him and the white man is not the solution of the problem, that it is to be deprecated on both physical and moral grounds; secondly, that unless he is provided with a legitimate ambition in life he will find an illegitimate one. Left alone, permitted to segregate, and deprived of the stimulating contact of a higher civilization, the American negro will sink to lower levels. He will

RACE

10 PER CENT. OR OVER

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R. L. SUTTON, N. Y.



act as a drag and a menace to the nation of which, after all, he is an integral part.

Education—the universal panacea of modern times—is the only practical remedy which has been suggested. In its way it is the most important factor. Properly applied and directed, it may make a good negro out of a bad one, and a good negro is a far better citizen than a bad white. But when the negro is educated, is raised, not individually but racially, to a higher level of knowledge and character, what then? Is it to be expected that he will press forward to this goal without incentive, without hope of reward? Is the negro race to be admitted, by degrees perhaps, but certainly and finally, to the full enjoyment of the privileges of American citizens? At present the exhibition of the strongest civic virtues, the highest talents, and the most disinterested ambitions do not secure a negro in America from treatment which the humblest subject of the British crown, black or brown, might resent. Americans who value liberty and justice more than life, who have been willing to shed their blood to secure them to Cubans and Filipinos, refuse them to a fellow-American because he is black.

The necessity for a proper adjustment of racial relations has, therefore, become a burning question. The writer pleads with his American cousins for a fairer and more open consideration of the subject, and for its readjustment on

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rational, honest, and truthful lines. Treat the negro as a subject race, but remember that a subject race has rights. Draw the line of color as strongly as you will, but do not treat the black man as if he were not human. The white men own the American continent; they have every right to dictate to others the terms on which they shall inhabit it; but for their own sakes, if for no higher motive, they should see that those terms will be such as self-respecting people can accept. It may be said that the negro is not self-respecting; if so the terms of existence should be regulated as to arouse in him that sentiment, which is the only basis for a useful life.

Generalizations like these are open to the criticism that they are easy to make but hard to realize. The negro question, however, has hardly yet reached in America the stage of generalization. There is no agreement, no settled policy, no unity of sentiment on the subject. The one distinct and certain feature is the widening of the gulf between the races and the embitterment of their mutual relations. Every State has its own method of dealing with what is, in reality, a national matter. Isolated efforts at reform in one section are nullified by abuses in another.

This is eminently one of those quagmires through which the American people need the leading hand of a strong, constructive statesman. Nothing but drastic reform, based on a profound change in public sentiment, can revolutionize the

present condition of drift and muddle. The placing of all official positions on a firmer and less corrupt basis would be a step in the right direction, for it would strengthen the powers of the federal government in proportion as it weakened those of local politicians. Reform should open an avenue to the really high-class negro, which could be done without increasing by one iota the influence of a black democracy.

It is surely not too much to expect of so adaptive and virile a people as the Americans that they should be able to evolve at least a working compromise which would deprive the "black cloud" of its most baneful possibilities. Imperfect as is the British system of dealing with negroes in the West Indies, it is truer to the spirit of democracy than that found in America, since it affords them not only opportunities but incentives to rise, recognizes and rewards individual merit, deals out an even-handed justice to black and white, and finally makes good subjects instead of bad ones. And all this while securing for the white population (a mere handful among the blacks) a position in the respect and affection of the negroes which many a Southerner must envy.¹

In dealing, however briefly, with the people of Greater America, one is constantly obliged to refer to education as the suggested solvent for

¹ The question is more fully discussed in an article by the writer, "The Negro Problem," *North American Review*, May, 1903.

many racial and political problems. Nothing is more striking in American life than the interest taken in educational projects, the sums devoted to them by private beneficence, and the importance attached to the possession of a training in one or other of the great colleges. It must be confessed that all this is novel to the average Briton. His interest in the education given in the Elementary Schools (in America called Public Schools) is limited to a grumble at the rates which he has to pay for them. The agitation regarding the education bill rages chiefly round a point which does not actually affect the efficiency of the training given in the schools. As for the public schools—Eton, Harrow, Rugby, and the others—they have become a tradition out of which it will be hard to shake the conservative Briton. He will continue to grumble at the unpractical nature of the education obtained there, in the same spirit as at the large bills; but, as a rule, he thinks that public schools are the training-grounds which best fit his boy, physically and morally, if not mentally, to take his place in English society; and, until the whole fabric of that society tumbles into ashes, perhaps he is right.

A great industrial people like the Americans, a nation made up of "pushers," a society in which stagnation has become impossible, could hardly take this abstract view. Education to an Englishman means character development; to an American it means actual equipment for the battle of

life. The attention paid to the subject, the money expended, and the interest displayed have secured for American education a foremost place. It is up to date in appliances, in mechanical aids, in scientific methods. There is an attempt to teach just what every American citizen will want to know, and, above all, to make him bright, ready of expression, quick in decision, self-possessed, and practical. The poorest can obtain this type of education, which is specially designed to act as a solvent on the many elements of which the lowest grade of society is composed; and of late years patriotism—love of America and devotion to her institutions—has been steadily inculcated.

Excellent in many of its features, American education is open to criticism on one or two points which vitally affect the character of the people as a nation. First, the tendency is towards materialism—a sacrifice of the more subtle forms of character development, which is the true aim of education, for a mere training in certain 'ologies and 'isms. Efficiency is more sought after than depth or thoroughness. There is too much desire for the actual advantages that learning can bestow rather than love of it for its own sake, and for the possibilities in the way of happiness which it opens to rich and poor alike. It is to this materialistic tendency that some of the most unpromising features of American society can be traced, for it must be remembered that, as true happiness in an individual has its roots in spiritual far more than

in material well-being, so it is with the nation of which that individual is a unit.

An interesting comment upon a kindred side of American life—the effect of industrial expansion and a high state of mechanical efficiency upon the real happiness of the people—is afforded by a Japanese writer who was sent by the head of the Foreign Office to make inquiry

“in those places where these wonderful machines are most used, as to their social effects, and learn what methods, if any, have been adopted to cause them to bring that comfort and leisure to the masses for which they were evidently devised.

“This I did” [says the writer]. “In Philadelphia I saw a new phase of American life. On a former visit, with apartments in the Continental, I had seen, I now found, but the upper side of things—art-galleries, museums, libraries, colleges, costly churches, elegant dwellings, and well-to-do, distinguished people. I had, too, no doubt, seen great department stores, ship-yards, and locomotive works, but all from the point of view of a well-fed and contented man. My attention had not been attracted to the workers, except that they appeared to be better clothed, better fed, better housed, and apparently happier than with us.

“I now, under my instructions, was to abjure the civilities of the rich in order to spend my time among and learn something about the poor. My former perceptions I soon found to be illusive. The better dress, houses, furniture, more varied food of these people was accompanied, I was surprised to find, with more tension, more anxiety, and, I think, with less happiness than among the same classes in Japan. In factories, amid the roar of labor-saving machinery, I found considerable numbers of

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children and young people of both sexes working ten hours daily, which, with the noon hour and the half-hours occupied in going and returning, make a twelve-hour day; called to toil by shrieking steam-whistles, and so fearful of being docked or discharged that usually the larger part of them were waiting at the factory doors fifteen to thirty minutes before time. Posted conspicuously about the rooms I saw 'The Rules,' rigidly forbidding talk, forbidding friends to enter, and so on, enforced by fines. I found that, with the lapse of time, machines have been speeded faster and faster, and that sometimes one person who formerly ran but one machine now runs two, three, or even more. In cotton factories one young woman now has charge of four looms, and occasionally five. I found that these workers rarely owned their own homes, three-fourths at least being tenants liable to eviction upon thirty days' notice. Wages seemed to be no more than a bare living, though at a much higher standard than in Japan, very few accumulating anything."¹

There is about these lines an air of truthfulness and conviction, and the facts are indisputable as far as they go. They lead us naturally to that most serious question with which the American people are now face to face—the relations between capital and labor.

De Tocqueville noted with approbation the equality of fortune among Americans, and even at a later date it seemed as though the good things of this world were more evenly distributed in America than anywhere else in the civilized world. Millionairism, in fact, is a modern disease, and,

¹ *Japanese Notions of American Political Economy.* By Tentearo Makato. Philadelphia, 1899.

unfortunately, it is one which seems to have become endemic. The natural sequence of events in a country where certain people are inordinately rich is that others should be excessively poor, not because the rich deprive or oppress the poor directly, but because money, piled up million on million, becomes too much for the control of one man and ceases to be an active power for good. Its productiveness is not actually lessened, since it is well known that millions beget more millions, but it is too often diverted into channels of minor usefulness to the community at large. Then the combinations known as Trusts, which often include several millionaires, not only tend to crush individual effort, but, by their power of artificially stimulating or depressing the market, are able to control the destiny of the laborer or artisan to an extent impossible in a country where Trusts are still in their infancy. Titanic forces are, therefore, meeting in this conflict of capital and labor. On the one hand, men commanding resources so vast as to be almost illimitable; on the other, the strongest democracy in the world. Neither can do without the other, but both are prepared to fight to the death for power. All over Europe we see the growth of socialism, which teaches men to combine for the security of their rights and for the express purpose of nullifying the advantages possessed by capitalists. The American people, with a wholesome regard for the rights of property, have not yet gone to the excesses which have

marred the cause of freedom and liberty on the European continent. They have, indeed, enjoyed a measure of freedom, opportunity, and comfort far above that possessed formerly by other peoples; but their patience is now being sorely tried. So long as industrial prosperity lasts and workers are at a premium, the pinch of the boot may not be so keenly felt; but there are signs that a period of reaction is about to follow that of over-production, and this, coming at a time when immigration is still high, must force upon the people the inequalities of their position as regards labor.

It is not altogether correct to attribute to the influence of Trusts the present financial condition in America. The fact is that a country, like an individual, has an earning power of so much a year, that a certain portion must be spent in living expenses and the rest invested. America has been investing out of proportion to her earning power in many ways, not least in over-production, and now comes the swing of the pendulum and the natural reaction, both of which are as likely to go a little too far in the other direction. There appears to be no remedy for this state of affairs, which is familiar to us in Europe; and though artificial conditions can retard or accelerate the swing, no true equilibrium will ever be established. The sufferers by this economic fluctuation are naturally those who live nearest the margin of poverty. If the Japanese observer and

many others are to be believed, there are more of these in the United States than the generally prosperous look of the people would warrant. The poverty of the Japanese peasant, and even artisan, is inconceivable to a Western mind—it has been computed that many families live and are housed on an income of some £5 a year—and yet no one who knows both Japan and America would hastily decide as to which country contains the happiest and healthiest working-classes. We in England are wont to speak wonderingly of Goldsmith's parson "passing rich with forty pounds a year!" But the picture was a true one when painted; the period was one of simplicity and rudeness, even in a class above that of the actual worker. It is, to a great extent, our needs, and not our incomes, which decide our worldly position. "Income twenty shillings, expenditure nineteen and six—riches," said the celebrated Mr. Micawber; "Income twenty shillings, expenditure twenty-one—bankruptcy!"

Circumstances—education, the claims upon vitality, the natural pride of a self-governing people—have raised the standard of American life to a height hitherto unrealized in civilized society. The American artisan or mechanic must give more of himself, and naturally expects more in return. It is, therefore, a very intricate and important question how to regulate the swinging pendulum of economic prosperity so that its backward sweep does not knock down a large portion of this del-

icately constructed and highly wrought fabric of American society. Poor as he is, the Japanese peasant knows he need never be poorer, and his simple wants enable him to strike a balance, like Mr. Micawber, between revenue and expenditure. It is one of the weakest spots in a higher and more complex civilization that such a simple solution of the problem becomes impossible.

The regulation of Trusts, in which many people see the only remedy for these economic evils—for the discouragement of millionaires and the general levelling-up of conditions—is an extremely difficult matter. Technically, the Trusts are corporations, and as such legally sound. Practically, they have been largely instrumental in promoting the prosperity of the country. So vast a territory, with such varied conditions and conflicting interests, might have been much longer in accomplishing its industrial development but for the artificial stimulus of these great combines. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped, in the truest interests of the American people, that some method will now be found to check the further formation of these monopolistic enterprises, which have already answered their purpose and done their best work. Any further development of them will be against the interests of the democracy and for the benefit of a group of millionaires. It will widen the gap between capital and labor, for the personal relation between employer and employé, which is so valuable an element in all difficulties,

is out of the question in these mammoth organizations. It will strengthen those organizations which, depending on a lavish and unprincipled expenditure of money for their power, are sapping individual liberty, eating out the very heart of democracy, and, in fact, delivering America over bound and helpless into the hands of a plutocracy. It is in the Senate that the strongest support of Trusts will be found, for in that body are represented the principal interests involved. When one recollects the growing influence of the Senate, its jealousy regarding prerogatives, and the power it exercises over any but the strongest President, one cannot but wonder if Americans are blind to the nature of the government in which they place such supreme confidence. The Senate, from the point of view of ability, is a body of which any country might be proud; but it is as plutocratic, as much representative of class interests in its own way as the British House of Lords is aristocratic and conservative in another. Indeed, there are signs of far greater sympathy with the masses about the latter body. Has Demos cast himself down from his throne and set up the figure of Mammon in his stead?

These and many other questions perplex every one who considers, even superficially, the problems of modern America and her people. The problems are, for the most part, not peculiar to America, but are shared in modified form by every progressive nation. But the immensity of her territory

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and its resources, the number of her children, and the lofty ideals which she has set before herself, differentiate America from the rest of the world, and make her at once the subject for highest admiration and for severest criticism.

CHAPTER II

AMERICA AND COLONIZATION

THERE has recently sprung up in the self-governing dependencies of the British Empire a dislike to the term "colony," as applied to themselves; and a sentiment similar in its origin would lead most Americans to demur to the statement that the United States is essentially a colonizing power. The objection, doubtless, has its root in the original meaning of the word "colony," which was at first synonymous with "plantation"—a name of unpleasing suggestions, though it originally had reference merely to the planting of people on an alien soil. Both words, in reality, imply nothing more than the taking root in a new soil of people who remain in close touch with their mother-country.¹

This being the usually accepted definition, it is obvious that limitation and distortion of the word "colony" must be in the minds of Canadians and

¹ The *Century Dictionary* gives the following definition: "A body or company of people who migrate from their native home to a new province, district, or country and inhabit it, but remain subject to, or intimately connected with, the parent state. Also, the descendants of such settlers so long as connection with the mother-country is retained."

Australasians when they reject it. As far as America is concerned, she may be said with accuracy to be largely composed of colonies, whose connection with the parent states is almost as variable as the relations of British colonial possessions to their mother-land.

It is instructive to note how the motives for colonization have recurred with modifications from age to age, and how frequently history has repeated itself in this matter. The earliest incentive which drove men from their homes to settle on alien soil was the desire for conquest; but the first great colonial power whose movements we can clearly trace was Carthage, a purely commercial state, whose dominion lasted six hundred years and broke up because of wealth and effeminacy at the capital and a lack of defensive organization. Greece and Venice also colonized for trade purposes. Rome, on the contrary, expanded for political reasons. The strength and virility of her internal constitution made the absorption of weaker organisms inevitable. She was the first state colonizer, introducing her own laws and methods of government wherever she went, and the uniformity and method with which she assimilated left a permanent mark on the world. The causes of Roman decay are too complex to be summed up in a single sentence, but it must be noted that, just as Greece failed through too little centralization, Rome eventually decayed because of too much; and that, just as Carthage fell for lack

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of military and naval strength, Rome, the great empire founded on military conquest, went to pieces because she counted too much on her invincible legions. In the Roman conception of colonies as integral parts of the state we find, as in so many Roman conceptions, the inspiration for modern ideas of colonial policy.

With the Portuguese began a new era, that of discovery and adventure, coupled with the lust for gold to be got without much labor. Thus we have the three main motives for colonization—conquest, trade, and adventure. All these were combined in varying degrees by the more modern colonizing powers. Spain added to these the missionary zeal which was the natural result of her fanatical and powerful priesthood. France, whose adventurers accomplished so much of the exploration of the New World, was unsuccessful in her attempts at true colonization, and in later years her efforts at expansion have been for political reasons and by other means. Holland was always a purely commercial power, and being poor and insignificant as a state, she worked through trading companies, whose history illustrates the uses and abuses of such agencies. All these powers, in trade with their colonies, enforced a strict system of monopolies, and regarded their possessions from the point of view of profit-bearing concerns for the use of the mother-country.

While Spain, France, and Holland marked the zenith of their prosperity by their colonial enter-

prises, Britain began to colonize at a period of insignificance abroad and discord at home. Her insular position and the fact that so much foreign blood ran in the veins of her people made it more natural for them to contemplate leaving their country when they were not satisfied with the conditions of life there. As a matter of fact, they were not groaning under special oppression, nor were they worse off than other European peoples; but the idea of individual liberty and constitutional government had very early taken root on this Northern soil, and grew strong in the hearts of the sturdy island brood. When English emigration began, the seed had grown to fair proportions and was beginning to find its surroundings too cramping. The people, not yet strong enough to get their will at home, were ripe for transplantation overseas. The middle class had grown in numbers and wealth by the increase of industries, and the system of land-tenure, then as now, made it difficult for either merchants or the younger nobility to found families at home, while the peasantry were ready for any scheme which freed them from the incubus of the decaying feudal system. The great incentive held out was that each and all should possess their own land, and the consequence was that the stream which began to flow westward was of a character peculiarly adapted to develop the country they adopted as their home. Practically every element of civilized communities was transplanted over-

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seas, and even in the most aristocratic of the colonies a strong democratic feeling was at once apparent. This overflow of population, this seeking for a wider sphere of opportunities, has been throughout the main factor in British colonization, and differentiates it from that of other peoples. It was not a state movement, for political or military or even trade purposes; it was individualistic, spontaneous, and for that reason no comparison with other colonizations is apposite.

There is one important factor in colonization which has had a peculiar effect on the American continents. Religious persecution has driven people from their homes in every country and at every age, but it was, perhaps, natural that the New World, which was not discovered until the last and greatest religion of the world had reached a mature stage in its development, should become the refuge for all whose creeds laid them open to persecution. They did not always find a warm welcome from the earlier colonists, who were often as bigoted in their own way as the persecutors of Europe, and this fact played its part in driving men on into the West and thus continuing the work of pioneer colonization. What they did escape was the strong arm of a power at once secular and religious. The New World, although portioned out by the Pope between the two great Catholic States was too far removed from the seats of religious dogmatism to be easily dominated by either of them, and, besides, conditions

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of life were strenuous. Therefore, although Puritans persecuted Quakers and the Inquisition did its best to dominate those parts of the New World which were pre-empted by Spain (religious warfare being still the inheritance of Latin America), the emigration of people of all creeds from Europe has made North America peculiarly the home of religious freedom.

A sixth and last motive for colonization is that of national jealousy and rivalry, and the latter part of the nineteenth century saw a notable outbreak of this. The fact that the vacant spaces of the world were being rapidly filled up by pre-emption of the great States led to a scramble in Africa and the Pacific, and is still agitating Asia. This movement must not be confounded with expansion for trade, colonizing, or other legitimate motives. As a political move it is legitimate only so far as it preserves the balance of power, and many of the acquisitions made can hardly be defended on any of these grounds.

If we take these six motives—trade, conquest, adventure, overflow of population, religious persecution, and political rivalries—we find that the United States has practically been animated by each in turn in the course of her expansion.

Trade has been a constant incentive; of this the acquisition of Hawaii is an illustration. Conquest—the desire for territorial expansion—led to many additions of territory in the early days; the Mexican wars and consequent annexa-

tions will serve as an example. The love of adventure led to the formation of frontier communities long before the interior was occupied. The overflow of population (not because of overcrowding) from Great Britain has its analogy in the movement in 1785, when Congress treated the land of the Northwest as federal territory, sold it to immigrants, and granted colonial charters on the lines of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania ones. The poverty and confusion reigning in the older States at this period contributed to make the tide set in strongly towards the West. While religious persecution cannot be said to have greatly affected the colonization by United States citizens, we have in Utah one case of a colony founded by reason of it.¹ International rivalry, as displayed in the latter half of the nineteenth century by the great powers of Europe, may not have consciously influenced the United States; but if we come to examine the reasons for her recent oversea expansion we shall find that this motive also plays a not inconsiderable part, while the Monroe Doctrine, as now interpreted, has a strong tendency in this direction.

The fact is that from the earliest period of its national existence, even while that existence was trembling in the balance, the United States has expanded steadily. That this expansion was for

¹ There are, of course, several other cases, in which religious persecution was the direct cause of the formation of fresh communities.

some time confined to the North American continent does not at all detract from the truth of the statement that it is as a colonizing power she has attained her present proportions and position as a great world power. "Accretion, not colonization," was the theory until the other day. But, though her expansion was at first contiguous, and therefore appears to us less remarkable, the distances were so great and the physical difficulties so enormous that, until steam and electricity triumphed over these, West was more removed from East, and North from South, than were the original colonies from Britain. It is estimated that in the early days of federal government a courier took two months to go from Philadelphia to the farthest frontier.

The condition of the thirteen original States after the recognition of their independence was not altogether a promising one. Their fiscal system was entirely upset, their trade hampered and partially destroyed, while they were held together in the loosest manner by a federal government whose control was far from effective. The determination to round off their borders had already led the colonies to fight for an extension of their authority, and they obtained this concession in the 1783 treaty, which gave them a large slice of territory in the Northwest and a narrow strip in the South. This was the only land appertaining to the States in common, but its area was increased later by the cession of lands whose posses-

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sion was disputed by various States. The first act of national sovereignty was the sale by Congress of land in the Northwest to emigrants and companies in 1785. The stream of emigration West had begun before this, people being glad to leave the old States, with the internal problems engendered by revolution, and to live in the wild freedom of pioneer communities. Already it was estimated that there were fifty thousand people west of Pittsburg, enough to found the first newspaper west of the Alleghanies—the *Pittsburg Gazette*. As these communities became settled, peaceful, and freed from the attacks of Indians, the older pioneers—many of them old soldiers and frontiersmen—moved on into the wilderness. The dangers of the life they led may be estimated from the fact that between the years 1787 and 1790 no fewer than fifteen hundred frontiersmen were killed by Indians.

The second generation were hardy, good marksmen, and roughly organized for defence, but lacking the experience and training of their fathers. They were farmers, ignorant, rude, and without the traditions which the first generation brought from the East, their principal characteristic being an intense democracy, natural in such rudely organized communities. The next influx from the East brought a civilizing influence. Settlers now took out proper papers for their land, started educational schemes, organized local government, and finally founded Territories which were ad-

mitted to the Union as States when they reached the required electoral standard. It is this working towards Statehood and rapid attainment of that goal which differentiates these communities from ordinary colonies; but in fact, if not in name, they retained their colonial aspect for a considerable period, owing to their distance from the more advanced centres of the East and the strenuous conditions of life. When they developed, it was on colonial lines, free and original, and it was not till the end of the first quarter of last century that their influence began to be felt in the national life.


In considering the beginnings of American colonization we must remember that at the time of the adoption of the federal Constitution, in 1789, the population of the thirteen States was only some four millions, by no means homogeneous in race or language, over one-fifth being colored. The proportions in North and South were fairly equal, Pennsylvania and the States to the north having about two millions, and Maryland and the States to the south about the same number. Socially and politically, the South was dominant. The Southern States were parcelled out into large estates, the cultivation of tobacco being gradually supplanted by that of cotton, and slave labor being, of course, the rule. The North, on the contrary, divided up into small holdings, with a great diversity of products, was chiefly agricultural. Wealth and trade were, on the whole, pretty

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equally distributed between the two sections, the population being chiefly massed in a narrow strip on the Eastern seaboard.

When these circumstances are taken into consideration, it becomes the more remarkable that from the first the United States has never hesitated on her path of expansion. At the same time the policy was not commended by many of her greatest statesmen, and has met at different periods with strong opposition from various States that feared a disturbance of the balance of trade and power by a reckless extension of boundaries. The question of forming fresh States became, of course, a burning one in the slavery dispute—at this period we see State-aided colonization at work. But, even allowing for the stimulus so given, we see in the constant pushing forward of United States' colonists, in the vigor of their pioneer communities, and the support afforded them in all emergencies by Congress, the strong expansionist bias of the American people, the restless, indomitable spirit in their mixed blood, and the power of organization which is so characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon.

While the nation was still in its very infancy it doubled its area at one stroke by the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. This was a daring *coup* for a people who had only just begun to recover from a terrible financial crisis; but it was successful, chiefly because of fortuitous circumstances in European politics. The importance of the great Mississippi



Valley to the United States can hardly be exaggerated, but at the time of the purchase it was largely conjectural, and as a matter of fact it was only hoped by the negotiators to secure the mouth of the river and the two Floridas. The offer of the whole of Louisiana came from the French. There is reason to believe that the infant republic, without realizing exactly what that great territory might mean, was so anxious to expand and to gain command of the great waterway that she was prepared to back her request by force if Napoleon would not sell. She was aware, of course, that the cession of Louisiana by Spain to France substituted a strong power for a decaying one, but that, for the time, France had little desire for American colonies. Napoleon was too much engaged with schemes of European conquest to care for a territory so barren of military glory, and he grasped at an opportunity of doing England a bad turn by increasing the power of her revolted colonies. Whatever the actual circumstances, however, it is a notable fact that the federal government shouldered the responsibility of this huge acquisition of territory, with its tiny population of fifty thousand whites and the same number of black and colored people, without hesitation, although there was considerable opposition in the Northern States.

It must be remembered that such an act as the purchase of Louisiana was not directly provided for under the Constitution. Jefferson, indeed,

thought of proposing an amendment asking Congress to justify his action. Even at this early period of the history of the Constitution, therefore, it became necessary for its interpreters to endeavor to make it correspond with their actions. The discovery of a loosely worded clause (No. 18)—the so-called “elastic clause”—provided them with what they needed. This gives to Congress the right “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . . the powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States.” As a matter of fact, it was not until a quarter of a century later that anything resembling an authoritative reading of this clause was given. Chief-Justice Marshall then laid down that the Constitution “confers absolutely on the government the power of making wars and treaties; consequently, that government possesses the power of acquiring territory either by conquest or treaty.”

The legality of United States' expansion is a question which has been raised many times in the course of American history. The liberal interpretation of her own Constitution is a matter entirely for her own conscience, and seems to have given rise to rather unnecessary discussion, since the Constitution was obviously made for America—not America for the Constitution. But she has on other occasions committed legal breaches of a most serious character in disregarding the decisions of the highest judicial authority, as in the

case of Indian territory. Although the proprietary right of Indians to the lands they occupy is a vexed question, their claims in Alabama and Georgia, for instance, although three times allowed in the Supreme Court were disregarded by the Executive.

The period following the acquisition of Louisiana was one of great prosperity and rapid growth, especially in the matter of naval strength, as was evidenced by the part played by the United States in putting down piracy in the Mediterranean. In 1812, notwithstanding her ultimate defeat in the war with England, the United States navy acquitted itself with credit.

Disorders on the boundaries of Florida and raids by the Seminole Indians into Georgia led to reprisals by the United States, and finally to the purchase of Florida from Spain. A long delay in fulfilling the terms of the contract ended in 1819, when the United States refused to temporize any longer.¹ After this there was no recognized expansion by the United States for twenty-six years, but the ground was being prepared for further advance.

¹ Florida had had an eventful history, being originally colonized by Spain, but ceded to Great Britain in 1763, in return for Cuba and the Philippines. For this loss, incurred through an alliance with her, France indemnified Spain by ceding New Orleans and the country west of the Mississippi. In 1783 Great Britain restored Florida to Spain, most of the English colonists leaving the country, and till 1819 it remained a Spanish colony, one of the last possessions of the earliest conqueror on American soil.

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The annexation of Texas presents novel features in the story of colonization. A colony of United States citizens established themselves in Mexico, on territory actually belonging to a foreign power, just as, for instance, the Germans have done in Brazil. Being liberally received, they flourished and increased, but the internal politics of a Latin-American republic were distasteful to them, and they particularly resented being placed, as they eventually were, under military rule. They revolted, and, headed by Houston, with the aid of volunteers from their native country succeeded in establishing an independent State in 1836, and in 1845 were admitted to the Union at the same time as Florida.¹ The rapid development of these States and their admission into the Union were, of course, partly due to the slavery contest, then at its full height. The admission of a Northern, or non-slavery, State led to an immediate demand for an increase in slave-holding States in the South. Arkansas was answered by Michigan, Texas and Florida by Iowa and Wisconsin.

¹ The annexation was foreseen by De Tocqueville ten years before. "The inhabitants of the United States are perpetually migrating to Texas, where they purchase land; and although they conform to the laws of the country, they are gradually founding the empire of their own language and their own manners. The province of Texas is still part of the Mexican dominions, but it will soon contain no Mexicans; the same thing has occurred wherever the Anglo-Americans have come in contact with a people of a different origin."—*Democracy in America*, De Tocqueville, 1898, New York edition, vol. i., pp. 554, 555.

In 1842 Frémont made his exploring expedition towards the Pacific, and the United States came in sight of that ocean. Boundary disputes led to the second Mexican war in 1845-46, which finally resulted in the seizure of New Mexico (including Arizona) and California. Immediately after this occurred the discovery of gold in California, which led to an enormous rush to that country, and so rapidly was it filled up that in 1849 California applied for admission as a State.

While matters were moving thus rapidly in the South there was an important development in the North. The Democratic party pressed for the annexation of Oregon, as a reply to Texas, and this was eventually carried despite bitter opposition. John Quincy Adams declared that the admission of Texas would justify a dissolution of the Union, while Lloyd Garrison won applause by suggesting that Massachusetts should secede. The American claims to Oregon were for a long time disputed by Britain, the claims being very difficult of decision. By right of exploration and discovery it probably belonged to Spain, but the right of occupation seems to have been pretty evenly divided between the United States and Britain. From 1818 to 1846 the country was jointly occupied by both powers. Emigration on a fairly large scale went on from the States, the profitable fur trade being the chief inducement. The expansionist spirit, fanned by considerations of party interest, was strong in the land, as attest-

ed by the cry of "fifty-four forty or fight," alluding to the proposed latitude of the Oregon boundary and British claims, but a compromise was eventually arrived at, and in 1846 an Anglo-American boundary between Oregon and Canada was settled at parallel 49 degrees.

The acquisition by purchase and conquest of the two great slices of territory in North and South, during the years 1845-46, was not sufficient, for it left a wedge of alien possessions in the very heart of the United States. Two years later the successful negotiations which ended in the Mexican cession rounded off America, which became a solid, contiguous mass, bounded by Canada on the north, Mexico and its gulf on the south, and stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This solidarity of position left nothing in question save a settlement of boundary disputes too numerous to be mentioned; but it is to be noted that in practically every case the United States has made a good bargain and increased her possessions, usually adopting the method of asking for more than she was prepared to accept and backing her proposals with determination.

The new lands, still waiting to be filled up and affording ample scope for adventure, did not suffice for the restless activities of the people. In 1851 attempts were made, of a filibustering character, to annex Cuba, and in 1853-54 a solemn conference of American ministers met at Ostend and urged that, the acquisition of Cuba being of ad-

vantage to the United States, in the event of Spain refusing to sell, it should be wrested from her rather than left to be Africanized like San Domingo. When responsible representatives of the government could express such spread-eagle opinions one cannot be surprised at the daring enterprises of filibusters like Walker, who made an abortive attempt to conquer Nicaragua and Honduras. The President, Buchanan, was so far from deploring this tendency of his countrymen that he proposed in Congress the establishment of a protectorate over the nearer portions of the "dissolving Mexican Republic" and the control of the whole isthmus. The decision of Congress in 1856 regarding Aves Islands authorized the protection of American citizens who occupy land or islands not already in occupation by another power. This principle is, of course, no new one in the history of colonization, for the flag has followed trade quite as often as *vice versa*, but it definitely puts an end to any theory of the United States as a self-contained, isolated republic, and practically closes the period of solely contiguous expansion.

At this period one cannot fail to pause and review the circumstances in which that unparalleled development took place, and one is immediately struck by the steady continuity of purpose which seems half unconsciously to have dominated the people and their rulers. In prosperity and adversity, in defence of slavery and in spite of it, by Fed-

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eralists and by Democrats, the work went steadily on. If Indian claims stood in the way, they were ignored; if the country were pre-empted, it was bought—if the owner would not sell, it was conquered. Frontiers were pushed on into the wilds, regardless of the horrors of Indian warfare; American settlers in foreign territory organized rebellion, helped by their own people, if not actually instigated by the government, as in the case of Houston in Texas. In short, the career of the United States has been from the first one of masterful, irresistible expansion, not for lack of space or opportunity at home, but because of sheer force, initiative, and nervous energy, characteristics which are peculiarly strong in the race which the North American continent has developed from so many alien stocks.

The great crisis of the civil war had a temporary effect in checking the expansionist movement, for in the reconstruction which followed there was plenty to occupy statesmen and citizens alike. The strong party motives for the admission of new States were largely removed, and of those Territories which had not attained Statehood at the time of the war, one, New Mexico, out of which the Territory of Arizona has been carved, remains still in embryo. The long-cherished schemes for controlling the West Indies, which led to a treaty with Denmark, came up at this time, but were suppressed by the Senate, although St. Thomas and San Domingo were anxious to be

admitted to the Union.¹ This anti-expansionist feeling nearly prevented the purchase of Alaska when it was offered by Russia in 1867. Seward, a strong believer in the future of the Pacific, needed all his influence to push the matter through, though he was helped by the general sentiment in favor of Russia, founded on her mythical claims to a sympathetic attitude during the war.

For over a quarter of a century there was no increase of United States territory. The country developed her resources, increased her manufactures, and embarked on the most brilliant period of her industrial career, assisted by a tariff system which, having its birth in the need for revenue during the war, was retained as a protection to the manufactures which had just been inaugurated, and soon led to a vast increase of foreign trade.

The opening of the Pacific coast naturally led to a great development of trade with the Far East. Even prior to it American seamen had been active in the Pacific, the Stars and Stripes being several times hoisted on Pacific islands, but it was not till 1869 that America actually took steps for

¹ "These terms not proving acceptable to Denmark, the negotiations were prolonged until finally Mr. Seward gave up the attempt to fix the date of ratification, concurred in a stipulation in the convention for the consent of the inhabitants, and offered \$7,500,000 for St. Thomas and St. John.

"On this basis a treaty was concluded on October 25, 1867. This was promptly ratified by Denmark, but the United States Senate delayed action on it, and finally rejected it in the session of 1868, as appears by the records of the Department of State."—Wharton, vol. i., § 61a, p. 416.

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occupying one of them. At that date money was voted for establishing a naval station and harbor on Midway Island, and though the project was abandoned, the island was retained. In 1875 her predominant trade in Hawaii led the United States to make a reciprocity treaty with those islands. American interest in the Pacific was increased by the rapid absorption of island groups by European powers. The native Hawaiian dynasty was bolstered up for a time, but its retention was a farce in view of the rapid adoption of American ideas; and in 1892 a republic was proclaimed, which was recognized by the States, and finally taken over in 1897. The acquisition in Samoa is another instance of the methods by which a powerful government must protect her trade, matters there being complicated by the rival claims of Germany and Britain. The position of Samoa makes it an important point on the American - Australasian trade route, and in the harbor of Pango-Pango the United States acquired a useful naval base.

Before the final acquisition in Samoa, however, America had embarked on an oversea career very different from these peaceful victories in the interests of commerce. In 1898 the war with Spain was rendered inevitable by her action in Cuba, and the appeal of the latter to the great neighbor republic. The Cuban war led to a military occupation of that island, now merged into a protectorate, and the permanent occupation of Puerto Rico. The war also, by one of the curious freaks of fate, led

the Americans to Manila Bay, and involved them irretrievably in the government of an Oriental dependency.

To the present generation of Americans, to whom the Mexican and Florida campaigns are as much past history as the Revolution, the Spanish war came almost as a shock, and seemed in many respects epoch-making. In no other country do events move so fast or are memories so short, and it is, perhaps, not to be wondered at that the modern American felt startled when he realized the lengths to which he had gone. But, as a matter of fact, the struggle with Spain has been going on steadily all through the century and a quarter of the United States' national existence. The republic is built up on the foundations of the old Spanish colonial empire; and Louisiana, Texas, Florida, New Mexico, California, were steps in the path which led them first to the Caribbean and then across the Pacific to the Philippines.

In the last few years of the past century America ceased to be a purely continental power. As a colonizer she met with extraordinary success within her own continent, so far as the development of the resources of the country, the spread of civilization, and the cultivation of a national spirit were concerned. In another respect, however, she has hitherto been unfortunate. Her experience for a long time brought her into contact with only two races of lower caliber than her own. White men of every nationality she has hitherto

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absorbed with apparent success, but the Indian and the negro have never ceased to be problems and burdens. She has attempted to solve the Indian difficulty by treating them paternally and the negro problem by a (soon abandoned) programme of fraternity. In both cases she has been singularly unfortunate, and though the Indian reservations, ill-regulated as they are, will gradually cease to be a serious problem because of their dwindling population, there is no prospect that the negroes will do anything but increase in numbers and power until they can no longer be disregarded as a factor in the state.

From whatever point of view we regard her present condition, it is obvious that one of the most pressing problems of Greater America is that of the government of alien races—an imperial problem in some phases, a colonial one in others. Strong in the colonizing spirit, Americans have pushed on to the limits of their own continent, and have then overflowed—not so much in population as in energy—into distant islands of the Pacific and adjacent islands of the Caribbean. Even on their own continent they became the masters of alien peoples—Indians, negroes, the Latin populations of Louisiana, California, and Mexico; and although immigration from Europe apparently fuses without trouble into the American nation, it is noteworthy that the three great divisions of alien stock which have come under the American rule on the continent—the Latin, negro, and

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Indian—have remained distinct, and present grave difficulties in the way of the homogeneity of the nation. To this day French is spoken in Louisiana; Texas, Arizona, and California are partly Spanish in feeling; while the negro is beginning to segregate in a black belt of which the only thing to be said here is that it is about as un-American as any community can well be. It is, therefore, in the direction in which she has been least successful in the past that much of America's energy must be expended in the future. Steadily, consistently, in the teeth of all difficulties, she has gone on with her expansion, colonizing her own continent, taking over the colonies of others, granting self-government only to her own people and only when they showed their fitness; governing as a colonial and imperial power all communities too weak for self-organization or too alien in race to be kindred in feeling. The history of colonization shows that these circumstances are inevitable. Every virile, ambitious people has met with the same difficulties, but none has met them in quite the same spirit. American democracy has yet to demonstrate to the world that her way is the short cut to that stability, progress, and general prosperity which it should be the aim of every strong people to bestow upon the weaker ones which come under their wing.

CHAPTER III

PACIFIC EXPANSION: THEORY AND PRACTICE

THE Pacific expansion of the United States is in a peculiar stage. Hawaii is practically Americanized; it has its local problems, but the lack of virility in the native people has made them singularly malleable to American influence, and Hawaii will, no doubt, continue to advance in prosperity on the lines of an American colony which has little prospect of becoming incorporated more closely than at present under its style as a "Territory." Samoa, likewise, has little economic or political significance, being chiefly important for strategic reasons. The interest of Pacific expansion is focussed in the Philippine Islands, and these, from many points of view, it is necessary to study rather closely in order to appreciate the present phase of United States expansion. They represent the struggle between the principles and theories of the United States and the practice forced on her by circumstances. She still clings to the theory that expansion for her will bring all the benefits of increased commerce, prestige, and influence without saddling her with responsibilities. In the Philippines this cherished delusion is being

rapidly dispelled. She still partly believes that she has evolved the best system of government, the highest form of civilization, and the most complete recognition of individual rights in the world, and is by no means anxious to hide her light under a bushel. It is the arrogance and energy of youth which have nerved her to the task, but by the time she has arrived within sight of its conclusion she will be mature, and will have a middle-aged tolerance for weak human nature, and that readiness to accept compromises and be less particular about ethical perfection, which comes with worldly wisdom.

Looking around on a vast and prosperous continent, on a progress unrivalled in world history, and on resources apparently boundless, the average American is apt to forget that these conditions are by no means entirely due to the political and social system which prevails. When the optimistic American arrived in the Philippines he was inclined to think that all that was needed was the gospel according to Demos. The Filipinos were poor, disorganized, ignorant, shiftless—all because they had been suffering for three centuries from an organized misgovernment by an effete monarchy. The American loves phrases better than anything—Presidential elections have been known to turn on them—and at this juncture the favorite phrase set forth the benefits to be derived by the Filipinos from the planting of the tree of liberty in their midst—glorious liberty

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under whose branches they had never yet been able to shelter.

"We shall plant our institutions deep in the soil," said one of the pioneers of American civilization to the writer when he landed in Manila. "We shall give the people liberty and light and freedom. There is a certain logical progress in our American civilization. We have been progressing from step to step, and if we went back on our principles now by establishing an ordinary colony we should be arresting that progress. No! We shall bestow all the benefits which we believe to be the glory of America upon these islands, and if we believe in our country and her institutions we cannot doubt the result. We mean to establish a free, self-governing republic in these islands, and to introduce the institutions which are our cornerstone. If we merely started a colony here or established trading communications, we should be false to the traditions of our country. We are not going to follow on any lines of precedent; it is quite a new thing we mean to produce."

This statement, in the actual words of the speaker, represents very fairly the attitude in which the ablest of the men who had to deal with the problem approached it. There was, of course, another group who thought the Philippines should be evacuated and left to themselves; but with their views we are not now concerned. The question which naturally arose out of this reiterated resolution to "plant the glorious tree of American

civilization" was, of course, as to the nature of the soil in which it was expected to flourish. The answer given by the gentleman already quoted is so characteristic of a section of opinion in the United States that it must be given *verbatim*.

"A great many of your countrymen," he said, "will say that the only way with a Filipino is to beat him every morning—he is sure to deserve it before night; but we don't take that view. There is the same difference between educated and cultured gentlemen and ignorant peasants in this country as elsewhere; but the better-class Filipinos rise to an extremely high level of intelligence. There are native lawyers and judges here who would compare favorably with those of any country, and if one meets them in controversy or argument they can hold their own with great skill and eloquence. At a recent banquet given on George Washington's birthday there were after-dinner speeches by Filipinos which would compare favorably with those at any banquet in the old country."

No one who has even a bowing acquaintance with the Filipino can doubt the truth of the last statement, and there is a consensus of opinion as to the high level of intelligence, as far as mere book-learning and abstract science are concerned, among the educated Filipinos. The difficulty is to see how this peculiar form of brilliance constitutes a people fit to assimilate "the concomitants of American civilization," whatever that may mean.

The mental capacity of educated Filipinos, their fluency and forensic ability, can be matched only among people of Latin stock, who have proved themselves in other respects the very antithesis of the Anglo-Saxon races in their ideals of social organization and government. Altruism, which should be the ideal of democracy, and individualism, which is its invariable outcome, require for the development of the first and control of the second a strength and steadiness of character, a plain common-sense, and a power of seeing things in their true proportions which are singularly incompatible with the artistic Latin temperament. Added to this is the general topsy-turvydom of Oriental ethics, from the Western point of view, and here we have the soil in which "American institutions" were to take instant root. Incidentally, the plant was not only expected to draw nourishment from the soil, but to change its whole character by some occult process.

Apart from the difficulties which the United States leaders made for themselves by the enunciation of high-sounding phrases, which Filipinos were unable to appreciate at their true value, there were many conditions in the Philippines which made the establishment of law and order a heavy task.

The islands are scattered and in many cases difficult of access, and the physical drawbacks were accentuated by the lack of cohesion among the people themselves. Although it has pleased

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a party in the United States to speak of the "Filipino nation," it is well known by all who have devoted any study to the history of the islands that none of the characteristics of a nation are to be found there. There is merely a congeries of tribes, speaking several distinct languages and a great variety of dialects, in different stages of civilization—some heathens, others Mohammedans, and a majority nominally Christians. The hostility and distrust among the chief tribes are even reproduced in village communities of kindred blood, and there had never been any approach to a clearly defined national sentiment until hatred of the oppressing friars united all parties, for a time, in the desire to expel them. The widely spread opposition to American arms had its origin, not, as is frequently stated, in the Filipino desire for freedom, but in a variety of causes, in which the ambitions of a *mestizo* aristocracy and the ignorance and prejudices of the masses were the chief factors, and tyranny, misrepresentation, and treachery the main instruments.

The peculiar features of country and climate prolonged the war to an unconscionable extent, and before it was well over the work of "planting the institutions which are the corner-stone of liberty" was commenced.

The motives actuating the United States were threefold. First, she desired to give the Filipinos a good government; secondly, she wanted to

give them a democratic government; and thirdly, she wanted to do this without following any precedent laid down by other nations. "It is quite a new thing we mean to introduce," said Mr. Roosevelt; "we are not going to follow any lines of precedent."

There was naturally a good deal of trouble to reconcile these three ideals. The simple and obvious method of dealing with a conquered country is to place it under military rule until order is evolved and trade and agriculture are resuming their normal condition. The next stage is one of transition, a semi-military rule, in which the plainest and simplest laws and regulations are enforced by civil measures. The personality of officials is the most important factor at this period, which prepares the way for civil government, under which local autonomy may be introduced.

As has already been mentioned, there was one special difficulty in the way of such a scheme as this, and that consisted in the peculiar social organization of the Filipinos. Had the islands only a native population, with leaders of their own race, this method would have met the needs of the situation admirably, as, for instance, it did in Burma. Unfortunately, the Spanish domination had led to the establishment of a class known as *mestizo*, or half-breed, some almost entirely white, who occupy the position of a self-constituted aristocracy, acquired by their superior intelligence and education and the social

prestige derived from their descent from the ruling race. They have no hereditary or territorial hold over the people, but they look down on the natives, just as they are themselves despised by the pure-blooded Spaniards. This *mestizo* class is most numerous and powerful at Manila, and the capital is to them what Paris is to the French—a world within a world. They have hitherto occupied the place in the political and social world which an aristocracy would fill in Europe, but with this exception, that they have not that interest in the well-being of the peasants or that hold on their affections which the feudal relation implied. It is to this class that the Americans, in the first flush of enthusiasm, pledged themselves, and it is they alone who, by education and opportunity, are able to flood the government offices, and who are already prominent as lawyers and politicians. With a class of this kind—restless, intriguing, brainy, treacherous, and eloquent—it would have been difficult to adopt any conceivable system of government which did not provide some scope for their energies.

The choice was between two dangers—that of employing them and of leaving them unemployed—and the first was decidedly preferable. The unfortunate circumstance was that the United States programme prohibited any form of government which was not democratic in its essentials. The obvious impossibility of working into such a scheme a people apathetic and ignorant, and an

aristocracy at once ambitious, irresponsible, and arrogant, did not deter the United States from making the attempt.

The Philippines were fortunate in the man sent out to superintend the democratization of the islands. It must be remembered that the commission were sent to establish civil government, and, having to fulfil that task, they had only to adopt the least harmful form. Public opinion at home would not have tolerated a less liberal provision for the individual rights of the Filipino. The war was scarcely over—it lingers still in the islands in the form of ladronism—when the people were called together and told that they were to be shown how to govern themselves.

The first and foremost step was the bestowal of elective powers. After a short period of government by a nominated official, elections were held for the post of provincial governors. The educational effect of the exercise of the elective function is one of the firmest convictions of the American idealist, albeit on his own continent he has already been obliged to withdraw it practically from one-ninth of the nation, and is proposing to adopt measures which will exclude still more. The problem in the Philippines is whether the Filipino gains sufficiently in moral status by merely recording his vote to compensate for what he loses by being ill governed. It is well known that the ballot-box is one of the most potent weapons of corruption, unless safeguarded most carefully, and

it is difficult to see what steps have been, or can be, taken to secure a genuine vote.

All this, it may be said, is true of other countries than the Philippines; and yet many of these countries apparently enjoy prosperity. But the Filipino is at a crisis in his career when he must have good government, fair government, strong and energetic government, if he is ever to rise above his present level. The country is laid waste by war and its inevitable consequences of famine, disease, and misery. The people have a dangerous facility for politics and a lack of practical common-sense which are fatal qualities—the very antithesis of the Chinese, who are indifferent to affairs of state, but are intent on their own business, and in whose blood is the faculty of local self-government. It would have been greatly to the advantage of the Filipinos if all their energies could have been directed into the practical channel of self-help and if the development of an elaborate political system had been left to a future date. Peace and prosperity are the first gifts a nation should confer upon the race it desires to elevate, and without prosperity it will be impossible to crush the hydra-headed monster of discontent and intrigue.

One of the first and most discouraging checks which American enthusiasm received in the Philippines was the discovery that the Filipino could not be intrusted with the control of funds; his intelligence was, unfortunately, superior to his

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honesty. It was, therefore, necessary to provide in each province an American treasurer, and, as the public works demanded also more skill and integrity than could be found among the natives, an American engineer, called the "supervisor." The municipalities enjoy a very complete local autonomy, so much so that, although the provincial Governor is expected to act towards them as "disciplinarian," he cannot even force them to adopt regulations which would insure a relative uniformity in the conditions and requirements of civil life in the different *pueblos*.

One of the leading Filipinos, and a member of the commission, Señor B. Legarda, acknowledges that the suffrage and individual rights are entirely new in the Philippines, and admits the danger of the elective system in municipalities, "where voters are only influenced by *casiquism* (bossism) or by the party passions and puerile reactionism which incited the late war." But he and others—for instance, Pardo de Tavera and R. de Luzuriago—claim that a period of two or three years' provisional government should fit the Filipinos for the unrestricted discharge of citizen functions and lead up to admission as a State within the Union—a somewhat curious conclusion to arrive at on such premises.

The time that has elapsed since the establishment of civil government is too short to permit of a comprehensive judgment on the results, but the extreme optimism of the central government can-

not conceal the fact that so far the elections of governors and municipalities have been exactly what was expected by less sanguine people; they are mischievous or harmless, exactly in proportion to the amount of American influence brought to bear on them and the control exercised by the civil Governor and white officials. The process of democratization has not been carried very far—it is essentially a system of “make see”; but the objection to placing authority in the hands of any class of officials nominated by government has led to an extraordinary degree of centralization. The civil Governor, an indispensable figure—entirely out of the picture, exercising, as he must, absolute power—has to be referred to in every matter. He may not be assisted by really responsible American officials on whom he can rely, and his Sisyphean task is rendered heavier by the necessity for closely controlling the sham Filipino governors and educating them up to the needs of their position. The burdens of his position include the control of the civil-service board, the insular purchasing agent, the office for the improvement of the port of Manila, and the provincial and municipal governments. He has, moreover, to assume the duties of absent heads of all executive departments; he is president of the Philippine commission, which involves a large amount of arduous and most important legislative work; and, finally, he must receive at all times the public and officials of all degrees. For all this he receives a salary of

\$15,000 per annum, which, at the rate of living in Manila, will barely cover his household expenses.

This intolerable conglomeration of functions is, perhaps, the inevitable fate of an official who is the agent of a democratic government. When the "principles of democracy" demand that the man who is the head of the greatest republic in the world is expected to fritter away on petty personal matters time which might be employed in studying vital national questions, it can hardly be expected that the Governor of a United States dependency should be accorded more liberal treatment. The effect of this system in the United States, however, is far less harmful than in the Philippines. The former has other machinery than the mere brain and will of the President on which to depend, and, in fact, the majority of Presidents are not chosen for their capacity and are so tied by party trammels as to have little scope for initiative. But in the Philippines the man at the head is the most important factor, and should be a man of capacity and be given a free hand and a strong backing. Democratic government is impossible; aristocratic government would be the result of any attempt to give the Filipinos political freedom. A strong paternal government is the only form left; but a weak paternal régime will result in spoiled children and a divided household. Meanwhile, the attempt to check the sham autonomy by a system of referring everything to the civil Governor has made the

mass of clerical work so enormous that it can only be dealt with by the multiplication of bureaus.

There is something peculiarly fascinating to the American mind in the organization of a bureau, and no one at all familiar with the United States can fail to have observed the relations between these bureaus and the great American public. At any hour of the day they are open to inspection and inquiry by any chance visitor, and in many of them special officials are told off to show curious strangers the working of the different departments. The bureaus and their officials are, in fact, the property of the democracy, and there is none of the reserve and unapproachableness to which Europeans are accustomed in their government offices. In some ways the system has undoubted advantages, and it is, of course, consistent with democratic principles. The tendency, however, is the same in many other phases of democratic government. That which is accorded to every one ceases to be either valued or valuable, and the efficiency of a department is impaired instead of being increased. The old adage is true, after all, that familiarity breeds contempt.

A second notable feature of American bureaus is the prodigious amount of clerical work which is deemed necessary to prove their value. Quantity, and not quality, appears to be regarded as a test, and no doubts are entertained of the effectiveness of work which involves the use of a record amount of stationery.

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These principles have been faithfully carried into effect in Manila, and the record of the working hours of officials, the number of type-writers in use, the amount of correspondence dealt with, the variety of languages to be interpreted, are enough to stagger the quondam British official, who has been used to imagine that *he* was overworked and overbound by red-tape in the days when he sat under a banyan-tree and dispensed rough-and-ready justice to a district in upper Burma. Of one bureau we read that a staff of six are engaged in reading and answering applications for appointments, "many of which exist only in the imagination of the writer." There is reason to believe that this staff is disgracefully overworked. Letters are received in "almost every known language"; and at the present time there are interpreters ready to translate from "French, German, Italian, Latin (!), Norwegian, Spanish, Swedish, Hebrew (modern), and Chinese (Amoy), as well as five distinct dialects of the Philippines." The task of examining charges and complaints against officials seems to be one of the heaviest; and we are told that one report occupies seven hundred and fifty closely written pages in Spanish or Filipino dialects. This bureau also draughts the appropriation acts and mails all necessary warrants, which vary in amount "from \$300,000 to 2 cents."

The system of reporting and publishing *verbatim* all debates and speeches (even if undelivered) has

affected the whole political life of the States, and its malevolent influence is to be traced in the writing of reports.¹ No country in the world has such machinery for the output of governmental reports on every conceivable subject, and the amount of undigested information compiled and issued gratis in the form of well-bound volumes is simply inconceivable to those who have not had ocular proof of it. The motive is laudable and the expense of little consequence to a country as rich as the United States, but the practical effect is not quite what might be wished. The American love of magnitude is nowhere more evident than in this matter, and the result is too often a vast conglomeration of facts, reports, and quotations, without sense of proportion, unasimilated, badly arranged and indexed, and involving a vast amount of work by the student who desires a clear and succinct idea of the matter in hand. When American officials write reports they permit themselves a redundancy of language

¹ A very outspoken reference to this question was made in the President's annual message of 1902. The American editor of the 1898 edition of De Tocqueville (vol. i., p. 269) has the following pertinent observation on this subject:

"Instead of complaining that 'little is committed to writing' in America, and that 'that little is soon wafted away forever,' he ought to censure the inordinate loquacity of Presidents, Governors, Legislators and other public officers, whose interminable messages, reports, and supplementary documents are preserved by the public printers in many huge volumes, which nobody, indeed, ever thinks of perusing, but which are even difficult to consult on account of their number and magnitude."

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and a free expression of personal opinions, even when the writers are merely required to relate facts. In the Philippines this practice is peculiarly unwise, as it encourages the Filipinos in their most fatal gift of shallow eloquence.

It is to the skilful manipulation of phrases, by which a barren report may attain quite respectable proportions, that we owe the following gem from the report of a provincial Governor.

"INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

"These branches do not amount to much in the province of Rizal, as, in general, they are only practised on a small scale. However, the spirit of association is awakening, and it can be believed that, when peace is firmly established in all of the archipelago, civil régime and the good dispositions of the people of the province will give it further progress and prosperity."

It would be a happy moment, both for the overworked bureaus and the people on whom reports are written, if the directions which used to be well drilled into young British officials could be given in the Philippines: Condense, don't generalize, and avoid sentiment.

It must not be supposed that the writer wishes to decry the labors of the Manila bureaus. A certain amount of routine clerical work is inevitable, and there is no doubt that many officials have devoted themselves without reserve to these duties. From internal evidence, however, there seems to be a decided tendency to magnify the

importance of mere office-work, and any one who has had experience of administration knows the danger of allowing this to increase. The system established in the Philippines seems peculiarly adapted for the growth of red-tape, and the nature of the Filipinos—especially the *mestizos*—with their love of oratory, litigation, and discussion of abstract points, makes them liable to exaggerate the weaker side of the political system devised by their white mentors.

The democratization of the Philippines has so far amounted to this: Municipalities have been given a local autonomy which they never exercised before, and are subject to all the dangers of the system, with its opportunities for undue influence by the moneyed class, corruption, and jobbery, without any guarantee—save the over-worked central government—that they will be free from oppression. There is no powerful industrial class to control the municipal politicians, and the vast majority of the people are ignorant, superstitious, and apathetic. The power of electing the provincial Governor by popular vote does not secure them a popular government. He will hold his position chiefly at the pleasure of one or other of the *mestizo* political parties, which are, in fact, aristocratic in their aims; and he is also subject to the central government, a fact which may increase the chances of his efficiency, but does not make him more acceptable to the Filipino. It must be remembered that good government does

not appeal to Orientals on its own merits; but they, like all other people, do appreciate it when it brings them freedom from taxation, increased prosperity and opportunities. All these cannot be achieved in the Philippines for many years, so that the present government cannot expect to be regarded as a popular one.

The governors, elected by the people, will inevitably fall between two stools. If they endeavor to enforce the measures necessary for the improvement of the country (which cannot be agreeable to a majority of the people), they will become unpopular with the democracy; if they fail to do so, they will be regarded with suspicion by the central government. This aspect of the case becomes especially serious when the question of taxation arises. In assessing the country for the land-tax, it was found almost impossible to ascertain true values, as officials favored their friends. Hitherto, the generous policy of the United States has avoided serious friction on the question of taxation, but the matter will have to be placed on a firm foundation very soon. The high wages paid to Filipino laborers and workmen in government employ have done much to reconcile them to the new régime, but when public works and education have to be defrayed out of local funds—as must sooner or later be the case—there will be considerable difficulty in adjusting wages on a scale commensurate with those paid in other parts of the Orient. The

present scale is inflated and the whole system artificial.

The third effect of democratization has been the elaboration of central government at Manila. How much the working of this machine owes to the energy, ability, and tact of a few American officials will probably never be known, unless—as is their constant aspiration—the Filipinos take over the administration of the islands themselves in the course of a few years. While the systematization of the work of government and the organization of departments specially qualified to deal with different branches were a necessity, and while the clerical education of Filipinos in advanced methods of work—in indexing, classifying, and so forth—is a valuable contribution towards their progress, it is a grave misfortune that they should have this object-lesson in government—an elaborate central administration turning out a vast amount of clerical work, while the country remains in a condition of chaos and public works are still in embryo. It is possible that the American capacity for pushing things through may enable them to surmount the red-tape barriers and do some really practical work in the Philippines; but the unique opportunity they had for teaching the Latin Malays a lesson in *doing*, as opposed to *talking*, is irretrievably lost. The American's love of bureaus and report-writing may not harm him—he is a thoroughly practical person at bottom—but to the Filipino it must prove a fatal snare.

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The clash of democracy with Orientalism is a peculiarly interesting study. It must be noted that even Americans do not propose to upset the aristocratic government in vogue among the Moros of the southern Philippines, who are Mohammedans. The doctrine of individual rights is not believed to be applicable to the Moslem, and the British method of dealing with these people has been practically adopted without variation. It is the Christianity of the Filipino, apparently, that gives him the claim to individual rights; but, as a matter of fact, it is the white strain among the *mestizos* that counts for most in the political situation. Without that the skin-deep Christianity (varied by undisguised heathendom) of the peoples of the archipelago would not have been sufficient to place them (theoretically) on a par with people who have fought and suffered for centuries before they were able to evolve popular government. The interesting parallel of semi-Latin peoples on the American continent and in the Caribbean may well be studied in this connection, and is dealt with elsewhere. Nowhere, it may briefly be stated, has a semi-Latin race succeeded in founding a popular government. The so-called republics are victims of anarchy, the best being governed by oligarchies or held together by the strength of a practical dictator. The methods of election in any Latin-American state are enough to dispose of the theory that the democracy has any voice in their government.

But, after all, the Malay element in the Filipino is the strongest, and the Malay is an Oriental. Democracy is an alien growth on Oriental soil, and it is extremely doubtful whether it can ever flourish under conditions so unfavorable. Japan, the only Oriental country which has evolved a modern political system, is intensely monarchical. The self-abnegation of her hereditary aristocracy has not by any means destroyed their power, which has been accentuated by their entrance into commercial and professional life. The Japanese, however, are no fair comparison for the Filipinos. They are, in fact, a Northern race, strenuous, homogeneous, patriotic, whereas the Filipino is a true child of the tropics, both in physique and character.

No Oriental tropical race has ever yet evolved anything approaching popular government, which is opposed to their traditions, inclinations, and the conditions of life. The Malay has been peculiarly backward in organizing political or social systems of any kind, and his invariable trend has been to an unqualified despotism. Before the Spaniards, in the early days, began their work of disintegrating the social system of the Filipinos, there is no doubt that, like every other division of their race, the tribes were aristocratic in their organization. Hereditary chiefs have always enjoyed power and prestige among people whose capacity for co-operation was practically nil. If an aristocracy were to come into power at the

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present day, however, it would consist not of the descendants of hereditary chiefs but of the *mestizo* class, whose disqualifications have already been stated.

Is it possible, therefore, that democracy will prove the solution of the difficulty? The writer thinks not. His experience of Oriental peoples makes him more than doubtful whether they can, for many generations at all events, reach the point of self-government. In the present case the immediate result of American evacuation would be to place power in the hands of a people who do not know how to use it, and who would become the tools of the educated *mestizos*. The ignorance of the peasant class may be remedied in time by education, and it may be possible to enlarge their point of view, which, like that of most Orientals, is purely local. When, also, the *mestizos* have given solid proof of their probity, loyalty, and disinterestedness, it will be ample time to intrust them with power.

CHAPTER IV

PACIFIC EXPANSION: THE PHILIPPINES—THREE YEARS AFTER

AT the time of writing (early in 1904) it may be said that the American administration of the Philippines has been working for over three years. The cession of the islands by Spain to the United States, of course, dates from 1898, but the actual subjugation of the islands was not anything like complete until a much later date. Early in 1901 civil government was established throughout the archipelago, and this may, therefore, be fairly considered as a starting-point.

The amount of administrative and reform work which may be accomplished in three years in founding a government in the tropics is not much, and the writer would have been the last to expect great results from such a short period. But the general assumption among certain leading Filipinos (who from their official positions appear to be in the confidence of the government), and the tone adopted by a section of the Americans themselves, seem to indicate a belief that miracles are, indeed, in process, and that the Filipinos have been regenerated and placed securely on a footing with "the really civilized peoples."

The long continuance of Filipino resistance to American arms was a most unfortunate sequel to an early mistake. The rebellion organized by Aguinaldo might never have come to a head had the United States adopted from the first a firm attitude towards the political party of which he was the leader. Disappointed with their own status in the country after the cession by Spain, the *mestizo* politicians of Manila were able, by entirely false representations, to stir up the population against the Americans, and it was to a false idea of the intentions of the United States that the stubborn resistance was due. The consequent neglect of the ordinary business of life soon made fighting a profession to a large number of the people, and the wild, free life of a *ladrone*, or brigand, attracted the most daring spirits, who, in their turn, terrorized the peaceful inhabitants. So popular is this irregular mode of life to this day that, according to an official report, a better-class girl in certain districts prefers life as the stolen mistress of a *ladrone* to marriage with a well-to-do and respectable citizen. The stamping-out of organized resistance was practically ended in 1901, but there was evidence at a much later date of communication between the *ladrones* and political parties in Manila, which leads one to doubt if the former are in reality condemned or even regarded with disapprobation by all their countrymen as irresponsible robbers. There is still a great lack of reliable information as to the relations between

the *insurrectos*, or organized rebels, and the *ladrones*, or independent robber-bands; but one thing is clear—the secret societies, especially the Katipunan, provide a link, though one whose exact strength it is impossible to gauge. Secret societies have not been prohibited as such, but only those which “have for their object the promotion of treason, rebellion, or sedition, or the promulgation of any political opinion or policy.” This restriction is absolutely useless, and it is doubtful whether any legislation which could be made to fit in with American principles would be successful in stamping out this most dangerous pest. In British possessions stringent laws have been enforced, and in Singapore, at all events, the power of the secret societies has been checked, if not destroyed. But wherever there are Chinese there will be the organizations so dear to Celestial minds; and the Filipino, prone to political intrigue, though backward in organizing power, is sure to imitate the secret societies of his Chinese and *mestizo* friends, on the one hand, and the “unions” and “leagues” of his American mentors on the other. The legalizing of these societies is, therefore, a step fraught with danger. Until 1902 the advocacy of seditious principles—*i.e.*, of separation or independence—either orally, by writing or printing, was forbidden; but in July of that year, as soon as “a state of war” was over, this rule was rescinded. The consequence has been a good deal of abuse of the license granted, and one news-

paper, an American sheet, was, indeed, prosecuted while the law was in force. Until the United States is able to put an actual period to the term of her occupation, it seems a little unwise to permit the doctrine of independence or separation to be preached to an excitable and easily influenced people.

The formation of a native constabulary was doubly essential in a country thus infected with *ladrones* and their accomplices. The native is not only better able to carry on the peculiar kind of warfare involved, but many turbulent spirits who might have joined the robbers were incorporated in the new force, which offered regular wages, a smart uniform, and congenial employment.

The result seems to justify the somewhat sanguine expectation that few regular troops will be needed in the islands, but it is to be hoped that the authorities will not move too fast in this direction. So far, it has been impossible, owing to the severity of their duties, to drill, discipline, and organize the constabulary as effectively as could be desired, and it must be remembered that on training, and not only on courage and spirit, depends their permanent efficiency. There is also a good deal to be done in establishing relations between the constabulary and local native officials. This will largely depend on the white officers commanding the different bodies of constabulary, and the loyalty of the men is also contingent on this

personal question. An effort is needed to render this branch of the service attractive to educated and reliable Americans.

It will, perhaps, be interesting, in this brief review of the Philippines—three years after—to see what are the opinions of prominent Filipinos, high in government office, on the benefits of American rule and the prospects of the archipelago. They are singularly characteristic.

Dr. Pardo de Tavera, a clever *mestizo*, of almost pure Spanish blood, educated in Europe and highly qualified in scientific pursuits, is the initiator of the Partido Federal, which was an ally of the United States during the closing stages of the insurrection, in the establishment of civil government. Dr. de Tavera considers that the principal benefit bestowed on the Filipinos is liberation from the friars. It is possible that the majority of his countrymen would hardly subscribe to this, since the friars were practically expelled before the Americans arrived in the islands, and a good deal of discontent has been expressed because the United States insists on dealing fairly with the religious communities in the matter of confiscated lands. The next benefit is municipal government, and there is no doubt that every participator in this will agree with him and that it is a popular measure. We have, at present, however, no evidence as to the practical nature of the blessings it is conferring. The legislative improvements effected by the government, especially the law

of *habeas corpus*, abolition of banishment, imprisonment, and military executions on account of political beliefs, are some real reforms which Dr. de Tavera and all his countrymen must appreciate; but freedom of speech, assembly, and the press are blessings which, for the present at all events, must be regarded as disguised if peace, order, and prosperity are the ideals in view. The enlightened Filipino attitude towards taxation is well illustrated by Dr. de Tavera. He regards it as an unpleasant necessity, to be put off as long as possible. His unenlightened countryman has a simpler creed. Taxation must be avoided at any cost, he says, with delightful inconsequence as to how expenses are to be met.

The two other Filipino commissioners who are associated with Dr. de Tavera concur in this expression of opinion generally, but one, Señor Legarda, contributes a practical suggestion—*i.e.*, the sale and development of public lands, and the importation of American farmers and laborers to teach the Filipinos—presumably to illustrate the “dignity of labor.” These gentlemen unite in the belief that two, or at most three, years will see the Filipinos in a position to dispense with leading-strings and emerge as a Territory of the United States. Meanwhile, they advocate the sending of two delegates, elected by popular vote, to represent the “nation” at Washington.

The primary benefit obtained by Filipinos from the American occupation, according to Dr. de

Tavera, is, therefore, the overthrow of the power of the Church; and as has been said, the expulsion of the friars can hardly be ascribed to the Americans. There may well be two opinions, however, even on the point as to whether the downfall of the Church has been altogether of advantage to the Filipinos.

In a country where all education, power, and prestige were practically vested in the Church, the violent expulsion of the religious orders naturally caused great dislocation. The native priests, however, continued to exercise their functions, and up to the time of the establishment of civil government the Filipinos remained outwardly devout Christians, though their ignorance rendered them a prey to debasing superstitions. The establishment of schools in which no religion was taught and the indifferent attitude (in their eyes) of Americans towards religious matters must, however, in time weaken the bonds which tie them to the Church. It seems doubtful whether Protestantism will make much headway with a people so sensuous as the Filipinos, but the immediate result has been the evolution of an independent Catholic Church, which renounces its allegiance to the Pope. It is to be feared that this severance of ties which involve at least a continuity of doctrine will lead to a relapse into extravagances and superstitions which will retard the progress of the people. Their mental condition may be gauged by the amazing story of a man who organized a

ladrone band and gave a good deal of trouble for some time, being at the time of writing still at liberty. He gained his ascendancy over the people by an announcement that he would go to heaven; and then, descending from a tree in the presence of his followers, gave it out that he had brought back from the celestial regions a box containing independence, which he would open and confer on those who assisted him.

The better-educated Filipinos, especially those *mestizos* who have received European education, have the tendency, so common among Westernized Orientals, to relapse into religious indifference, if not atheism. Altogether, the Philippines appears to be a very suitable ground for missionary endeavor.

The subject of education is by far the most important one in the Philippines, and from the first absorbed much attention on the part of the Americans. The excellence and liberality of their own public-school system made them regard with surprise and indignation the condition of the Filipinos in this respect. It is not too much to say that the vast bulk of the population were entirely ignorant, the village schools being taught by people nearly as little educated as their pupils. Under the Spanish rule, in many of the larger towns schools and colleges existed, but these, always under clerical guidance, were lamentably behind the times in equipment. At Manila a certain number of the better class obtained, also under

priestly régime, a literary, if not a scientific, education, and the best men went to Spain or France and returned with diplomas as doctors or lawyers. Having observed that the immediate need was for more light among the poor and scattered population, the United States, with characteristic impulsive generosity, decided to meet this need at once. Education requires teachers; Americans will be able to train the Filipinos to become American in ideals and standards—we will send one thousand American teachers at once to the Philippines! This appears to have been the chain of reasoning, and the immediate result was the wholesale chartering of teachers in the United States, by a sort of open order to the various educational institutions, and within a short time an army of teachers was on its way to Manila, whence they were distributed broadcast over the islands.

The fatal mistake with Orientals is to be in a hurry. That reform was urgently needed is certain, but that it could be met by such drastic measures is far from certain. The least evil accruing from this measure has been a vast waste of time and energy, which might have been advantageously expended on more permanent reforms. That a number of the teachers were unsuited for the work was inevitable; that many have done good service is greatly to their credit, when it is remembered that language, country, climate, customs—everything, in fact—were new to them.

The chief difficulty at present seems to be that the majority must return to the United States at the end of their term of three years and an entirely fresh and raw batch be drafted in. The enormous cost involved by this method is, perhaps, unimportant to the United States. But the lack of continuity is a great drawback, and it is unwise for a country with a large surplus to give lessons in extravagance to an exceptionally poor one, which it hopes in time to make self-supporting. It is, of course, difficult to gauge the exact value of the work done by Americans in primary education; but, to take the simplest aspect of the case, it is doubtful whether it is wise to adopt suddenly the American system with an Oriental race like the Filipinos. The thing to be avoided is the turning-out of a vast number of superficially educated people with a thin veneer of Americanism. The imitative faculty of the Filipino and his retentive memory make him peculiarly apt to develop on these lines. It would have been, in the writer's opinion, a far wiser plan to concentrate the energy and money on equipping schools for Filipino teachers and establishing a system by which they could be insured good and permanent salaries according to the value of the work done. American superintendents and teachers for the study of the English language might have been employed, and the primary system improved by degrees. All Americans should have been given time and required

to learn Spanish, and the Filipino teachers should have learned English, and have been required to use it in schools. This is theoretically the principle adopted as regards the language question, but American teachers, coming for so short a period as three years, do not have time to perfect themselves in Spanish. It is recognized now that the Filipino teachers are, after all, the agency upon which the future of education mainly depends, so that it seems deplorable that, to quote the report, "the lot of Filipino teachers is not a fortunate one." The inflated prices paid by the government to workmen and other employés make the pay of the native teachers seem small—they are, in fact, the lowest-paid class in the community—and the abolition of the old system of fees or gratuities from pupils cuts them off from what used to be a source of profit. The system has made this almost inevitable; nor are the average teachers worth more than they get. But this is a state of affairs which careful training and proper inducements would remedy.

The democratization of the islands cannot so far have been said to react favorably on education, since the municipalities, which are now responsible for their own schools, frequently disclaim responsibility for salaries to teachers they have not themselves selected, or, if they agree to pay, make the rate as low as they can and withhold it as long as possible.

It seems, therefore, that, although a certain

number of little Filipinos may be learning to be "mighty smart," and a certain amount of good influence is at work, the office of teacher has been brought into disrepute among the natives, a feeling of injustice engendered, and a great deal of time and money wasted. That this is the case is largely due to American idealism. Not content to attempt the education of the Filipinos on the simplest and least difficult lines, they were bent on infusing into the educational system that atmosphere of democracy which is their fetish. The aims of education were mixed up with, and handicapped by, the desire to "upset the prestige and domination of the present oligarchic element and secure the emancipation of the dependent masses."

University education and secondary schools are receiving attention, and ought to be of great service, if they are carefully handled and not prostituted to a desire for "popularity." It must never be forgotten that character-training is the chief safeguard to a brilliant and shallow people, and that it can hardly be acquired in one generation. Technical—or, as it is termed in the United States, industrial—education is desirable, but apparently not particularly popular. The establishment of schools will not necessarily imply pupils, but every effort should certainly be made to lead the Filipinos in this direction. Unfortunately this specializing of education for the benefit of a working class is not likely to be popular under

American tutelage, being opposed to the spirit of Democracy.

The educational policy of the United States towards the Philippines has been influenced by the same motive which dictated her whole policy—a desire to do for the Filipinos what had never before been done for an Oriental people. The example of Japan might have been followed more closely, so far as the patient laying of foundations was concerned; but the democratic craze, and the general feeling that salvation must come in a couple of years or not at all, have combined to mar what might have been the most interesting educational experiment of the age. Thanks to the generosity of the United States in presenting him with a ready-made social, political, and educational system, the Filipino, before he is rudimentarily educated, will be plunged in the vices of over-civilization, and the chances are that he will pass from childhood to decay without ever reaching maturity.

The subject of education leads one at once to the labor question. No local question has, perhaps, been more freely discussed than the industrial capacity of the Filipinos, and there are two diametrically opposite views of their possibilities. It must be noted, however, that there is no one who believes the Filipino to be capable, *unaided*, of doing anything for himself, and the history of Malayan peoples in every case supports this view. They are neither a com-

mercial nor industrial race by instinct, and, although agriculture has been their one avocation, they employ to the present day the most primitive tools. All the progress made by Malaysians in any of their habitats may be traced directly to Hindoo, Arab, or European influence, and especially to actual discipline on the part of the dominant race. The intense aristocratic prejudice with which the race is permeated lost its picturesqueness under the Spaniards through the destruction of tribal organization, but was retained and intensified in a contempt for commercial and industrial pursuits. The Chinese and their half-breeds became the merchants and petty traders of the islands and also the only skilled workmen. They swelled the ranks of local politicians and undermined the social and commercial fabric of society with their secret societies and their talent for intrigue.

The Filipino has, therefore, practically no status in the world of labor. He has hitherto been despised as an economic factor. Apart from his innate prejudice against labor, he is handicapped by many things. His physique, like that of many a race of mixed blood, is poor. The savage tribes of the interior, who have not mingled their blood with that of Chinese, Japanese, Arabs, Europeans, negroes, and others (as has the coast-bred Filipino), are of infinitely finer physique. Moreover, the Filipino has not, like the Japanese, the advantage of a bracing climate during part of the year. The winter is pleasant in Manila,

and even more so in other places on the coast, while some of the hill country is probably healthy all the year round, but the climate generally is of the damp, enervating character which predisposes to diseases of chest and lungs, and at certain seasons is as trying and unhealthy in the valleys and coast towns (where work has to be done) as in any other tropical country. The mixed blood of the Filipinos, and especially the white strain, which is widely diffused, makes them more susceptible to climate than a pure race long acclimatized would be. Joined to physical disability, the enervating effects of climate, and aristocratic prejudices of great antiquity, is the radical, uncompromising, deeply rooted indolence of all Malayan people. The Burmese—physically strong, active, and by no means lacking in capacity—suffer from this same complaint, which is nothing but sheer indolence—partly the effect of climate, but having its roots deep in the national character.

The Filipino is, therefore, a bad tradesman; if he condescends to such an ignoble pursuit, he usually leaves the details to his women-folk. He has the makings of a fair artisan in such trades as do not require much physical strength or sustained effort, but as a laborer he is subject to two great drawbacks—physical incapacity and moral weakness. He is unreliable to the last extent, and is subject to fits of in consequence—the child of caprice, to whom the warmth of the sun and the

coolness of the shade will always be temptations to shirk, and whose lack of foresight makes it irksome to work to-day that he may eat to-morrow. How much this Oriental characteristic has been aggravated by Spanish influence can hardly be estimated, but it is quite certain to-day that for one man who will steadily set to work to build a wall there are twenty who will meet to discuss its necessity, its probable cost, the legal aspect of the question, and its bearing on local or national politics.

The evidence collected by Americans as to Filipino workmen is interesting but in the highest degree inconclusive. Some officials report the "flattest failure" in the attempt to get unskilled labor performed, even at high wages; others report that, under an improved system of payment and patient supervision, Filipinos have proved most satisfactory in certain classes of work. The standard by which they judge, however, appears in all cases to be that of the work performed under them by local Chinese coolies, whom they replaced by Filipinos, finding the latter in the long run more satisfactory. There is a general complaint against the Chinese that they object to adopt new methods, whereas the Filipinos are ready to be taught. The question is whether any of the gentlemen who report in this sense are acquainted with the work done by Chinese in, for instance, Hong-Kong or Singapore. It is quite probable that, unsuccessful at first in handling

their coolies, they would with a more extended experience have got more satisfactory results. It is, of course, highly desirable that the Filipino should be employed in his own country, and that every effort should be made to fit him for an industrial career, but it is hardly fair, on such slight premises as can be afforded by a few months' trial, to pronounce him the equal, if not the superior, of the Chinese in the labor market.

The government pays inflated rates to secure Filipino labor, gives its employ  s advantages in the way of instruction and supervision, and is prepared to be lenient to shortcomings. This is a benevolent policy and theoretically right, but it may react to the disadvantage of the islands. It is impossible for the commercial community to proceed on these lines, nor will the provincial and municipal authorities be able to do so. These must have the cheapest labor procurable, and, as far as the mercantile community is concerned, there is a consensus of opinion that Filipino labor is not cheap.

The compromise adopted after considerable discussion has been to allow a limited number of skilled Chinese laborers to be imported for three or five years, with a head-tax of fifty dollars and the obligation on employers to engage a Filipino apprentice to work under each. This legislation, with its autocratic interference with private liberty characteristic of modern democracy, may possibly be justified on grounds of expedience. The

Filipino, despite the declarations of his champions, evidently needs to be protected from Chinese competition if he is to remain the dominant factor in the islands; but the question arises—how can this artificial standard be maintained?

The development of the islands commercially and industrially, which depends initially on the execution of costly public works and secondarily on a spirit of enterprise among its people, must be injured by any system which interferes with the economic balance. Private enterprise and the introduction of foreign capital will be retarded by this interference with the normal conditions of labor supply. Nor will this artificial stimulus be sufficient to carry the Filipino on the path of material progress, even were it possible for America to continue its present policy. The suggested panacea for this situation seems to be the inculcation of the doctrine of the "independence and dignity of labor under a free government." But, picturesque as this phrase may be, it is rather inadequate for the many problems it is expected to solve. The phrase has evidently caught the fancy of the Filipinos, and "labor unions" have been formed in Manila. Their principal instigator is officially described as a "crack-brained *insurrecto*, with political purposes only." The description, however, is rather euphemistic, for seditious correspondence was found among the archives of the president, who was in close communication with the *ladrones*. It is a significant circumstance

that Manila, the headquarters not only of government but of political parties, is still, as it has always been, the refuge of rebels and *ladrones*, who come in whenever closely pressed or in want of funds. This circumstance would lead one to regard with distrust the formation of any leagues or unions, and the more so that, as already said, it has so far been found impossible to get any hold on the secret societies which exist throughout the islands.

The "dignity of labor," therefore, is rather a weak reed to lean on if it can only be advanced by unions. The Filipino has not yet reached the stage of being an efficient or reliable laborer; he is in his infancy still, and must be cajoled, bribed, and protected. It is, therefore, folly to talk of his "combining" or "learning the spirit of co-operation" at this stage. He will pick up the catch-words fast enough, and may even organize a strike for higher wages, if the government proceeds too fast with his education. The example of Americans is to be one of the most potent influences in his regeneration; and there is no doubt that in the use of machinery, the learning of modern business methods, and in other ways he will profit greatly. But in the department in which his labor is most needed, and in which he has so far proved most unsatisfactory—that of hard, unskilled, daily labor—he cannot learn the dignity of the pursuit from white example, because the white man cannot perform such tasks in the

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tropics. There is no doubt that every Filipino would be willing to have the white man's job of supervising, but it will be difficult for him to appreciate the "dignity" of his own position.

The most hopeful policy is that of raising the standard of life by improvements in dwelling-houses, sanitation, and so forth, which will bring home to the Filipino the advantages of a regular wage at a rising scale. The next generation, with improved education, will be even more amenable to such practical considerations, and in time the people may attain to a sound economic position which will make genuine co-operation possible. The greatest danger they have to fear is to be made the tools of the politicians; and until they have reached a higher level, socially and economically, they cannot appreciate their own interests or protect them. It is a cruel kindness to affect to put political power into the hands of such a democracy as this, and the experiment can lead to nothing but misunderstanding and confusion, which will become chaos the minute the strong, guiding hand and open purse of America are withdrawn.

It is obvious, whatever side of the question is raised, that there is a vast amount of practical work to be done in the direction of providing the islands with some of the elements of civilization. Every new country occupied by white men turns its attention first to public works, being aware that on these depend the prosperity and progress for which they hope. In conquered countries,

such as India and Burma, or a protectorate like Egypt, it has been found the wisest policy to begin at once with the improvement of communications, thus providing employment for the natives, disciplining them in habits of work, and opening the way for future trade.

It was natural to expect that some such policy would have actuated America in the Philippines, and that the rest of the world would have had an object-lesson in such a matter from an intensely practical nation, whose public works are acknowledged to be models. Circumstances have, of course, been adverse. Cholera, famine, cattle disease, and brigandage have followed in the wake of a devastating war; but, at the same time, it is surprising to find how little has been done. The establishment of an elaborate system of government, the organization of a civil service, the expenditure of a vast amount of time and money in planting American school-teachers all over the islands seem to have engaged all the available energy.

It is, perhaps, more astonishing still that an illiberal policy should have been pursued towards foreign capital and foreigners. It was, of course, only natural and right that America should establish her own banks and should protect the interests of her nationals in every way, but the attempt made by stretching a point of law to prevent an English bank from even bringing in a clerk is but one case out of many in which British

bankers and merchants have been hampered in their business. It is not too much to say that the British community, in whose hands some of the most important industries have hitherto been, are laboring under a natural sense of injustice, increased by the fact that inexperienced officials frequently make matters worse than they need be. In the adjacent British colonies no discrimination is practised against Americans.

The question of trade expansion in the Philippines is not at present one on which any very definite information can be obtained. The Americans point to a great increase both of exports and imports since their occupation, but, apart from the fact that no very reliable data are to be had of trade in Spanish times, it must be remembered that the comparison loses much of its significance owing to the military and civil occupation and the artificial stimulus thereby provided. In speaking of "increased trade" also, it has to be taken into account that revolution in the Philippines had reduced the islands to a very low ebb just before the American occupation. The snapping of all links with Spain is another misleading circumstance, since most of the trade with that country has now gone to swell the bulk of traffic with the United Kingdom and the United States, without involving a corresponding increase in the total. Notwithstanding the optimism natural to the official view, the foreign community, American and European, are unanimous in declaring that the

Philippines are far from being in a promising condition commercially. The United States must supply the chief markets for Philippine products, and a higher measure of reciprocity than that at present granted is universally demanded. Agriculture is the one resource of the people—the only possible pursuit under present conditions—and agriculture is described (officially) as being “wofully depressed.” Tobacco and sugar are the most important products of the archipelago, and, as in Cuba, the barriers against these in the United States markets are likely to prove serious obstacles and retard the prosperity of the islands. The importance of China as an outlet for Philippine produce, and the possibilities of Manila as a second Hong-Kong or Singapore must be largely affected by the result of the dispute between Japan and Russia. Commercial treaties with China, such as have been recently executed by the United States, should vitally influence the development of the Philippines, but the power of China to execute them is dependent on a very doubtful question: whether the Oriental is to retain his position in the East, or whether he is to fall irretrievably under the heel of the Slav. To put it more plainly—the intensely protectionist and monopolistic policy of Russia makes her aggression a menace not only to the Oriental but to every power which is interested in the commercial development of the Far East.

The introduction of capital into the Philip-

pine islands for the development of industries seems to be an essential, if any progress is to be made; but in view of the modern development of capitalism in America, it was felt desirable to make restrictions which would prevent the creation of Trusts and secure the Filipinos a proper share in the exploitation of their own country. Laudable as was this design, like that of excluding the Chinese, it is undoubtedly instrumental in preventing the development of the country. American capitalists no longer care for the smaller forms of enterprise; nor are the conditions favorable to these. Political power is exploited for the support of all great undertakings, and can only be commanded by those operating on a great scale. The Trusts feed the machine and the machine feeds the Trusts, and there is no place in modern America for anything small or modest.

The difficulty is to reconcile the conflicting interests of the Filipinos. If they are to be set among the really free nations, they must become prosperous and industrious as soon as possible; and how to accomplish this without resource either to Chinese labor or the American capitalist is a problem enough to puzzle the wisest. Compromise only is possible, just as compromise alone has adjusted the relations between democracy and imperialism. But compromises are slow in working, uncertain in their tendencies, and it is impossible to foresee what the future will bring.

To go back to the material progress of the

islands, we find that after three years of actual civil government—though many parts of the archipelago were pacified earlier—not one yard of railway has been begun; only one wagon-road is in process of construction; no canals or deepening of rivers have been undertaken, nor any improvements of harbors,¹ except at Manila; while the inter-island communication has only recently been facilitated by the purchase of fifteen small coasting steamers. The office of chief consulting engineer for the archipelago was only organized in October, 1902, and the provision made to secure improvement of public works in the provinces has proved entirely inadequate, because the extremely low salaries offered to the provincial engineers could not attract competent men, and also because those who were fairly competent had no stimulus or encouragement to bestir themselves. Efforts have been made to improve sanitation in the chief towns, but nothing permanent will be accomplished in that direction without the most sweeping reforms and strict discipline. The opening of communications would have been far more useful than the spread of democratic theories or arguments about the “dignity of labor.” Relief-works are badly needed in many districts, but these can only be profitably carried out by an experienced and properly organized Public Works

¹ A naval base is badly needed in the Philippines, and a site has been chosen at Subig Bay, but the necessary legislation is still in abeyance.

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Department. The functions of this department should have begun, immediately peace was restored in any district, by the preparation of surveys. Unfortunately, the uncertainty which prevailed as to the course which America would take led to a makeshift government, a hastily organized net-work of bureaus, and a lack of forethought and provision for the future.

Thus legislation on the subject of Chinese labor and of franchises has been already subject to revision, and will probably need further modification. Much still remains to be done to render the judicial system satisfactory and to secure the uprightness of courts; commercial prosperity has not been placed on a sound basis, nor has agriculture received the necessary stimulus.

The work of criticism is easy, and it was inevitable that a great number of serious blunders should be made at the outset. When we remember the character of the control exercised at Washington and the absence of any machinery for dealing adequately with these serious problems, it can hardly be wondered at that the executive in the Philippines has failed in many respects. There have been displayed by American officials in the Philippines a devotion, ability, and disinterestedness which reflect the highest honor on themselves and their country; but the conditions under which they held office, and, above all, the demands made on them by public opinion in America, have seriously hampered them in constructive work.

What was wanted was less idealism and more common-sense—a curious criticism to make on American achievements, but nevertheless true. If the average American could see in the expansion of his race its true significance, if he could rid himself of the idea that he alone possesses the touch-stone of freedom, if he were less concerned with the ethics of government and more with its practical justice and incorruptibility—if, in fact, he ceased to masquerade as the apostle of liberty and were content to appear simply as a peace-and-order-loving Anglo-Saxon, he would immensely simplify the task he has set himself. By all means let him strive after his ideal democracy. He can find abundant material for reform in his own continent. Let him do all he can to adjust the relations between man and man in the manner most perfectly consonant with liberty and equality. But let him not, in a blind effort to prove his own adherence to a shibboleth to which he gives the lie every day in his dealings with negroes or Indians, force the Filipino along the path that leads to anarchy.

Common-sense says that the Filipinos wanted peace, good government, and commercial prosperity. America has given them political institutions and legislation. Filipinos wanted education; Americans are determined to give them that. Unfortunately they have forgotten that obedience is the first lesson, and that one must not begin to rule until one has learned to obey.

CHAPTER V

CARIBBEAN EXPANSION: CUBANS AND THEIR AMERICAN FRIENDS

THE present condition of Cuba and her possibilities for the future are little understood on the British side of the Atlantic, though a less confused conception undoubtedly prevails in the United States. In theory, we have the edifying spectacle of a tiny nation, goaded to desperation by the cruelty of their masters, turning on them, and, after a life-and-death struggle, being rescued by the strong arm of a disinterested neighbor, who, after finishing the fight and setting the Cuban house in order, departs with streaming banners for his own country, followed by blessings from *Cuba Libre*. We expect, then, to see this new republic settling down comfortably under the protecting wing of her liberty-loving neighbor, and becoming a good and prosperous little country.

Before one can put the lights and shades into this very impressionist sketch, however, it is necessary first to understand to a certain extent the character of the Cubans and the conditions of life in the island, and also to appreciate the circumstances which drove the Cubans to rebellion

and the exact relations between the United States and her little neighbor. No palliation need be sought for the abuses of Spanish government, no unnecessary cynicism displayed as to American disinterestedness, in order to show that the ordinary view of Cuban affairs is hardly a true one.

It is not unusual, especially in America, to hear the Cubans spoken of as if they were a people similar to the American colonists at the time of the Revolution, and as if they achieved their independence after a similar struggle. Apart, however, from the superficial resemblance arising from the fact that they are a white, or nominally white, race, that they revolted successfully against a European monarchy, and that their rebellion was largely the result of economic exactions on the part of the mother-country, there is little resemblance. The Cubans are not only widely different in character but also in their circumstances.

To take first the most important question of race. The Cubans are a Latin people, that being the principal and dominant race in the island, and the one whose civilization, manners, language, and character color the whole life. Two generations in the island go to make a true Cubano; but there can still hardly be said to be a Cuban race. The Cuban may be of Latin or negro stock, or perhaps combine the two with a dash of Indian blood; and if we speak of the whole Cuban people as a "race," or even as a nation, we are evidently beside the mark. Although the process of fusing many

peoples, till lately mostly of kindred and Northern stock, is said to have evolved a national type in the United States, there is, in fact, a good deal of imagination even about this "American type," which, before the recent influx from eastern Europe, already varied to a considerable degree, according to climatic conditions and the original stock with which each region was peopled. A small island like Cuba, shut out as far as possible by restrictive barriers from the rest of the world, save its mother-country, from which it received a constant reinforcement, might seem, at first sight, to have more chance of evolving a national type, but it is far more probable that a type evolved under such circumstances would remain fundamentally true to the racial conditions to which it owed its origin.

The original stocks were three—Spanish, negro, and Indian; but the last was early extinguished, and only its traces now remain, although it is quite possible to distinguish them in some of the half-breed people.¹ The two great races of Cubans are, therefore, the White and the Black, and between them is a large and growing mulatto class, of all shades. No rigid line separates the Spaniard from the negro, so far as intermarriage is con-

¹ It may be well to note here the mixture of races in Spanish America. These were: (1) European Spaniards, (2) creoles (children of Spanish parents), (3) Indians (indigenous), (4) negroes (of African race), (5) mestizos (children of whites and Indians), (6) mulattoes (children of whites and negroes), (7) zamboes (children of Indians and negroes).

cerned; and still less from the Cuban creole, with whom he has always intermarried freely. There is no race prejudice — only class distinction — in Cuba, and many colored people are placed by their circumstances on a footing of equality with whites. Here lies one essential difference—a very wide one—between the Cuban and the American. The prevalence and strength of class distinctions is, however, a strong feature in all Spanish-American countries and owes its existence to the early conditions of colonization and to the inequalities of wealth caused by the exploitation of natural resources. It is only of recent years that the United States has offered the spectacle of great fortunes co-existing with poverty and misery, but this was from the first one of the elements of social life in Spanish colonies, where the strong enriched themselves at the expense of the weak. This radical difference in the fabric of society cannot be altered by legislation or wholesale reforms.

The Spaniards always occupied a unique position. As the dominant race, in the early days especially, their peninsular birth gave them a social status, increased by the fact that they were government officials, wealthy planters, or businessmen. The Cuban aristocracy was chiefly made up of planters, who frequently bought titles—the Spanish “grandees” who owned property seldom lived on the island—and society was sufficiently catholic to include every one of means and education. A very pleasant society it was,

despite the formality and etiquette which the customs of the old country prescribed. Lavish expenditure, open hospitality, charming courtesy, easy gayety, and a considerable degree of refinement were the rule. The men were educated abroad—in Spain, France, or the United States; the women were celebrated for grace and beauty; and, while the commercial prosperity lasted, heavy taxes and governmental abuses were little felt by the influential classes. Even the negro slaves enjoyed, on the whole, an easy lot. Although no attempt was made to educate or elevate them, the easy-going habits of the country made for their happiness, and, as in the Southern States, the household negroes were more pets than slaves.

Despite the exactions of venal Spanish officials, then, the three component parts of Cuban life were fairly harmonious until the decline of commercial prosperity put another strain on their relations. The Cuban creole and the peninsular Spaniard were brothers in feeling as well as blood, but at the same time a process was at work which tended to differentiate them, and with the birth of Cuban independence as a sentiment, which took place about the end of the eighteenth century, began the true evolution of the modern Cuban. The growing distrust ripened into a family quarrel, until, at last, feeling became so bitter that a Cuban would spit after mentioning the very name of Spaniard, and the consequent breaking-off of ties naturally led to an exaggeration of all points

of difference between the creole and the peninsular man. Even so, it would have been difficult for a stranger, in many cases, to distinguish the native-born, and it is impossible to overlook the fact that, racially and congenitally, the white Cubans are Spanish.

The modifications of the Anglo-Saxon race on the American continent have hardly produced one type, but rather several types, of which the most that we can say is that they differ in some particulars from the English one. These modifications are, however, more mental than physical, and if we set aside social and political differences arising out of different conditions and influences, we shall find that the Anglo-Saxon breeds true, whether in America, Australia, or Great Britain. We can confidently expect of him a certain moral standard, a large share of practical common-sense, an unquenchable energy and ambition, and a lack of artistic instinct. The fundamental characteristics of each race will be similarly observed in their several migrations, and are singularly exemplified in the colonial evolution of the great Latin nations.

In Cuba, despite a certain amount of reinforcement from the mother-country, a marked physical modification has taken place. The Cubano is slighter, smaller, and darker than the true Spaniard, and there can be no doubt that in physique, at all events, he has deteriorated. This is the natural effect of a tropical climate on white races

and their descendants, accentuated doubtless by the early marriages which seem the natural consequence of life in tropical countries, where the women mature early. Notwithstanding physical modification, the Cubano remains in character and proclivities very Spanish, the chief change in this respect being merely an exaggeration of certain traits. Negro blood brings its own inevitable tendencies and limitations, and the Indian strain has undoubtedly helped to give Cubans their character for amiability; but the main characteristics may without exception be traced back to Spain. As regards the mingling of Spanish and colored blood, it can only be said that, although there have been exceptional individuals of the mulatto or *mestizo* class, the result as a whole is deterioration from a moral as well as a physical point of view. The predisposition to disease in half-breeds between white and colored races is a recognized fact; and it has been specially noted in the West Indies that a contagious malady proves more fatal to the *slightly* colored class than to any other. The half-breeds lack the virility and staying power of the pure races. Their mental and moral qualities are a delicate subject for discussion. Englishmen have always felt a strong prejudice in this respect, even in the case of so refined and cultivated a people as the Hindoos.¹

¹ In a letter, only published after his death, and written at the request of a Japanese statesman, the late Mr. Herbert Spencer gives expression to this antipathy for fusion between

This objection is, of course, founded on race prejudice, but it has been confirmed by experience, which shows that, despite brilliant exceptions, the half-breed is as a class unreliable, superficial, inclined to be tricky, to reproduce the worst features of both parents, and, even under the most favorable conditions, to degenerate in physique. The race question is further complicated in Cuba by the fact that in this case the colored element is negro. Hitherto the negro problem has troubled Cuba but little, but in the near future, when the simultaneous introduction of American prejudices and individual rights begin to clash, there will inevitably arise some very curious situations. The jealousy of the genuine negro towards his colored half-brother, which is so strong a factor in Hayti, is certain to gain ground in Cuba. Despite the fact that the mulatto as a class is undesirable, there is no doubt that almost every individual of the negro race who has risen to real eminence has owed something to a white strain. It is the brilliance of these exceptions which makes the rule

racés far apart in characteristics and civilization. He says: "The physiological basis of this experience (the physical deterioration of half-breeds) appears to be that any one variety of creature in course of many generations acquires a certain constitutional adaptation to its particular form of life, and every other variety similarly acquires its own special adaptation. The consequence is that, if you mix the constitution of two widely divergent varieties which have severally become adapted to widely divergent modes of life, you get a constitution which is adapted to the mode of life of neither . . . there arises an incalculable mixture of traits, and what may be called a chaotic constitution."

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of inferiority so much more evident, and at the same time casts a serious doubt on the wisdom of popular government for Cuba. Popular government—unless it is a farce, as it so often is—means the ascendancy of the masses and not of the brilliant exceptions. Both as regards colored and black Cubans this is to be regretted.

The experience of Britain in the West Indies inculcates the lesson of caution, and, according to most French authorities, the broad powers of self-government granted to the French West Indian colonies are by no means an assured success. "As regards politics," Leroy-Beaulieu says, "we have introduced French liberty into our colonies; we give them civil governors; we admit their representatives into our parliament. . . . All these reforms are excellent in themselves. It is unfortunately to be feared that they will, in practice, result in abuses, and that unless the mother-country is very watchful those free powers which she has granted to her colonies will become powers of oppression."¹

The proportions of the population seem to show, however, that the whites are sufficiently numerous to outweigh all others. Roughly speaking, one-half are white, one-sixth mixed, and one-third black, with a few Chinese. Strict analysis would undoubtedly reduce the numbers of the first considerably and add them to the second. A re-

¹ *Colonization chez les peuples modernes.*

markable influx of white immigrants, however, is taking place, though, unfortunately, it is by no means permanent. During the last six months of 1900, of a total of fifteen thousand, twelve thousand were Spanish, one thousand from the United States, and nine hundred were from Mexico.¹ The negro population would probably have been a good deal larger were it not for the fact that during the years of emancipation great mortality was the rule. But, though the blacks will increase more rapidly under the new conditions, it seems highly probable, if not certain, that the white element will have no difficulty in maintaining its superiority. This element is Spanish by race, traditions, and customs. Its civilization is Spanish, and by every tie of feeling and sentiment, by mental, moral, and social affinity, it is bound to the land which gave it birth, although politically the connection is severed. This fact is not forgotten by the Cubans. Gratitude to the United States for her intervention on their behalf and a desire to emulate her in the paths of progress have by no means bridged the gulf between the Latin and Anglo-Saxon races.

In order to understand the position of Cuba today, we must gain a clear idea of the Cubans, and

¹ During three years ending December 31, 1901, fifty-four thousand Spaniards, two thousand Chinese, thirteen thousand from other countries entered Cuba. Many Galicians and Canary-Islanders came for the year only. The Asturians enter clerical service and the Catalans are skilled workmen.

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especially of the white Cubans, who must inevitably constitute the ruling class.

The Cuban, as already said, is the heir not only of Spanish civilization but of Spanish character, which has filtered down to him through corrupt channels. In no case has he developed any traits which are not typically Spanish, and from various causes he has, on the whole, an average record far lower than that of his peninsular forebear. The causes may be briefly stated as being, first, physical deterioration, the result of climate; secondly, moral deterioration (in 1899 the percentage of lawful marriages was only 15.7), partly climatic and partly the result of circumstances; and thirdly, mental deterioration, owing to defective educational opportunities, the extent of which may be realized when we read that even after the American occupation 57 per cent. of the population were illiterate. The last two causes were, more or less, the inevitable result of Spain's mistaken colonial policy, and her repressive measures had undoubtedly a great effect in quenching ambitions which would have led Cubans on the path of progress. Nevertheless, the upper classes in Cuba enjoyed during a period of their history a prosperity which has left its mark to this day, and which opened to them opportunities of self-development. They also enjoyed, against the desire of their masters, a freer intercourse with the United States than had any other Latin-American colony. They received immigrants with advanced

ideas from the French islands, from Europe, and even from Louisiana. Altogether, it is hardly fair to represent them as having been entirely cut off from the rest of the civilized world.

It is true that there have been distinguished Cubans in Europe—such as José de Heredia, elected to the French Academy; and Suñer, the well-known dramatist in Italy—and that some have held office in Spain. But in Cuba we find lawyers and doctors by the hundred (some very skilful), but no administrators; scientists, but no inventors; poets, but (with, perhaps, a couple of exceptions) no engineers; politicians, but few business-men; orators, but no skilled laborers; musicians, but no hotel-keepers. It must be remembered that to French immigrants the Cubans owed the development of the sugar-cane, which was the foundation of their prosperity. Other French settlers introduced apiculture, long a most profitable industry; indigo owed its cultivation to the Spaniard Las Casas, and to this day business-houses are in Spanish, American, German, and British, rather than Cuban, hands. In the ranks of the leaders of Cuban independence some of the most distinguished names were those of peninsular Spaniards; and, in judging the achievement of any eminent man in Cuba, it must not be forgotten that two generations at least must be born in the island before we can fairly assume that the type is a Cuban one.

Three salient characteristics of the Spaniard

have taken deep root on Cuban soil, being fostered by the conditions of life in the tropics. They are the aristocratic bias, the love of political theory, intrigue, and oratory, and the natural indolence both of mind and body. To these we may add a natural gayety which, to the Northerner mere frivolity, characterizes all children of the Sunny South. On the whole, it cannot be denied that the main defect in Cuban character—the result of heredity fostered by environment—is a lack of practical capacity. The greatest drawback to Cuban progress is the scarcity of agricultural labor and the practical non-existence of skilled labor.

Such being the main characteristics of the people of Cuba, we will now turn to the effect which propinquity to the United States has had on her history. It is a natural outcome of the geographical and economic conditions of Cuba that from the earliest period of American independence the relations between the island and the continent should have been very close.

Shortly before the American colonies gained their independence an event happened in Cuba which had considerable effect in opening her ports to trade, and thus permitting a greater freedom of intercourse with the continent. This was the British occupation of Cuba, in 1762, as the result of the Family compact, Florida being also ceded to Britain. Although the occupation was short-lived, it gave a great impetus to her ports and to the upper and wealthier classes. The restoration

of Cuba to Spain, in 1814, restored the old régime of monopoly, repression, and isolation, and the secession of Mexico, in 1821, severed a connection which had brought Cuba a large part of her revenue. But the era of prosperity which had set in continued till 1825, and Cuba, while it lasted, was oblivious of other considerations. Ports were opened and the cultivation of sugar became enormously profitable. Under these conditions no restrictions or disadvantages could outbalance the wave of prosperity, and during the palmy days of the West Indian islands Cuba was the richest of all. It is hard for any one acquainted with the West Indies of to-day to reconstruct this golden age. Coming across a deserted palace in the midst of wild scenery, in which the sugar culture can hardly be traced, we note the marble columns, the decaying floors, once richly inlaid, the stately staircase with broken balusters, and it is almost impossible to realize how comparatively short is the period which has turned this home, once the abode of wealth and luxury, into a haunt for birds and beasts. Nowhere is the contrast more marked than in Cuba, where war has destroyed what remained after a long period of economic depression.

The halcyon days lasted for nearly half a century, and it is not, perhaps, surprising that in the early days of the American Republic Cuba would have been welcomed into the Union. Annexation was freely talked about, despite the

fact that, during the Napoleonic period in Spain and the independence of the American-Spanish colonies, Cuba had remained staunch, earning thereby the title of "loyal Cuba." It is hardly to be questioned that at this time Cuba herself, so far as she possessed an individuality, would have resisted any attempt to annex her. The policy, therefore, of the United States was to preserve Cuba from European control. Early in the last century, in 1809, Jefferson wrote: "I would immediately erect a column on the southernmost limit of Cuba and inscribe on it a *ne plus ultra* as to us in that direction." And Madison, soon after, expressed similar views.¹ In 1823, John Quincy Adams delivered himself of his famous instruction to the minister at Madrid to the effect that Cuba and Puerto Rico are "natural appendages of the North American continent," and the former "an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union." He pointed out the commanding position of the island, the safe and commodious harbor of Havana, fronting a long seaboard destitute of these advantages, and the economic dependence on the United States. And, in conclusion, he added: "Looking forward . . . for half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that

¹ The United States, he wrote in 1810, "could not be a satisfied spectator at its falling under any European government, which might make a fulcrum of that position against the commerce and security of the United States."—Madison's *Works*, vol. ii., p. 488.

the annexation of Cuba to our republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself." At this time Jefferson advocated the "peaceful acquisition" of Cuba. "It is better, then," he wrote, "to lie still in readiness to receive that interesting incorporation when solicited by herself, for certainly her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanted to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest!"¹ In direct sequence to this declaration is the action of Clay, two years later, in warning France and other powers off Cuba and Puerto Rico, this being actually the first application of the doctrine identified with Monroe.

It was not to be expected that this development of interest on the part of the United States should pass unheeded by the Cubans. Prosperity had taught them much, too. The sons of rich planters went to France or the United States for education, and came back full of the newest and most revolutionary ideas. Rebellions became frequent, and in 1835 Cubans claimed from Spain representation in the Cortes, and the contempt with which the request was refused burned deep into their souls. From this period may be dated the growth of the movement for Cuban independence. Repression became more and more the order of the day, though one or two of the Captains-General—Tacon, for instance—introduced reforms

¹ Madison's *Works*, vol. vii., p. 299.

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and kept things together for a time. In 1840 and 1843, however, it became certain that Cuba would not be permitted to achieve her ends by enlisting the support of any European power, for the United States assured Spain that, in the event of any attack on her West Indian possessions, she would have the assistance of "the whole naval and military resources" of the North American Republic.

Until 1845 the Monroe Doctrine was applied to prevent acquisition by any other European power, but shortly after came a development of the doctrine, due to the expansionist spirit recently roused by the Mexican war. The acquisition of Cuba was now desired not merely by the South, as an extension of the slave States, but also by a section in the North, on account of its commanding position regarding the isthmus, then coming into importance as the route to California, the new El Dorado. Attempts to purchase Cuba were, therefore, made by Polk, who at the same time developed the Monroe Doctrine elsewhere (in Yucatan), apparently with the view of showing Spain the precarious nature of her footing in American waters. Spain, however, had no desire to sell, and clung tenaciously to the last remnant of her great American possessions—"the country would prefer to see it sunk in the ocean" were the words used. Her method of retaining Cuba was the time-honored one of increasing her vigilance, preventing intercourse with the rest of the world,

and decreasing the privileges of her subjects, the natural result being the crystallization of Cuban discontent into a distinct attempt at independence. The abortive Lopez expedition, in 1851, enjoys the distinction of being the first blow actually struck in the cause of *Cuba Libre*, although the issues were hardly so clear at the time. There is no doubt that this expedition was—unofficially, of course—actively fostered in the United States, and that the ringleaders of Cuban revolt from this time onward found a sympathetic asylum, a base of organization, and a free field for the ventilation of their grievances in the territory of their great neighbor. A few years later, in 1854, a fresh card was played in the Ostend manifesto, which was in fact a deliberate attempt to force a quarrel on Spain, and in this, as in all previous declarations as regards Cuba, it was the necessity of that island for the welfare of the United States which was alleged as a reason for detaching it from Spain. It is right to add that this proposed action was repudiated by the United States government. That so much persistence was shown was largely due to the anxiety of the Southern leaders to increase the number of slave States; but many of the Northern statesmen were agreed as to the desirability of acquiring the island. These diplomatic efforts were renewed from time to time until the civil war absorbed all energies of both parties, and in the reconstruction period the sentiment of retrenchment and peaceful reform was so strong

that the expansionists had to curtail their ambitions. This period saw a change in the attitude of the United States. The chief motives for acquisition had been removed by the abolition of slavery—with the consequent elimination of the slave States—and by the rapid opening of the trans-continental railways, which rendered the isthmus route to the Pacific for the time being of less value. The United States now asked merely for improved conditions and freer commercial intercourse. There was little reference to Spanish misgovernment or Cuban liberty in those days. Cuba herself, however, was going from bad to worse in economic depression and official thralldom. The same circumstances which ruined the sugar industry throughout the West Indies were in operation here, and from 1868 to 1878 there raged a bitter guerilla war—a *guerra chiquita*, as the Cubans termed it—waged by the creole, or native, party, in which the last ties of sentiment which bound the Cubans and Spaniards were cruelly rent. During this war, in 1873, the *Virginus* incident¹ aggravated the situation, and soon after Spain was given to understand that the United States did not “meditate or desire the annexation

¹ The *Virginus*, a vessel with United States registry and colors, carrying contraband of war, was captured by the *Tornado*, a Spanish war-vessel, and taken to Santiago de Cuba, where the captain, entire crew, and four passengers were executed. The capture was not made in Cuban waters, but it was found that the vessel was the property of certain Cubans and controlled by them, and the incident was arranged peaceably.

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of Cuba to the United States, but its elevation into an independent republic of freemen, in harmony with ourselves and with the other republics of America."¹ A certain measure of reform was accomplished, on paper. Spain granted the once-coveted representation in the Cortes, but only to nominees of the Captain-General—a restriction which nullified any possible usefulness. A large number of Cubans now left the island, principally for the United States, where they kept alive the embers of independence.

In 1892 a reciprocity treaty was debated between Spain and the United States which would have helped to restore the fallen fortunes of the Cuban planters. Its rejection plunged the island in despair. In 1895 the final revolution broke out, which, notwithstanding reforms promised in the usual Spanish way (in 1895 and again in 1897), reduced Spain to the last extremity and led to the intervention of the United States in 1898 and the final emergence of *Cuba Libre*—though sadly mutilated and crippled.

¹ Foreign Relations, 1874-75. p. 859.

CHAPTER VI

CARIBBEAN EXPANSION—CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES

A GLANCE at the sequence of events in brief outline of one aspect of Cuban history will show that the growth of the spirit of independence as a national sentiment was certainly largely influenced by economic conditions. The decay of the staple industry of Cuba, owing to a competition in which she was hampered by her European parent, brought home to the people, as mere misgovernment had never done, the egotism of Spain in dealing with her colonies, and the emancipation of the slaves put the finishing-touch—or, rather, a series of touches, for it was a slow process in Cuba—to the distress and discontent of the people.

The prosperity of their great neighbor, added to her frequent overtures, encouraged the Cubans in the belief that the United States would lend them her countenance, and the question became the more pressing when the high-tariff policy practically completed the barrier between Cuba and prosperity. The development of the Southern States as sugar-producing countries made them Cuba's natural competitors, but on what unequal

terms! The market of the United States is the natural one for Cuban produce, but there was no prospect of being able to use it. It must be remembered that sugar and tobacco form three-fourths of Cuban exports, and for the former there is practically no room now in Europe, flooded as it is with beet sugar.

The condition of the people under circumstances which reduced the incomes of the large estates and wiped out the small ones was lamentable. The large towns still contained many families of wealth and position, and some large plantations whose owners had the means and foresight to set up improved machinery were able to make small profits; but the majority of men saw no prospect for themselves and their families but emigration. Meanwhile the emancipated negroes retired in large bodies to the woods and mountains, where they retrograded—and, indeed, sometimes reverted to a state almost of savagery. The poor whites—a very large class in Cuba, and one that is on the increase—must have felt severely the effects of the general depression; but it must be remembered that in a country like Cuba, blessed with a fertile soil, constant sunshine, and a clement climate, people who have to keep up no appearances can live in ease and can without exertion provide themselves with the necessities of food and shelter. The white peasantry are infected with the inertia of the tropics, and, despite their white blood, are little more civilized than the negroes.

They are absolutely ignorant, no form of public instruction having been prescribed by Spain, and their children run about naked—as, indeed, do the children of poor whites in most Latin-American countries. Moreover, as workmen—if they are to be persuaded to work at all—they are unreliable and unsatisfactory.

Under these circumstances it is natural that all Cubans with a spark of ambition should flock to the cities, despite the fact that, as a rule, they possess little industrial or commercial ability. The modern tendency to forsake the land and crowd into cities is deplored even in countries whose future as well as present prosperity depends on the development of manufactures and trade. How much more, therefore, in an island like Cuba, economically entirely dependent on the products of her soil. The extent to which she is dependent on agriculture may be realized from the fact that she has no manufactures, except for the most elementary local wants, and that mining is of the most primitive character, and, in view of the probable resources and neighboring competition, is not likely to become important. The labor question is, therefore, a serious one. At present the island has under four per cent. of its available area under cultivation and supports a population of but one million five hundred thousand, whereas, if properly developed, it could easily maintain fifteen million by agriculture alone. In view of the inadequacy of the local labor supply, it is un-

fortunate that of the considerable number of immigrants who come into Cuba so few remain. Many of the immigrants belong to the Spanish peasantry, and would be good settlers if they could be induced to settle. Although opinions differ as to their value as laborers compared with the Cubans, there is no doubt that, on the whole, they practise the virtues of sobriety, frugality, and steadiness common to their nation, and that they are in these respects superior to the Cubans.

The general conditions of labor in Cuba are unfavorable to the rise of a prosperous peasantry. In addition to inherent defects, the Cubans are handicapped by the after-effects of slavery, which will be felt for a long time to come, and also by the store system, which encourages them to run into debt, and makes them in consequence dependent on their employer. The labor question in Cuba is not a social problem; it is as yet merely a matter of supply and demand, but it is complicated by the presence of the black and colored population. With the infusion of fresh ideas regarding labor and the remodelling of society by American standards will come an inevitable strain upon the relations of the two races of which the laboring population is composed. If any form of modern socialism were to find any real foothold on Cuban soil this situation would be aggravated, since it is one of its vital principles that the strong should be handicapped to equalize the opportunities of the weak, and the black popula-

tion would act as a drag on the whole body of workers.

With a people in the condition of the Cubans at the successful close of the struggle for independence there was obviously only one course to be taken, and the United States took it. The enforcement of law and order and the working of the whole social and political machinery could only be accomplished by placing one man in authority. The military governors of Cuba were able in the short time at their disposal to accomplish some much-needed reforms; but it would have been impossible to evolve order, much less to carry out measures of reform, had affairs been left in the hands of the Cubans themselves. The period of military government was a most valuable object-lesson and gave the late revolutionary party time to organize itself and to take over the reins, when the time came, with a fair show of preparedness and competency.

The American legacy to Cuba was highly characteristic, both in its practical utility and its unpractical attempt to harmonize the irreconcilable elements of Latin-tropical life with Anglo-Saxon ideals. The first and most important efforts were in the direction of education and sanitation. The latter is a subject which a military governor's powers gave him peculiar facilities for dealing with. In cities like Havana only drastic measures are of any use, and by means of these the city was cleansed of the most

flagrant abuses and the public health vastly improved. Scientific investigations as to the spread of tropical diseases also resulted in great improvement in the health conditions of the chief Cuban ports, and the sanitary standard set should prove of the greatest advantage to the whole island. In this respect it is interesting to compare the work done in Havana and in Manila. In the latter, sanitation has been but tentatively attempted, apparently with the desire to respect the private rights of citizens; and the civil authority has been unable, despite considerable trouble and expenditure, to effect any radical reform. In the matter of railways and other public works Cuba has also profited by a vigorous military administration, which did not pause to consider whether such measures should not be initiated by the people themselves. There were only some six hundred miles of disconnected lines of railway when the Americans began their occupation, and when they left there were one thousand five hundred miles in working order, the railway system binding the two ends of the island, which had been unconnected before save by coasting steamers. Roads, however, were neglected, as, indeed, they are in the United States itself.

Education was the most important reform attempted, and to this General Wood devoted a large sum, considered by many to be out of all proportion to other necessary work. The need was crying. Cuba had practically no public

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education at all, and the task was to create an entire system without any previous foundation on which to build. No one save a military governor could have faced the situation in the same way. The first step was the arbitrary apportionment of a generous sum out of the scanty revenue; the second the enforcement of compulsory education; and the third the provision of schools and teachers. The last was naturally a Herculean task. It was accomplished by the same arbitrary method—a truly military way of dealing with the problem—which laid it down that the first thing was to start a school and find a teacher; the second to go into details of management. School districts being arbitrarily settled, a local school-board was got together, school-houses were built or constructed out of old ones, teachers of some sort were provided at fixed wages, and thus a nucleus was formed. The control being vested in the military governor himself, he was able to correct mistakes as he went along, to alter the system here, weed out and reject at will, and so gradually increase the standard of efficiency, while all the time little Cubans were getting some sort of education, which was presumably better than none at all.

The difficulty of procuring trained teachers was not met, as in the Philippines, by the importation of an army of American school-masters and masters. It was realized that the teachers must be Cuban if they were to work effectively, and that, with proper American supervision, they would im-

prove in ratio with the growing capacity of their pupils. Educational facilities were given in American colleges to selected Cubans, and these were sent back to leaven the whole lump. Enormous sums had, of course, to be spent in equipping the schools and providing text-books, but the general system seems to have been to utilize as far as possible any available material, and not to expect immediate perfection. Normal education was left to take care of itself. The first thing was to place primary instruction within the reach of every child; and it is possible that the first generation of literate Cubans will benefit from the fact that their brains were not expected to suddenly cope with all the refinements of a modern, up-to-date education.

The main fault of this system has been its expensiveness. The generous impulse which led to a wholesale establishment of schools led, of course, to a certain number of mistakes, all costing money; and the responsibilities incurred in equipping the teachers, together with the provision of numerous school-houses, form a considerable item in the expenditure of so poor a country as Cuba. Having begun on this scale, however, it will fatally impair the efficiency of the system if retrenchment is attempted; and yet it is no longer possible, without the exercise of arbitrary power by the President, to insure the appropriation of so large a proportion of the revenue to education. Other departments, especially the public works, cry out with

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good reason for their share, and vested interests must be considered. The second danger is that the party system will affect educational policy and control. The inspectors, on whom efficiency largely depends, are chiefly, if not entirely, American, and educational progress will be seriously curtailed and efficiency destroyed by changes in the personnel or breaks in the continuity of their control.

Both these evils—lack of funds and uncertainty of party government—are, of course, aggravated by the economic conditions.

The legislative efforts of the United States in Cuba are legacies of far more doubtful value. Cuba already possessed, in the Spanish law, a highly elaborated system of admitted wisdom, framed by Latin legislators for their own people. It was not the Spanish laws which were to blame for abuses in Cuba, but the maladministration of them. In any case, an arbitrary tampering with the established laws of a community cannot fail to be mischievous, since it strikes at the root of social life, manners, and religion, probably the natural outcome of race and climate. An example of this may be found in the invalidation (for a period) of religious marriage without the civil ceremony. The present condition of law in Cuba is naturally one of confusion; American methods of procedure grafted on the old foundation of Latin jurisprudence. It is to be regretted, first, because the simpler the law the easier its applica-

tion, and because the Cubans understood their old code far better than they can any new one; secondly, because the example set, during the United States occupation, of unnecessary legislation will not be lost on a Latin people like the Cubans, naturally too much given to theorizing and experimenting.

The legacy which the United States did *not* leave was that of restored economic balance. Cuba began her independence as a country drained of money, with a declining agriculture, a rural population hurrying away to the cities, and a greatly increased rate of living.

As regards the general national sentiment, it may be said that it was in favor of independence, and therefore welcomed the departure of American troops, as it had welcomed their arrival. A great deal has been said and written about the affection of the Cubans for their American brothers and their gratitude for deliverance. It was a wise man, however, who remarked out of the depths of his knowledge of human nature that gratitude is a keen sense of favors to come. Although the bulk of the population rejoices in deliverance from Spain, it also, being ignorant as well as poor, expects very shortly a substantial increase in prosperity—some new departure which will restore the palmy days of Cuba. Unless that comes there will be discontent, as well as poverty, intrigues, and even rebellion, since despair is a hard master; and there will be plenty of politicians ready to assure

the people that another change of government would secure the desired improvement.

The better-educated Cubans, and the members of the government particularly, must see the issue more plainly, and are, indeed, on the horns of a dilemma. The exact political status of the island as a "protected republic" is no secret to them, and they realize that the United States has a hold which no effort on their part will loose. It is not likely, after all that has happened, that she will abate one jot of her claims on them or permit a *rapprochement* with any other country. On the other hand, they have known all along that the key to the situation lay in the economic question, and that on reciprocity with the United States depends the prosperity of Cuba, and therefore her future. There is undoubtedly a party, especially among those Cubans who throughout the rebellion preserved a somewhat neutral attitude, and therefore kept their business or property together, who would welcome annexation to the United States on any terms because of the economic advantages. But the Latin-American is not, as a rule, commercial in his aims, nor is he practical, and the majority would undoubtedly view with great hostility anything which threatened their rights as a nation. There is at least one section, whose voice is unheard, who would bitterly resent incorporation within the Union—the negroes.

The sordid American view (that of the party

which regards Cuba in the same light as did Jefferson and Adams) is undoubtedly that, placed in this awkward position and daily becoming more embarrassed and confused, Cuba will herself ere long ask for incorporation as a State, an eventuality which would leave no room for inconvenient criticism as to "grasping imperialism." Thus would be fulfilled the advice given by Jefferson eighty years before, to "lie still, in readiness to receive that interesting incorporation when solicited by herself." The Democrats, who oppose all annexation of territory involving a colonial government, and who are averse to admitting alien and inferior colored races, do not have the same objection in the case of Cuba, believing that its people will soon graduate for American citizenship. If Cuba became a State, in their opinion, a stream of emigration from the United States would soon Americanize the country. The capabilities of the Cubans for self-government on State lines have yet to be demonstrated, but, judging from experience in all other Latin-American countries, it will be a long time before they are able to initiate any government which will not eventually become either autocratic or oligarchic. That white immigration, even on a large scale, will change the character of the Cuban populace is an expectation equally contradicted by experience. The history of the British in Canada and of the Anglo-Americans in Louisiana certainly does not support the idea.

The vexed question of reciprocity, which arises inevitably in connection with every part of Greater America (and this includes her protectorates and those States in which she has practically established "spheres of influence"), is peculiarly acute in the case of Cuba, which is absolutely dependent economically on the United States. After serious opposition a certain measure of reciprocity has been granted, but, as in the case of the Philippines, the reduction in tariffs has been too partial, too carefully adjusted to protect vested interests in the United States, to be of real and permanent benefit to the quondam Spanish colonies. It must be remembered that these were in grave economic difficulties before they began the wars which have still further reduced them to poverty. The snapping of bonds with Europe practically throws them helpless upon the markets of the United States, and it is doubly hard for them, in their impoverished and backward condition, to compete with highly organized and protected industries.

One thing is certain—without American energy and capital Cuba cannot be developed, and without the fullest measure of reciprocity and a secure and stable government this capital will not be invested in the island to any appreciable extent.

The situation will be seen, even from this brief and partial examination of a few of its aspects, to be full of difficulty. Señor Palma began his career as President under most unfortunate auspices, and, unlike the most successful ruler which Latin-

America has yet produced—President Diaz—he was no longer in the prime of life when he took office. He is, of course, honest, enlightened, well intentioned, and progressive, and, having spent so much of his life in the United States, he is conversant with the political anomalies of that country and their possible effect on his own. He is, in effect, practically the nominee of the protecting republic, a fact which carries its disadvantages, so far as the support of his own people is concerned.

Will he be able, in the teeth of economic depression, which his government is unable to relieve; of the necessity for taxation to maintain the reforms instituted by the military governor; and of the growth (on Latin-American lines) of democratic principles fostered by the United States—will he be able, under all these circumstances, to keep his country contented and united? All these queries apply to any successor of Palma; and, indeed, the President of the Cuban Republic, under any circumstances, has no bed of roses. There are few Cubans so capable of filling the position as the present one.

Should he fail and revolutions break out, the protector, of course, steps in. Should he yield to economic pressure and decide to ask for admission to the Union, he will earn eternal obloquy from a large section of his countrymen, and will probably witness again the horrors of war. Under whatever circumstances, it is hard to see how the

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farce of Cuban independence can be prolonged much further. There are men who shed their blood in the late war to whom this saying is a harsh one, but the best friends of Cuba can only hope that she will secure the benefits of incorporation while there is still an opportunity to secure the privileges. Cuba depends, has always so largely depended, on the economic factor; is so incapable of working out her own salvation without a helping hand in her commercial affairs, that no future is possible which is not built on a basis securing a free intercourse with the United States. Stability of government is hard to establish without prosperity, and prosperity will not come without the assistance of the United States. After all, a worse fate might befall a Latin-American republic than to become part of the great Western democracy. Of the other side of the shield—the results of such an incorporation on the United States herself—we must speak later.

Expansion into the Caribbean is so important to the United States, and so full of significance as to her future, that it cannot be discussed here. In the next chapter it will be further considered.

CHAPTER VII

THE NEW AMERICAN SPHERE

WHEN the United States crossed the Pacific, and established herself on the confines of Asia simultaneously with her occupation of Cuba and the annexation of Puerto Rico, it was generally felt that she had embarked on a career of active expansion which could not be suddenly checked. What would be the next step?

Many circumstances pointed to the absorption of Mexico as the logical sequence of events. Already more than half the area of original Mexico had passed to the United States, and the formation of new and progressive communities on her frontier and an economic conquest might be expected to lead to a closer union. The story of Texas is still fresh, and might be repeated. To the subject of Mexican independence we must return later, it being sufficient to note here that circumstances have led the United States again to non-contiguous expansion. Instead of the anticipated slow but steady extension of United States control southward through Mexico, thence to the Central American republics, and then to the West Indies, we find that the oversea acquisitions came first, that

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the canal question has involved the second step in Central America, and that Mexico will be reserved for a later stage in the process of expansion.

There is, both in the British Empire and the United States, a very excusable vagueness as to the Central American republics. They are, in fact, all one country, colonized by the same race, having the same religion, language, customs, and peculiarities. The architecture, social etiquette, and, above all, the moral atmosphere of all pseudo-Spanish colonies are almost identical—everywhere one feels one is in the land of *mañana* and noontide *siestas*. The Central American republics enjoy similar climatic conditions—the hot, low-lying, unhealthy coast lands, subtropical zone, and the healthy, cool highlands, on which are situated the principal cities founded by Spanish colonists. Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the republic of Panama (which politically, though not physically, belonged to the South American republic of Colombia)—these are names with which Europeans and North Americans are familiar chiefly on account of their numerous revolutions and internecine strife.

Although so near to the North American continent and the populous West Indian isles, these republics are difficult of access. Few natural harbors exist on their coasts, and little has been done to provide artificial harborage; steamer communication is indifferent, and railway connection between the republics there is none. There are

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several lines from the coast inland, which are all intended eventually to link the Atlantic and Pacific, but none are completed save the one at Panama (an American line), and another at Tehuantepec, both being handicapped by lack of harborage at either end. The population of the Central American republics is very small, only some three and a half millions, including a considerable number of semi-civilized Indians and the negroes on the Caribbean coast lands. The resources of the republics have been hardly touched. All are rich in minerals, and their highland districts are white men's countries, adapted to cultivation of all sorts. The crying need of all is stability of government, without which the foreign capital and enterprise to develop the resources and provide communications cannot be induced to come to the country. Nor is it sufficient that one republic should enjoy peace to insure its prosperity. Costa Rica has been quietly governed for some years past and has made notable progress, but when her short boom in coffee came to an end she was plunged almost into bankruptcy and could not continue the public works she had initiated. It is essential to the true progress of countries so intimately connected, geographically and racially, as are the central states of America, that general peace and security should reign and that communications from north to south should be opened. Their present condition of mutual distrust, of isolation save by sea, and

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of constant political disturbance cannot continue permanently. Central America has become to the western hemisphere what the Balkan States have long been to Europe. Russia, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, are rapidly becoming the arbiters of this continual menace to the peace of their respective continents. The analogy need not be pursued; it is sufficiently suggestive in outline.

It is one of the strangest developments of the Spanish colonial system that, although she stamped her own characteristics so strongly wherever she went, and although her revolted children are indisputably brothers by blood, tradition, appearance, language, and customs, yet they offer the most singular examples of internecine warfare. The Latin-American republican, who likes to imagine himself the peer of the United States citizen, who refers to "Independence Day" with the same swelling pride, and would have you believe that his people were on all-fours with the revolting British colonies, should ask himself why—in face of the Union of the North American colonists, despite great differences of nationality, creed, and even interests—he and his Latin-American brothers have never effected the slightest degree of federation, but hate each other with deadly hatred.¹

¹ Carlos Selva, an able Nicaraguan, in speaking of the instability of Latin-American governments, says: "Where are the liberties, the guarantees, the rights of the Spanish-Amer-

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There is no doubt that the prevailing spirit which saved the Northern Union from disintegration was not sentiment—that made for disunion—but a sturdy common-sense, which is part of the Anglo-Saxon heritage. What is the heritage of the Latin-American?

Spaniards have never, whatever may have been their faults, laid themselves open to the charge of lacking character. Strongly marked traits—masterful passions and obstinate prejudices—have distinguished them throughout their history, and they are the heirs of not only a Roman but of an Oriental civilization. The typical Spaniard is courteous and ceremonious, as befits the descendant of a long line of civilized forefathers accustomed to social amenities. He is sober, regarding intoxication as uncouth and finding in it no subtle humor, as does the Anglo-Saxon. He is imaginative, possessing the artistic temperament, for he belongs to a race foremost in art and literature and still imbued with a deep sense of beauty both of form and color. He is a born orator, having the facility for words which characterizes

ican citizen? They exist in the *constitutions*, but only there. These are generally made very liberal, leaving nothing to be desired—nothing except their fulfilment."

As a corollary to this view we have in a recent work by Senator Cabot Lodge the statement that, as a consequence of the movement started by the American Revolution, the "entire continental empire of Spain in the Americas broke off and became democratic."

The admirers of democracy can hardly be grateful to Mr. Lodge for this pronouncement.

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all Latins and the love of hyperbole which the Moors bequeathed. He loves intrigue, is caught by a theory, captivated by a phrase, adores the abstract, and enjoys intellectual subtleties. Spain —perhaps the worst-governed country in Europe —is a land of politicians and orators, and has had written constitutions which were almost models of their kind. Nothing illustrates so well the divorce in Spanish minds between the abstract and concrete. An essential Spanish characteristic is bravery, but their very courage is impractical and of far less service to the military commander than a blind, unpicturesque obedience to discipline. "Spaniards," said Ferdinand of Aragon, "were ever a nation of warriors, and also most undisciplined; everybody wants to be in command and nobody consents to obey. Every Spaniard knows how to fight; none knows how to command himself or others."

In comparing modern Spain with that country in its palmy days, it is difficult to gauge the degree of deterioration in national character due to a period of extraordinary prosperity which was the result not of legitimate commerce or industry but of colonial speculation and exploitation. Those who know the peasantry of Spain, who were not sharers in these days of wild extravagance and idle opulence, will recognize in them the sterling qualities of patience and sobriety, virility and hardihood, which may yet prove the salvation of their country, despite the legacy be-

queathed by their past and the burdens imposed by corrupt politicians and an emasculated aristocracy.

The aristocratic bias of Spanish character must not be passed over. The wave of revolution which swept across Europe, uprooting autocratic institutions and giving new form to the aspirations of a people who had just shaken off the last shackles of feudalism, made but little headway in Spain. The Bourbons were expelled, and a popular constitution was enacted, which would have secured the fullest rights and individual liberties of the people. Universal suffrage was introduced and a popular representative chamber established, with powers equal to the Senate. The vital principle—that of the sovereignty of the nation—was proclaimed, but this democratic constitution was far from being successful. Strong as is the power of the hereditary aristocracy in Spain, there is no doubt that, having won this initial victory, the proletariat could have maintained its position if there had been any genuine national enthusiasm for the measures introduced. Instead, we see the speedy downfall of the constitution, the abdication of its elected king, Amadeus of Savoy, and the erection, after a short period of republican government and anarchy, of another constitutional monarchy, which restored the Bourbons and all their traditions.

This constitution was shorn of all the elements of popular government. The king is the chief

executive, and the Cortes is composed of, first, the hereditary nobility, land-owners, and men of high position; secondly, of one hundred members nominated by the crown for life; and, thirdly, of one hundred and thirty members elected by state corporations and the largest tax - payers. Although local autonomy exists, as it has always done in Spain, and municipalities are nominally independent, the government provides a check on all matters. The country is divided into provinces, which elect deputies, in ratio with the population, to deal with all affairs outside politics; and the civil Governor of each province, a state-appointed official who owes his position to political influence, has practically supreme power and responsibility.

It is obvious, therefore, that the checks provided prevent any popular power, but it is a remarkable fact there has been no real opposition to this autocratic form of government. The people as a whole are not only ignorant, but apathetic. Socialism and democracy are little heard of save in connection with municipal elections and in a few seaport towns, the resort of turbulent spirits of all nations. Although the recent elections showed victories for the republicans, the reason is chiefly that only the professional agitators and their following take any part in them. The mass of the people are not affected at all by these modern tendencies, despite that undoubted interest in matters political which makes every *fonda* a cen-

tre of fierce discussion on any night of the week. Spain is, indeed, a land of political intrigue, but it centres round the figures of pretenders to the throne, and is singularly devoid of the spirit of enlightened patriotism and desire for genuine political reform.¹ The Spanish politician who rises from the ranks to high position is likely, as in Russia, to become more autocratic than the aristocrats. A case in point is that of Señor Canovas del Castillo, who was born of middle-class parents and made his way by the sheer force of brilliant attainments. He is in many respects a typical Spaniard of the best class—strong, courageous, cultivated, witty, a fine orator, with great personal charm, faithful to his friends, but at heart an absolutist, a Spaniard of the Middle Ages, a modern Cardinal Ximenes. It was Canovas who prolonged the Cuban struggle. "To the last dollar and the last man," was his ultimatum.

When we turn to her quondam colonies we find the main characteristics of Spain and her people reproduced with remarkable fidelity; and, far apart as were these colonies scattered over two hemispheres, cut off by immense distances from the

¹ Lest this should seem too harsh an estimate, the following words, spoken by Don Francisco Silvela, ex-Prime-Minister of Spain, to the correspondent of a Havana paper, and translated in the *Spectator* of January 30, 1904, may be quoted: "No republic is possible without republicans, and no great country without great patriots. Patriotism is disappearing in Spain . . . the Spaniard of to-day is either a bull-fighter or desires to become one—anything, in fact, except a Spaniard."

mother-country, they yet present, both in outward appearance and in the character of their people, a remarkable resemblance to one another and to the old country.

Britons are accused of carrying their own customs wherever they go, and of establishing in every quarter of the globe their bath-tubs and cricket-grounds, regardless of æsthetic fitness. The Spaniard went a great deal further. He came in many cases to stay, married a native, built his house solidly, as was the custom of the old country, and imposed his own civilization without reserve. The Church largely aided in this work by the policy of making proselytes at the point of the sword; and so, while a British colony may boast nothing more characteristic than a tin tabernacle and a bungalow (a comfortable adaptation of the native hut), the Spaniards had always imposing palaces, churches, solid houses, colonnades, plazas, and pleasure *alamedas*. The churches are of one invariable type—two squat towers and a porch between, with a large, empty nave. The houses are on the Moorish pattern so familiar in southern Spain, with the central *patio*, or open space, and the outside walls blank and bare save for a few *reja*-guarded windows. In one respect the traveller has the sameness of Spanish colonies forced on his notice. The hostelries, unless kept by a foreigner, are invariably bad and can only be matched in the peninsula itself. The amusements of the people are equally invariable—*fiestas*, cock-fights,

music and dancing, dominoes, cards, and gambling.

The influence of the Church has, of course, had a great deal to do with preserving the character of Spanish colonial social life. The religious processions and ceremonials, the *fiestas*, the numerous saints' days, have been initiated by the priests, and it is due to the natural tendencies of tropical people that their more sensuous side has been exaggerated. The divorce of Church and State, which has taken place in all Central American countries, has not greatly shaken the influence of the Church on the lives of the people. Indeed, the flexibility of the Roman Catholic Church is nowhere more forcibly illustrated than in Spanish America, where she is undoubtedly a living force in all matters, even in those states which are most anti-clerical. To this subject we must return later, with reference to the part played by the Church in South America; it is only necessary here to remark the strong hold which the priests have over all people of Spanish blood, and the fact that the conservatism of the Catholic Church has been instrumental in maintaining the outward as well as the inward resemblance of the colonies to the mother-country.

If Spanish origin is so deeply marked in the outward aspects of life—as in architecture, manners, amusements, or religious observances—it seems reasonable to conclude that the Latin-American, despite a slight difference in physique,

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can hardly be expected to develop any traits foreign to his race. The Latin peoples have, it is true, on the whole, suffered more modification in foreign environment than the Anglo-Saxon, despite their conservatism in outward matters, but this is due chiefly to their intermarriage with the natives of the country or with Africans, and not to the influence of any foreign civilization. In character, therefore, the Latin-American is a Spaniard, affected by a strain of Indian or sometimes negro blood, by a hot climate, and by peculiar conditions of education.

It is a serious question whether the North Americans, supposing that Central America and Mexico are to pass under their control, will be able, as colonists, to retain their energy, virility, and practical natures. As controllers, administrators, overseers, they would have constant reinforcement from a Northern climate; but as colonists, even in Mexico, they seem to suffer from climatic conditions sufficiently to modify the national type. Nor are they able, as are the Germans, to endure patiently an exile in Latin-American countries. They are antipathetic to their neighbors; they chafe and fret at the slowness and inertia around them. Their one idea is to be able to leave as soon as possible and return to a civilization to which their natures are better attuned. The Englishman, and still more, the German, goes to foreign countries to make a living; the American goes to get rich—a very different matter. Under

these circumstances it is difficult to see how Latin America is to be "Americanized," except in a few externals. Will "American civilization" (by which is meant that of the United States) be able to stand against that much older type which has fitted into climatic and racial peculiarities so as to almost become part of the soil? There is no question that the United States can control, protect, or govern alien races if she chooses; but can she incorporate them in the nation, or must they remain forever "dependencies," anomalies in her system?

It must be remembered, however, that the Union is composed not only of Ohios or Maines, but includes also Louisiana and Florida, and that the change from Yankee to Texan is gently graduated, so as not to be too startling.

The subject of Pan-Americanism, which arises naturally out of these questions, must be reserved for a future chapter. We are at present concerned with the most backward part of the Latin-American race only. It is hard to understand why Central America should have become distinguished in this unfavorable way. Nothing geographical or climatic is sufficient to explain the phenomenon, while proximity to the United States ought to have been in their favor. As far as Panama is concerned, however, the canal projects, upon which all dreams of future greatness were built, have been answerable for a great deal of demoralization.

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
The Spanish war and the opportunities offered to the United States by it made a great difference in the canal policy of that country, and it is interesting to notice that, as soon as she made up her mind irrevocably as to the canal, she began to be precipitated on that path of expansion marked out for her by destiny. Having decided on the Panama route and settled the difficulties as to control entirely in her own favor, she was met by a sudden check from the Colombian government. Their motives in refusing to ratify the canal treaty were of the most mixed description. A proportion of one of real patriotism, not desiring to alienate territory, to two of selfish cupidity, and four of ignorance worked on by party interests, will probably give a sufficiently true idea of their stand-point. Without entering into the question of the justification of the United States' action on the grounds of treaty rights, and without applauding the course actually taken, which was certainly open to objection on some grounds, the writer feels bound to say that in the interests of the world at large, and in particular of the American nation, it was well to terminate as soon as possible the intolerable condition of affairs in Panama. To have secured the necessary rights and guarantees for the construction of the canal without friction would have been a diplomatic victory worthy of achievement; but such victories are, in fact, little in keeping with the genius of the American people. In the long run, the effect would have probably been

the same. The canal is essential to American unity and progress, but it must bring in its train certain elements of discord. The United States is now irrevocably involved in the domestic politics of the Central American republics, and especially—a matter of far-reaching consequence—of a region which politically belonged hitherto to South America. Apart from this, the energy to be focussed on Panama, the developments which will follow, and the growth of American interests in that quarter, will render it necessary to secure an amount of harmony in Central America which has not been possible hitherto. Great Britain has had experience of the unexpected lengths to which the protection of “a mere strip of land” intersected by a canal may lead her.

The writer has always held that, on account of its geographical position, forming practically part of the future seaboard of the United States, the canal should be built and controlled by her. Its functions in uniting east and west are of the greatest importance to the American nation, and in the development of the vast Pacific and in the fortunes of the Far East this great channel of communication, between the producing countries of the Pacific and Far East and the manufacturing centres of the United States, must be a powerful factor. Distance is being annihilated all over the globe; the isolation of the Orient, with its teeming millions, is a thing of the past; and the vast latent forces lying dormant in the Pacific area will

shortly be brought within reach of the manufacturing nations of Europe and North America. To Britain, with its overwhelming interest in ocean traffic, the canal will be of great value, bringing us thousands of miles nearer to the Pacific shores of the New World; but there can be no doubt that it will benefit the United States in an infinitely greater degree than Europe. It will divert little or no European traffic from the Suez Canal, but it will confer an immeasurable impetus to the manufactures and trade of the United States, will greatly stimulate her mercantile marine and ship-building industry, and will provide a most powerful incentive towards developing her navy. The canal will complete an equatorial belt of navigation round the world through the gateways of Suez and Panama; will do away with the geographical obstacles involved by the circumnavigation of Cape Horn; will place the ocean coasts of the United States nine thousand miles closer to each other; will move the neutral competing zone of the United States and Britain from the Pacific coast of South America to western Australia, and from the Pacific coast of North America to within the coast-line of China; and will bring Japan, northern China, Russia on the Pacific, Australasia, and Hong-Kong as near to the Atlantic seaboard as they are now to western Europe.

Great as will be the effect on the *economic* position of the United States of the channel from ocean to ocean, it is mainly on account of its *strategic* value



PANAMA AS A STARTING POINT
for the
PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

that it has been so warmly advocated by the supporters of American expansion. It is generally maintained that the command of such an inter-oceanic highway will double the power of the States for offence and defence. "The nation which controls this canal," says a distinguished American naval officer, "may issue hence squadrons in the height of vigor and discipline, striking blows upon both oceans." "With this canal," said a United States Senator, "we could move our ships-of-war upon short lines with abundant fuel, and concentrate a fleet in three weeks upon our Western coast that we could not assemble in three months by doubling Cape Horn. . . . To the United States, in a political and strategic view and as a seaway to our Pacific coasts, this canal is of greater importance than the Suez Canal is to Great Britain." Such being the view taken of the strategic importance of the canal in the United States, let us now consider briefly its strategic value to Great Britain.


First and foremost, the vast changes which have been taking place in the Pacific and in the Far East of Asia emphasize the value of an alternative route for Britain to India, the China Sea, and Australasia. Our main line of communication with the East—the Mediterranean and Suez Canal—is open to attack along the whole route from the English Channel to the Red Sea; and the advent of Russia on the Pacific, her aspirations for ports on the Persian Gulf and even on the

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Mediterranean, and the possibility, by no means remote, that Germany may also cut across our direct line of communication with India and Australia—all these developments make the question of an alternative route to our dominions beyond the seas a very practical one.

The present British naval bases and coaling-stations in the West Indies, therefore, are by no means futile, even though we do not expect to make an aggressive use of them. We count on a neutralized waterway, and as that will be created by an English-speaking race with whom we are strongly in accord and whose ideals and aspirations are similar to our own, we are not altogether reckoning without our host.

The writer is one of those who regard an Anglo-American bond as eminently desirable, and there has sprung up in recent years a *rapprochement* between the two great nations which makes one hopeful. The canal will bring us closer together, will strengthen the bonds of mutual interest, will help to lift the United States out of a position of deceptive isolation, and, by bringing her more into the arena of world politics, will materially add to the force which the Anglo-Saxon part of humanity is to exercise on the world's future. It is natural that she should desire to control a factor which will have so large a share in shaping her history; and Great Britain will not be the loser by this. The opening of communications is always certain to be of benefit so long as neutrality



PANAMA AS A SHORT ROUTE
 from
NEW YORK and NEW ORLEANS
 to the
PACIFIC SLOPE

can be secured. We have little cause to anticipate that this important line would be closed to us by United States hostility, but the strength of our position in the Caribbean is a sort of additional guarantee for us.

The canal, therefore, may be regarded from several points of view. From an economic and strategic point it should prove valuable to both the United States and Britain. From the point of view of United States isolation, or freedom from foreign entanglements, or other similar blessings which American statesmen used to declare were essential to their country, it is not quite so clearly beneficial. It enlarges the American sphere with some precipitation, and it makes the little-desired task of controlling Central America an immediate necessity.

Although a strong impression exists that Mexico is on an altogether different plane from the Central American republics, and although the progress she has made in civilization warrants this to a certain extent, we have no proof of the permanency of her present condition. She is not a republic, save in name. Until the advent of President Diaz she was as unstable as her sisters. In the course of forty-seven years she had ten forms of government, fifty presidents or dictators, two emperors (both shot), and one regency. Diaz proved the strong man who could hold the country together. Coming in on the crest of a wave of military revolution, he retained his position by the wisdom of his

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policy and the strength of his hand. His best measures were the opening of communications, which he accomplished by the lavish grant of concessions, for which a price has, of course, to be paid; the strengthening of his army, and the consolidation of his finances. By means of a well-equipped army and good railways he controls the people, and the rehabilitated credit of the country has led to foreign investments and economic development. At first chiefly English and French, the trade and financial development have gradually been passing into American hands, and at present it is roughly estimated that about five hundred million dollars are invested by the United States in the country, and the amount is increasing annually at an extraordinary pace.¹

While there has been a great advance in the material progress of Mexico, that country does not present the spectacle of a nation in which all classes are making strides towards a more advanced civilization. It is said that eighty-five per cent., at least, are illiterate. The republican ideal of a peasant-proprietor class, growing in prosperity and education towards an equality of opportunity with their wealthier brethren, is as far off from Mexico as ever. The large preponderance of

¹ This is the consular estimate for January 1, 1903. But there are a number of American corporations representing large investments which do not issue statements of their capital; and the total is probably not less than seven hundred million dollars gold.

Indians in the lowest stratum of society is one drawback, many of these living in their old tribal organization and hardly civilized at all. There has been a Juarez, it is true, but only one. In this benign climate, a winterless land, the masses are not inclined to work. The fluctuations of the currency have also been a great drawback to progress, and are the subject of an American-Mexican commission. The system of government, like all democratic systems, is extremely costly and will be difficult to maintain. Heavy taxation is necessary, and the position of the *peon* is rendered more unfortunate by the system of *hacienda* stores, to which he becomes indebted and is practically a slave until he can work off his debt. Though not exactly legal, this system is widely prevalent. Taxation has always been a heavy burden on the Mexican people, and one of the unfortunate features has been the taxation of industries and cultivated ground. The *alcabalas*, or inter-state customs, which have been recently abolished—officially at least—were heavy burdens; but the chief difficulty in the way of economic development has been the tariff policy of the United States. The duties have been considerably decreased and a free zone established on the Mexican frontier, but the custom-houses between the countries, with their delays and inconveniences, caused to a large extent by maladministration, are a serious obstacle to trade. As Mexico is becoming almost entirely dependent economically on the

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United States, she is naturally very much handicapped by a system of restrictive tariffs. The only basis for a reciprocity treaty, however, is the free admission of sugar and coffee into the United States in return for food stuffs and manufactures, and this solution would, of course, be inimical to the vested interests which are responsible for the opposition to reciprocity here as in the Philippines and Cuba.¹

It is of peculiar interest, at this period of British economic development, to consider whether any

¹"To British North America the United States supplies 52 per cent. of the total imports for consumption; to Mexico, equally adjacent, but speaking another language than our own, 40 per cent.; to the Central American states, next removed by distance, though readily reached by water and now being tapped by railways, 35 per cent.; to Colombia, a trifle farther removed, but equally accessible by direct water transportation, 33 per cent.; to Venezuela, equally accessible, 27 per cent.; to the West Indies, which lie in close proximity, but which have been up to the present time controlled by commercial nations whose policy in many cases has been to retain their commerce for their own people, 20 per cent.; to the Guianas, also readily reached by water, 25 per cent. of the imports of British Guiana, 17 per cent. of those of Dutch Guiana, and but less than 6 per cent. of those of French Guiana.

"Up to this point the study of the growth of commerce between the United States and other American countries is fairly satisfactory. Beginning with 52 per cent. of the import trade of Canada, 40 per cent. of that of Mexico, and ranging on downward along the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, a fairly satisfactory share of the commerce of those countries is enjoyed by the people of the United States, though it will be conceded that her people have a right to expect a larger share of the commerce of the countries lying so near at hand, especially in view of the fact that our purchases from them are much larger than our sales to them."—BUREAU OF STATISTICS, WASHINGTON (1821-1900).

change from our free-trade policy might not lead to modification in existing tariffs throughout the world. That its first effect would be to reduce the American tariff wall cannot be doubted, and this would naturally have great results in Latin America.

What will happen in Mexico when Porfirio Diaz (already past the Biblical limit of the span of life) lets fall the sceptre he has so successfully wielded? We are told that his successor has been already chosen—every precaution has been taken for his “election”—but we have no guarantee that every generation will produce a Diaz. There is no principle to guide either government or opposition; the personal factor has been supreme, and often tyrannical in its manifestation, and while there is no question that this form of government, with its many drawbacks, has been the most successful evolved by Latin-American people, it is not a democracy, nor can it be regarded as a training-school for constitutional politicians, nor has it the permanence of an hereditary monarchy.

Mexico remains an unsolved problem, but one with which Greater America is deeply concerned and must ultimately help to unravel. That it forms already part of the new American sphere of influence can hardly be denied. From the United States border a constant stream of influence is trickling down through Mexico; or, to change the metaphor, the United States is shooting out tentacles in every direction on her southern boun-

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dary. Whereas formerly the cry was "Accretion, not colonization," it is now "Absorption, not annexation," but the Mexicans may well ask "What's in a name?" It can never be forgotten that a great part of Mexico is already under the Stars and Stripes. The actual occupation, with sovereign rights, of the canal strip will act as another centre from which United States influence must spread still more tangibly, and, as the Monroe Doctrine involves its adherents (or rather exponents) more and more in the meshes of Latin-American affairs, the question will be, where will the "American sphere" end? A boundary-line—the latest of several—has already been found for it by sanguine expansionists in the Amazon River, but as this includes in the sphere a large part of Brazil, the subject becomes at once involved in that of Pan-Americanism, and must be considered in a later chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONTROL OF THE CARIBBEAN

NOWHERE, perhaps, does history afford a sadder lesson in the evil effects of the human lust for gold than in the story of this beautiful sea, the blue Caribbean, studded with countless islands, each a gem of tropical beauty. Nature has done everything for this favored region; man has been the destroyer of its peace. From time to time, as if in rebellion against the evils which were disfiguring her beauty, the earth-mother has revenged herself by one of those sudden cataclysms which have devastated whole islands; and it is, perhaps, a fitting though a terrible sequence in the long chain of tragedy that the last few years should have seen the greatest catastrophe of all and the wholesale destruction of one island. It is as if these beautiful gems of the Caribbean were placed under some baneful spell by reason of the evil passions of by-gone generations and as a retribution for the cruel fate which Western conquerors meted out to the gentle, harmless aborigines.

No one who has ever visited these lovely islands can fail to retain an image of their exquisite beauty, and he will find it difficult to decide as to the rival

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claims of each to be considered the queen. Set in a sea whose sapphire blue deceives one with an aspect of placid loveliness, by no means justified by its treacherous currents and contrary winds, the coral strands are fringed with palms and co-coa-nuts; mountains of indescribable beauty and grandeur rise tier on tier till they melt into an azure sky; flowers and foliage of radiant beauty clothe every ravine. In the brilliance of tropical sunlight there is nothing lacking to complete the charm of the scene.

Amid this bounteous nature, however, man has moved like a destroyer. The races now in occupation of the soil—white and black—are singularly out of the picture. No one familiar with the tropical East can have failed to notice how perfectly the peoples are assimilated to their own environment. Their clothes and dwellings, their very figures and faces, seem to have an artistic relation to the background in which they are set, and even in the case of a fantastic civilization like that of China one feels little sense of discrepancy; it has, in truth, grown up from the soil and drawn its color from the character of the surrounding country and the skies above. It is not a mere sense of picturesqueness which leads one to abhor the banalities of Western settlements in the East, but a feeling that they are out of key with nature. Architecture which in northern climes seems right and suitable, and therefore æsthetically correct, appears grotesque in the lands of eternal sunshine.

Englishmen have to a certain extent realized this, and have compromised in their dwellings to secure modern sanitation without a sacrifice of artistic fitness. But in their personal appearance and manners they can never fail to appear as strangers in these countries. They are the growth of an alien civilization, and whether it be better or no, it certainly does not have that relation to nature — that indefinite, subtle connection with the scenery, the sky, or the flora which an indigenous civilization possesses.

The West Indies present this anomaly in a most striking manner; nowhere do we find an indigenous civilization, nowhere do the people seem to be in intimate relationship with their habitat. On a Saharan desert, with a fierce, tropical sun bleaching the sand on which his shadow is cut in deepest cobalt, the glowing black of the negro, his fierce freedom of gesture, the barbaric note of blood-red in his scarf, and the glint of white in his teeth and eyeballs make a never-to-be-forgotten picture—a perfect harmony. Here, however, he is still uncivilized, wild as his own bare country, free as its scorching sunlight.

In the West Indies we find a different being. Set in a background of tropical luxuriance, and at the same time half converted to a civilization which is foreign both to him and to the country, the negro is nothing but a travesty of his white masters. His language is the debased coin of Spanish, French, or English; his clothing their

discarded finery, or rags of his own devising on the same model. His home is as devoid of originality as it is of artistic beauty. It is a shelter—nothing more. It is a significant fact that the curio-hunter in the West Indies can find nothing interesting save the Carib baskets, woven by the descendants of the aborigines, or some barbaric bead-work of no originality or beauty. The negro is far behind the Fiji-Islander in decorating his house, the summit of his ambition being to purchase American “rockers.”

In speaking thus of the West Indian negro it is, of course, the outward aspect of the peasantry we are considering; and it must be acknowledged that from a pictorial and æsthetic point of view, the poor black is in all respects preferable to the poor white. The cotton clothes of the black “mammies” are often clean and stiffly starched, and a touch of color is imparted in the turban, which is added to, in the French islands, by multicolored kerchiefs and skirts, making up a bright and effective costume. The present tendency, however, is to dress more and more in the cast-off fashions of white folks, and to abandon the turban for the trimmed hat, but the effect of clean cotton dresses is still sufficiently flower-like to make a not unpleasing note in the landscape. The tendency of the poor whites is to a slatternly neglect of house and person, which is far more reprehensible, both from a moral and æsthetic point of view, than the childish vanity of the blacks.

Here, then, is the first fruit, apparent to the most casual observer, of European greed in snatching the islands. We have peopled them, but we cannot replace the ancient race which we exterminated. Neither we nor the negroes are sons of the soil, in the true sense of having evolved there our character and civilization; and the consequence is a permanent divorce between these beautiful islands and the people who dwell on them. The negro has, of course, found here a secure home, but he has not yet recovered from the baneful influence of the system under which he was brought. The ease with which life can be supported has also vitiated his character, never strenuous, and it is only when pressure of circumstances drives him to it that he can be depended on for systematic labor. Thanks to the economic policy of Europe, the West Indian islands have for many years past been driving many of their foster-children into the foreign labor market, but—and this is part of their curse—they do so at the cost of their own prosperity. It is at once the lack of laborers and the lack of remunerative labor that constitutes a deadlock in the West Indies to-day. A people who were children of the soil might have wrung from it a living even in the teeth of difficulties; the negro, with sugar gone and nothing to replace it, when he can no longer subsist by scratching up a yam-patch, must go elsewhere or starve in idleness.

The West Indies are interesting not only as the

second home of a black race, but as an object-lesson in the possibilities of peopling the tropics with white races. How far the perpetuation of these races is due to intermingling with the negroes and aborigines, and how much to constant reinforcement from Europe, it is impossible to gauge; but it does not require a very close observation to see that, in different degrees, the creoles of all the islands are in many respects different from, and in the more sturdy virtues inferior to, the parent stocks. The Spaniard has in him a touch of Orientalism and has no race prejudice, facts which have helped him in the task of assimilation. The creoles live a sort of hot-house existence and have the characteristics of exotic rather than of tropical, indigenous plants.

Nowhere do we see the growth in a West Indian island of a community whose social and political life has made independent progress towards the goal of individual enlightenment and liberty. Many of the islands have now attained to the dignity of self-government, and two have achieved independence. Hayti is an interesting study and a most striking example of a Black Republic, as it has now been over a century in the enjoyment of a democratic constitution. It was, of course, the black element in that island which overthrew the dominion of Europe, and the victory was one of matter over mind. There is no need to recapitulate the reasons which left the white population at the mercy of the blacks, nor the methods by

which the Black Republic was founded. Right and wrong are inextricably interwoven in all such cases, and there may be instances in which the end may excuse, though not justify, the means. What is Hayti to-day, after the long sequence of crimes of which her history is made up? Apologists, both white and black, are found who try to put a good complexion on the condition of the island, their chief reason being to justify or to avert condemnation of the republican institutions on which its government is founded. It is significant, however, that the warmest friend can say no more than that the evil reports are exaggerated. Cannibalism, they declare, does not now exist, and voodoo worship is on the decline; but they can furnish no explanation for a state of affairs in which the accusations that are current receive credence. The plain evidences of corruption and anarchy are enough for our purpose, without any examination of the darker sides of social and political life, and these are incontrovertible.

The checkered history of Haytian rulers is worth recording. Of these, one was assassinated, one killed himself, one was exiled, many were deposed, four fled, one was shot, three abdicated, and only one died peaceably in office. The trade of the country has declined to a mere fraction of what it once was; there are not more than ten miles of railway; there are no public hospitals, save one kept by Sisters of Charity; no sanitation; no public works, save the palaces built by rulers for

themselves with forced labor. The army is a laughing-stock to European visitors, and the whole business of government is kept up on a scale of tawdry grandeur. Foreigners are not allowed to acquire land, and there is only a handful of whites in a population of blacks and mulattoes. We cannot find that anything is done to provide enlightened public instruction, and religious teaching is certainly handicapped by the darkest superstitions.

Much the same state of affairs exists in San Domingo, the Dominican Republic, which embraces the eastern two-thirds of the island of Hayti, the chief difference being that the dialect spoken is Spanish. At the time of writing, anarchy is supreme, trade is at a stand-still, and it is becoming more and more certain that action must shortly be taken to protect European and American interests. The American naval commander reports that at a recent date no fewer than four separate movements (which might be dignified with the name of revolutions) were in process simultaneously.

This condition prevails in an island which was not only proverbially fertile and rich, but had been the focus of influences emanating from the most cultivated and refined capital of Europe. Hispaniola, in the French period, was in many respects ahead of her sister islands, and the many excellent qualities of the French colonists had combined at once to make it not only one of the richest, but

one of the first in the refinements of civilization. It must not be supposed that the writer is placing responsibility for failure entirely on negro shoulders. The long series of blunders and injustices, of crimes and follies, of which the West Indian isles have been the scene have their root deep in the past, and for the most part we of the Old World, and the unfortunate races whose fate is bound up with ours, have but blindly followed a destiny to which the lusts of our forefathers condemned us. On northern soil man is sufficiently master of his fate to break through the bonds woven for him and make a new world for himself, but in the West Indies he must remain forever a slave, not only to his own weaker self, but doomed to toil forever, to roll back the stone which his fathers, in ignorant passion, threw down.

The recent establishment of another independent republic in the Caribbean opens questions of wide importance. Cuba is considered elsewhere more fully; it is sufficient here to say that she has been given her freedom on terms which merely make it a matter of time as to how soon she becomes part of the United States. Puerto Rico has already been created a Territory, with free access to the markets of the United States, but with no claims to Statehood or to American citizenship for her people. Nevertheless, the supreme court has just decided that Puerto Ricans are not aliens, since he is either a citizen of the United States or of no country at all. Hence it follows that while

he *is* a citizen in the sense of being amenable to United States laws, and entitled to protection, he is *not* a citizen as regards constitutional rights. This is an example of the confusion which arises from the attempt to reconcile democratic theory with imperial practice. Civil government in Puerto Rico was organized in 1900. The insular government (American) practically controls the whole system, but Puerto Ricans have local autonomy and are clamoring for more complete self-government, desiring to have all duties and functions vested in municipalities as far as possible, in order that they may obtain control.¹

So long as capable and disinterested Americans, uninfluenced by local politics, are at the helm, the present condition of affairs will continue. But if they were to be removed, what guarantee is there that the party dissensions so characteristic of Spanish America will not return with all their attendant evils? And if Puerto Rico were to become a Territory with a claim to Statehood, what

¹ The central government having been established, the legislative council (with an American majority) set to work to organize details. Revenue, education, and local government were reformed, but the guiding hand of the central government was apparent in all these, although every effort was made to give local autonomy and responsibility to municipal officials. A code of laws was drawn up and police and other regulations enforced. Judicial reforms were introduced. Finances are rigidly supervised by an American treasurer. The official selections have been made without party bias, and administrative heads have endeavored to introduce the "merit" system in the civil service.

is to prevent the initiation of all the evils of political life existing in the United States?

In this new advance of the Americans into the Caribbean we see a significant circumstance affecting the future of that region. Few, if any, of the West Indian islands have not changed hands more than once since their discovery to the Western world, and one of the things most certain in the future is that their checkered career as political pawns is not yet ended. Here we find the direct result of the policy adopted by the early conquerors, and we realize the full extent of the blighting influence of that policy upon these islands. They have been in the past, and, now that their brief day of intrinsic value seems to be setting, will again become nothing more than pawns in the game of world politics. It would have been impossible so to regard them had they been peopled by a truly indigenous race. Even the patriotism of a creole population like that of Cuba is partial, disturbed by other influences, and rather a sentiment than a national heritage.

Before pursuing any further the subject of West Indian possibilities, it may be well to give a brief résumé of the actual state of affairs, political and economic.

At present the British islands contain the bulk of the population, some three millions, of whom not more than two per cent. are white. The British islands have varying forms of colonial government, all on the crown-colony pattern, providing differ-

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ing degrees of local autonomy and representative government. Economically they are decadent. No fresh industry on any adequate scale has replaced sugar, and, in face of the over-production of that article in other parts of the world, it is impossible to see how the industry can ever be revived. Its downfall might have been delayed by judicious methods in the early period of decadence, but the most drastic measures would not avail now, and the one hope is the creation of fresh industries.

As for the condition of the negro race under these circumstances, it is one of the curious anomalies with which every student of world affairs is familiar. By every law of civilization the negroes ought to be in a bad way. They should suffer with the whites. Economic depression is supposed always to fall first on the lowest strata of society. Indifferent government (and the government of some of the West Indian islands has been very indifferent) should first affect the well-being of the poorest, as they are the least able to defend themselves. The contrary has been the case in the British West Indies. The muddles of governments, the decline of prosperity, the increase of taxation to support heavy public works neglected in palmy days—all these have fallen with crushing force on the white planter. They have wrecked his home, and they have driven him in despair from the islands, but they have left the negro practically unharmed. Poor he is, but in the

bounteous West Indies he need not feel hunger or cold. The land left by the white planters has gradually fallen into the hands of black squatters, and with the wide area available they are able to shift their yam or potato patch as soon as the soil seems exhausted.

Froude, in a memorable book full of mistakes, but lit up throughout with those inimitable flashes of insight—those touches of sympathetic description which give his work a living value lacked by that of more scientifically accurate writers—has given us a picture of the happy West Indian black. It may be an exaggeration, but the impressions of a man like Froude are worth a good deal as evidence, and are borne out by many others of less eminence. There are problems in the British West Indies—there is poverty, there must be misery—but the writer can unhesitatingly affirm that, were he a negro, it is in these islands, rather than in any other part of the world, that he would prefer to have his lot cast. The British have, so far as in their power lay, done what they could to ameliorate the lot of their black subjects. The natural orderliness of the Anglo-Saxon has led him to establish the essentials of civilization. Law and justice are firm and incorruptible, markets are easy of access and well regulated, good roads have been made wherever possible, and, in fact, the negro lives his primitive life under conditions made easy by the protecting care of a higher civilization. The race prejudice which keeps white and black

apart has not prevented the ruling race from dealing fairly and generously with the subject one. Froude thought they were going too far in this respect. He foresaw the time when the few remaining whites would refuse to be governed by a black majority and would leave altogether, and thus the democratic principle, just struggling into birth, would rid the island of the white element so badly needed to leaven the whole lump. Since his time, however, there has been little progress in that direction. The eyes of Britain were opened, and a halt was called in that march on which she was urging all her colonies. It was realized that the race question must count for something in matters of government; and while many mistakes have been perpetuated on the islands, there has been a genuine attempt to legislate in a discriminating manner for the backward race. The responsibility of ruling the negro has not been altogether shifted on to his own unaccustomed shoulders. In the larger islands a certain amount of progress has been made, and for them it seems, indeed, as if the worst crisis were over. The growth of the fruit industry is a hopeful sign, and also the advance in means of public education and a slow but perceptible improvement in the moral status of the negro.

It must be understood by all who would appreciate the West Indian problems that a condition of contented poverty, readiness to work, if well paid and overlooked, and even a disposi-

tion among the better class to become useful citizens and efficient government employés, go side by side with a most primitive morality among the great bulk of the population. Until this defect is remedied—and that can only be by white influence, example, and discipline — any talk of democratic principles in the islands is criminal folly. A sham democracy is more degrading than any other form of government, since it inevitably leads to the predominance of the most unscrupulous. A true democracy in the British West Indies would mean the ascendancy of the lower class of negro, with his inferior moral and mental standard, over his superior brothers and the handful of whites who could not leave the islands. It would be a mere mob rule.

No tampering with constitutions or rearrangement of the political grouping would be of any real assistance to the islands. It might secure more efficiency here or reduce a little extra taxation there, but it would not touch the root of the matter, which is the economic problem. We must return later to that question, but first must glance at the condition of those islands belonging to other European powers—the French, Dutch, and Danish West Indies.

The French islands number two of the most considerable of the Antilles—Martinique and Guadeloupe. Even before the recent disasters which have depopulated the former, these islands contained only some four hundred thousand souls.

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Many of the British Antilles, of course, were originally colonized by the French, and remain to this day Gallic not only in language but in many other characteristic features of their civilization. Dominica, one of the largest as well as the most beautiful of this chain of islands, is an example of this. The protective tariffs of the mother-country have helped to prolong the life of the sugar industry in the French colonies, and it has been to this alone that they owed their apparent superiority to the British islands, which has led not a few observers to pronounce in favor of the French rather than the British mode of government in the West Indies. In other respects the French and British islands differ considerably. The former contain a larger proportion of half-breeds, the color-line being less strictly drawn. Whether this is in itself an advantage is a matter of opinion. In one respect it cannot fail to be a drawback, since a pure black population will increase in numbers and retain its fine physique far better than a colored race. The political system, admired by Sir Charles Dilke, is founded on the granting, through universal suffrage, of representation in the central government. He speaks of the progress made by individual blacks under this more liberal treatment, but it is to be noted that the instances with which he points his remarks are taken from British islands — Barbadoes and Jamaica. French observers themselves are less sanguine as to their success in the West Indies.

It is significant that the local administration of Guadeloupe absorbs fifty per cent. of the annual value of the products of the island, while in Martinique, before the recent catastrophes, there were one thousand four hundred *fonctionnaires* to some fourteen thousand eligible voters. Leroy-Beaulieu says: "The deputies whom Martinique and Guadeloupe send to our parliament serve only to represent the malice, ignorance, and prejudice of the blacks. The weak executive power in France allows itself to be intimidated by these deputies, and sends out to the colonies cowardly and incapable governors whose indecision of character feeds the more or less barbarous hopes of the negro majority. . . . The hatred for the negro in these islands is complicated by the hatred of the poor for the rich."¹ M. Maurice Ordinaire, in his study of modern colonization, makes an interesting comparison. "The Briton admits that individuals of another race, living under other climes, may have different wants and ideas from those held by himself. He does not pretend to 'assimilate' brethren of all colors, whose brains, for the present, at least, are not quite as well developed as his own. Neither does he think that he has fulfilled his whole duty towards them and assured their happiness forever when he grants them political rights which they do not know how to make use of. He thinks quite the contrary, that for

¹ *Colonization chez les peuples modernes.*

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primitive societies, such as colonies are, there are more urgent liberties than a mere formal and ostentatious franchise (*franchise d'apparat*), and that the primary benefit to be conferred upon them is a régime which develops their initiative, teaches them responsibility, and favors their economic ascendancy." ¹

From these quotations and from the evidence of other writers one gathers that, although the commercial prosperity of the French islands may be superior, there are many rifts within the lute. The absence of friction between blacks and whites, the general content and peacefulness which prevail in the British islands, and the immunity from party politics which they are not able to appreciate, would be poorly exchanged for the fictitious privilege of electing seven deputies and four senators to parliament.

The efforts made to improve the actual condition of the people have been, as is not unusual in Catholic countries, mainly due to the Church. Public instruction, public works, and sanitation make a better show on paper than in reality if the eyes, ears, and nose of an ordinary traveller may be trusted. From one point of view—the æsthetic — the superiority of the French West Indies is undoubted. Some of the colored creoles have a reputation for beauty which is well deserved, and until recent years there were to be seen every-

¹ *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales.* June, 1900.

where quaint and distinctive costumes, the result of French influence and taste on the color-loving negroes. Unhappily, the beauty and daintiness of these childlike people have their dark side in the shameful passions to which they owe their origin and their inheritance of moral as well as physical fragility. None but the ignorant sentimentalist will prefer the spectacle of a French West Indian city, with its picturesque vice, its graceful, multi-colored people, and its general air of charm, gayety, and lightly concealed squalor, to that of, for instance, Barbadoes, where a pure black race—devoted to the soil; simple-minded, if ignorant; independent, if poor; contented, peaceful, industrious, and, in a word, wholesome—are living their own lives according to the light vouchsafed them and leaving no legacy of sin or disease to future generations.

Little need be said of the Dutch and Danish West Indies. The former have only about fifty thousand inhabitants, and the trade is so small that the islands do not even pay the expenses of government. The Danish islands have a population of thirty thousand, and, in view of a steadily declining trade and the desire of the United States to acquire the islands, it seems impracticable that a country like Denmark can continue to support the burden of a useless and expensive dependence. And yet the fate of the Danish islands is not quite so clear as it seems, as will be shown in a future chapter.

What is to be the future of the West Indies? What power will control the Caribbean, for which Great Britain and France fought so long and desperately? It is undoubtedly on an economic basis that the struggle will very largely be decided. But from a strategic point of view the islands seem likely to resume their ancient importance, for the opening of the trans-isthmian canal will immensely increase their strategic and political value.


The actual bearing of the canal question on American expansion is discussed elsewhere, but it is necessary here to glance briefly at the effect it has had on the control of the Caribbean. In a previous chapter we have seen how unlikely it is that Cuba can long remain outside the Union, even under the guise of a protectorate. Meanwhile, Puerto Rico is already a Territory—nominally, at least—and the desire for more islands in the West Indies is only checked by the fact that there are none whose owners are willing to part with, or too weak to retain, them.

The Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico have often been described as an American Mediterranean. The Gulf is absolutely dominated by the United States. The Caribbean is enclosed by a chain of islands, of which one—Cuba—blocks the entrance to the Gulf, being only a short distance on either side from the American main-land. Thus Cuba, the largest, richest, and most highly civilized of all the West Indies, occupies a commanding position as regards the American main-land, es-

THE CONTROL of the CARIBBEAN SEA

STRATEGIC POINTS

- BRITISH.....□
- UNITED STATES.....△
- OTHERS.....○



pecially that most important point, the mouth of the Mississippi. Either as a base of supplies, a strategic point, or a rendezvous for commerce, the Mississippi is of paramount importance. The United States has in Pensacola and Key West supplementary strategic points, but the importance of these is rendered double by the fact that they are practically guarded by Havana, the finest city of the West Indies, and called by the Spaniards, not inappropriately, "the key of the New World." Cuba is well provided on all sides with harbors, and the improvements in internal communications made during the American occupation have tied these together and greatly increased their value.

It is obvious that these natural advantages cannot be fully utilized by the United States so long as Cuba, though protected, remains a weak, independent republic, backward in civilization and hampered with all kinds of internal problems, the greatest being undoubtedly that of evolving a stable government out of most unstable material. But how long will the present condition of affairs continue? Already, as if to forestall the conclusion, the Americans have recently provided themselves with a *point d'appui* on the island, important positions (Guantanamo and Bahia Honda), some forty miles east of Santiago de Cuba, on a lease not dissimilar to that of Germany in Kiaochau. The Isle of Pines, which was reserved to herself, is more suitable for a sanatorium than a strategic point, and has been restored to the sov-

ereignty of Cuba. It must not be forgotten that Cuba supplies the lack of harbors which is one of America's greatest difficulties in these waters. The whole Gulf of Mexico is practically devoid of any harborage, and even the littoral of Central America is without natural harbors until we reach the Chiriqui lagoon and Carthagená.

Turning to the Caribbean and canal, we see that Cuba commands one of the principal entrances to the ocean, the Windward Passage, which lies between Cuba and Hispaniola (the island which consists of the two republics of Hayti and San Domingo). Under present political conditions Hispaniola may be regarded as a negligible quantity. The next channel is the Mona Passage, between Hispaniola and Puerto Rico. The acquisition of the latter does not provide the Americans with a strong strategic point, being deficient in harborage, but it secures to them a most convenient jumping-off place; and very near, on the other side of the passage, is a fine position, Samaná Bay. The future of Hispaniola, with its two black republics, is still obscure, but it is certain that it will not be possible much longer to ignore this blot on the civilization of the Western World; and the Americans, being unable, by the destiny they have marked out for themselves, to permit any other power to intervene, will eventually have to control this island more or less directly. The position was to have been neatly rounded off by the acquisition of St. Thomas and the other Danish islands, a

process which would not be long delayed if the only obstacle were a dwindling sentiment on the part of a small handful of the Danish people. These islands command yet again a third route into the Caribbean from Europe. Having regard to the extraordinary rapidity with which the United States has advanced on her path of expansion and the difficulties she has encountered and overcome, it is possible that most of us may live to see the changes indicated, and with these three islands—Cuba, Hispaniola, and Puerto Rico—lying so compactly together, either in her possession or under her control, the Caribbean will indeed become almost an American lake.

There is one crumpled rose-leaf, however, in the bed which America is preparing—one obstacle to her unfettered sway in these waters. That obstacle is the island of Jamaica. A glance at the map shows that it occupies such a position as to nullify the importance of some of the American, or potentially American, points of vantage. Its situation in the centre of the Caribbean is also in its favor. But the most important point is that it belongs to Great Britain, whose superiority in naval strength helps largely to outweigh the disadvantage it suffers through isolation from neighboring islands or the main-land. Though inferior in resources to Cuba, and economically largely dependent on the United States, Jamaica as a British outpost in the centre of the Caribbean has great strategical importance. As a military station it

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has, moreover, the great advantage of healthy and easily accessible highlands. As a naval base it is also favored, Kingston being one of the best harbors in the West Indies. Captain Mahan is of opinion that, taking everything into consideration, the superior size and resources of Cuba would give her an overwhelming advantage over Jamaica; but he leaves out of consideration the health question, and it is notorious that disease killed far more men than bullets in the Cuban war. Another point in favor of the smaller island is the presence of an industrious peasantry, devoted to the British crown—a different condition to that of sparsely inhabited Cuba, with its mixed races, pulling different ways, and not remarkable either for their loyalty or industry.

Great Britain has one other highly fortified post in St. Lucia, which, though some distance from Jamaica, serves as an important link in communications and as a coaling-station, and is provided with a useful adjunct in Barbadoes. With Trinidad to the south and Antigua and Dominica to the north, these islands are well outside the American sphere, but exercise an important influence on the Caribbean. There is another British colony on the Caribbean littoral, which is little considered, and, indeed, despite its size and the apparent advantages of its position, it is of little real importance, possessing no harbor, and the scantiest population. It should be advantageously disposed of to the United States.

With the transference of the Danish islands to the United States there would remain only the French islands, Martinique and Guadeloupe, and the Dutch Curaçoa group. Of the former, Martinique may now be considered negligible, owing to the volcanic catastrophe which overwhelmed it and the abandonment by France of the Panama canal. The Dutch islands are economically stagnant, but in any case will not be allowed to pass to any other power. These islands are of the greater strategical importance as Colon, the Atlantic terminus of the canal, is indefensible.

It will be seen, therefore, that, so far as can be done, America has made every provision to insure that the main routes to the isthmus from the Atlantic should be under her control. The wisdom of such a provision does not require to be elaborated, but there is an interesting side of the question which can only be touched on here. What use can America make of the advantages she has gained in the Caribbean by her policy of expansion unless she is prepared to embark on a naval programme commensurate with it? No longer is her seaboard confined to her own territory; she has an extended littoral; she has a Pacific island dependency on the one side and a Caribbean sphere on the other. To this subject we must return.

While the United States has been expanding, economically and politically, in the Caribbean, the British islands have been for some time credited with a desire for amalgamation with their great

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neighbor. It is safe to say that this desire is strictly limited and is purely on economic grounds, for the bulk of the population—the negroes—who are not suffering as much as the white planters (in many cases are not aware that they are suffering at all) — are far from wishing to become American citizens. They are perfectly aware that as British subjects they enjoy a position of respectability, a degree of justice and freedom, and even an amount of self-government, which would be denied to them in the democracy of Greater America. The desire for amalgamation with America may, therefore, be expected to decrease with the exodus of white men from the West Indies; it has already undergone considerable modification even in that dwindling white minority since they realized that American domination would mean the loss of that last shred of prestige which their position as a ruling class gives them, even among the wreck of their fallen fortunes. On the other hand, the Americans have never been desirous of shouldering the burden of government in these islands, where order is admirably maintained by the British, where life and property are safe, and where trade is free to the world. Jamaica they would not object to have, but Jamaica is the one island which is not languishing. As for the others, while America can have markets without responsibility, she is not likely to want more. The American business-men who are fast taking up the fruit trade are not discontented with the state of

affairs, having every liberty and far less interference from government than in their own country, even if they do complain of the general "sleepiness."

The situation resolves itself at first sight into an *impasse*. Great Britain apparently cannot help her island colonies. America does not want them; and they are by no means unanimous in the desire for a change of master. Still, they are powerless to help themselves, and unless they can do so the islands must become black, and gravitate, slowly but surely, into the American orbit. The great American Republic seems to loom up on the horizon whichever way we turn, and patriotic Britons and West-Indians alike may be pardoned if, like Froude, they sometimes feel that all is lost in the Caribbean, so far as the British Empire is concerned, and that nothing remains save to beg the United States to "pick up the pieces."

But, as has been said already, the trans-isthmian canal at once sends up the value of the West Indies strategically, and, by diverting a great stream of traffic through the Caribbean, gives them fresh opportunities for economic development. For the British islands another possibility arises in the rapid growth of Canada. There seems no valid reason why Canada should not be to the British West Indies what the United States will shortly be to Cuba. These countries are complementary to each other, and in the new phase of imperial policy we may find the key to

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the situation in a commercial bond, though not perhaps in a political one, as was first suggested. The failure, hitherto, to secure this bond between the northern Dominion and the tropical colonies need not be taken as a sign that such a thing is impossible. We believe that we are about to embark on a new era in our history and to stake everything on a grand effort to bind our scattered empire together in such a way that every unit will participate in the advantages. There should be no Cinderella in our imperial family. The conception is such a grand one that it may well excite the ridicule of politicians, who are too sure of their own omniscience to have imagination. The power of a great idea, a great conception, is quite beyond the limitations of mere statistics. As regards the Caribbean, the question is a crucial one. We must turn over a new leaf or be willing to lose our share of power in the region with which our naval glories are inextricably associated.

CHAPTER IX

PAN-AMERICANISM IN THE SOUTHERN CONTINENT

MR. BLAINE is generally credited with the paternity of the Pan-American movement, but the claim might well be advanced on behalf of Bolivar, the "Liberator." It is probable, however, that these two men would have put a very different interpretation on the expression "Pan-American." Blaine desired the political ascendancy of his own republic, which was to assume the attitude of protector, but avoid annexation, except in the case of Canada. Bolivar, on the contrary, wished to give the Latin-American republics a more equal position by a contractual engagement with the United States, which would assure to them their independence. Since that period there has been no approximation of the ideals of the two continents; on the contrary, each has been strengthened in its own peculiar view of the exact nature of Pan-Americanism which is necessary to its own development.

It is obvious that the expression "Pan-American" does not imply the ascendancy of any one race of Americans, and although it has of late years become usual for the United States citizens

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to be spoken of as "Americans" and regarded as *the* people *par excellence* of the New World, yet it must not be forgotten that the southern continent, and even a great part of the northern one, are inhabited by other peoples equally American, but in some cases widely different in race, thought, ideals, civilization, language, and religion from the inhabitants of the United States.

The Dominion of Canada, occupying one-third of the northern continent, must naturally be the first element to be considered in any scheme of Pan-Americanism; but it is of so much importance that it must be dealt with separately. We will first consider the relations of the Central and South American republics to their great neighbor.

It has already been said that the destiny of the United States, having taken her into the Caribbean and on to the isthmus of Panama, will compel her to intervene in Mexico and to adopt a protective attitude towards Central America, and, in involving her in the domestic affairs of the backward republics, will lead to their gradual absorption.

The republics of South America are, however, governed by different conditions. The southern continent is hardly inferior in area or resources to the northern one, and, despite the heat of the equatorial region, it affords ample space for the growth of a great white population. That it remains to so large an extent unexploited is due chiefly to the unfortunate incapacity of Latin peoples to found stable governments or succeed in

UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AMERICA Showing TRANSPORTATION ROUTES

- Railways in Operation* —————
- Railways Projected* - - - - -
- Proposed Location, Inter-Continental Railway (Surveys Made)* ———
- Proposed Extensions, Inter-Continental Railway (Surveys Projected)* - - - - -
- Steamship Lines* ———
- Distances on Steamship Routes in Nautical Miles* ———

R.D. SIMMONS, N. Y.

130

120

110

100

90 Longitude 80 West 70 from 60 Greenwich 50

40

30

20

10


0

10

20

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any practical enterprise. The Spaniards contented themselves from the first with taking as much as they could out of the country without any attempt to secure its permanent prosperity.

In every respect, indeed, the colonization of South America has differed from that of the United States. The northern immigrants pushed steadily on, westward over the Alleghanies, southward to the Gulf of Mexico, organizing as they went, keeping in touch with one another, opening communications. It was not sentiment which bound them together, but practical common-sense and the presence of a common danger. Their fierce Indian foes, on the one hand, and the pressure from Europe, on the other, made them realize the importance of homogeneity, and their very weakness apart led to their strength in combination. The Spanish colonies, however, had no such incentives to combination. They were handfuls of white men planted among subdued and often gentle native peoples, holding little communication with one another. The East and West had no connection save through Europe—no intercourse, no mutual interests. When one after the other shook off the yoke of the mother-country one might have expected a *rapprochement* between the different Latin colonies; but the demon of political unrest was too strong. Intrigue, faction, and party fights became the occupation of the ruling class, and these were fostered by Europe. The natural incapacity of the hot-headed Latin

for self-government, of which we have already spoken, had not been modified by his colonial training, and the principles of democracy were rendered futile by the presence of Indian populations which could not understand them and were not to be allowed on equality with their white masters. As has been well said, "The American Constitution was reproduced in south latitudes, but the inward grace of enlightened public opinion is lacking."¹ It was an attempt to pour new wine into old bottles, and the result is still visible in a generous waste of what might be good vintage.

A brief glance at the various republics is necessary before we consider the possibility of the Pan-American bond.

Colombia and Venezuela are extreme examples of the vicious effects of democratic theories working on unprepared soil. It is remarkable in the history of each that the only periods of peace or security enjoyed have been under the usurped authority of some dictator. Guzman Blanco, in Venezuela, and Nuñez, in Colombia, serve as examples of this. Bolivar, the bright star of Latin-American independence, was a Venezuelan, but enjoyed a great deal of obloquy from his compatriots on account of his aristocratic birth, and died of a broken heart in hiding near Santa Marta. Miranda, another Venezuelan patriot, worthy of

¹ *Tropical America*, by I. N. Ford.

the chivalry of old Spain, died in a dungeon at Ceuta, the Spanish penal settlement in Morocco.

Perhaps the most remarkable difference in the North and South American republics is the respect shown by the former to her Constitution, and the invariable custom of the latter to "amend" it on every occasion. It is a radical difference in the conception of laws. The Anglo-Saxon has no natural turn for legislation or for the theory of politics. The Anglo-American is even content to turn the whole business over to paid politicians. To the Latin-American, however, this business of politics is the breath of life, and he has a profound belief in the efficacy of legislation to reform all evils.

Notwithstanding all this, the Latin-American is also curiously apathetic about the actual working out of his political theories. Just as the Spaniard, who will wrangle all day and all night in a wine-shop over the merits of a candidate for election, will not trouble to go to the polling-station in the morning, so the Latin-American, having fomented a revolution, will regard its progress with indifference and is little interested in its effects, except in their parochial aspect.¹

¹ Bolivar feared unrestricted suffrage, especially in Latin America; he believed in equality of civic rights, but not in equality of right to govern. Under his constitution, adapted to local conditions, there were to be a President, elected for life or during good behavior; a national legislature or Congress, with a Senate and House, the former an hereditary body or elected for long terms, the latter every two years by vote of the people; an independent judiciary, for life or during good behavior.

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In Venezuela, since the achievement of independence, eighty years ago, there have been fifty revolutions (ten successful), and each turn of Fortune's wheel has meant a fresh tinkering of the constitution. Under such circumstances stability of government is obviously impossible, the only safeguard being the imposition of some more or less arbitrary will on the people. This pressure must eventually come from outside — since the stock of Latin - American dictators seems to be running short—and from which quarter it is not difficult to prophesy.

The paucity of the population of Ecuador (which, on an area the size of Germany, supports some one and a half million people) and the heat of the climate on this Pacific slope have not prevented her achieving a record in her own way. In thirty years—from 1830 to 1860—she had seven distinct constitutions, and every year witnessed some “amendment” or “reform.”

Her neighbor, Peru, is more interesting from many causes. Its area is equal to that of France and Austria - Hungary combined. The Indians, who are a large majority in a population of some three millions, were the heirs of a civilization bequeathed to them by the Incas, possessed a great system of roads and canals, from the Cordilleras to the coast, and offered considerable opposition to the Spaniards. They are now a partly subject race, having no share in the government, and their Latin masters, who pride themselves on

the purity of their Castilian blood, have exhibited, with the graces of their ancestors, their most fatal traits of obstinacy and non-progressiveness. Devastated by the war with Chili, bankrupt, crushed, racked with internal dissensions, Peru is trying, with the aid of British energy and capital, to rehabilitate herself. In the day of prosperity she provided herself with the best railway system in South America, and although constructed with great improvidence and little foresight, it may yet prove of value in the future development of a country undoubtedly rich in mineral resources.

Bolivia is the least accessible of South American republics, now that its ports are absorbed by Chili or Peru. The immense mineral wealth of the country is discounted by the lack of communications, and the white and half-white population is too small to render progress likely. In disputes with Peru and Brazil, Bolivia has already got the worst of it, and will probably decline still more. A curious situation has arisen through the action of the government in granting a large tract of land on the disputed Brazilian border to an American syndicate, with power to maintain an armed force—a dangerous precedent in many ways.

The most interesting, in some respects, of South American republics is that of Chili, whose expansion in late years has been remarkable. Although cut off from the interior by the Andes, it has extended its territory by spreading down the whole coast. The Indian population numbers

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fifty thousand, of which the Araucanians, formerly fierce warriors, are now quite peaceable and settled, while the Fuegians are dying out. The Chilians proper are a hardier and more energetic race than other Latin-Americans. They are for the most part of pure stock, live on the sea-coast or adjacent mountains, and have kept in touch with Europe by a system of excellent steam communication. They are said to exhibit more genuine patriotism and to have a truer conception of national ideals than some of their neighbors, and, in any case, they have been successful in war and progressive in peace. They never fell under the influence of the French conceptions of democracy, and escaped, therefore, some of the more baneful effects of the doctrines of Rousseau and other apostles of the revolutionary period. The country, when conquered by Spain, was already fairly advanced in civilization and possessed village organizations and settled laws as to right and property. After the revolt the government was at first, under the guise of republicanism, entirely controlled by the aristocratic and clerical element, and Chili has been through her fair share of political disturbances. Balmaceda, the leader of the Liberal party in 1866, introduced many reforms, but came to grief in an attempt to establish himself as a military dictator. The revolution which ended in his suicide showed that the Chilians were not prepared to be governed by military cabals, and since then Chili has not witnessed other than party warfare

of a bloodless character. Her government remains, however, more representative than democratic, and a certain stability of public opinion is assured by the presence of a large foreign community—British, French, Spanish, Italian, and German—whose interests are all in favor of a settled government. The government, being oligarchic rather than aristocratic, has been hard on the peasantry, who do not own the soil and are practically in the condition of serfs. They are exceedingly poor, and emigrate in large numbers, despite the growing prosperity and prestige of their country. Public education is liberally provided for in Chili, far in advance of any other South American country, a fact in itself eloquent of the superiority of the people. The mineral wealth of the country is its chief resource, but the agricultural and pastoral industries have increased and great attention has been paid to communications, Chili being the first South American republic to embark on railways, and possessing some fifteen thousand miles of public roads. Half the national debt is held in Britain, and that country is paramount in commerce and in the development of nitrate, which is the principal industry.

The Argentinos consider themselves the Yankees of the southern hemisphere, or did so in the period of their short but phenomenal prosperity. As a matter of fact, they, in common with all Hispano-Americans, are lacking in the steady judgment and moral balance of the New-Englanders. This

has been strongly illustrated both in their political and commercial dealings. The revolution of 1890, brought about by real abuses, failed to remedy them, because of the lack of capacity on the part of the leaders. The boom in commercial matters, though undoubtedly inflated by European speculation, would not have led to the crash which succeeded it but for the utter lack of foresight and prudence among the Argentinos themselves. They plunged recklessly into expense, piled up the national debt, inflated the currency, endeavored in everything to imitate the United States, regardless of their own circumstances (as, for instance, in building a magnificent federal city), and finally collapsed into chaos.

The prosperity of the Argentine was, indeed, not due to their own initiative, but to European immigration and capital. The Argentino conceives it his mission to direct the energies of others, and despises labor. Immigration is conducted on a large scale, the government assisting the immigrant in every possible way, taking charge of him until he reaches his colony or the *hacienda* where he is to live. The best labor is recruited from Italian immigrants, and they, together with the large commercial settlements of Germans, keep themselves apart, with the result that there is little homogeneity about the people of the Argentine. The country, moreover, is so vast in extent, being equal to about one-third of Europe, and with a very sparse population (under five millions in

1900), that a large section remains undeveloped and lends itself peculiarly to the settlement of isolated communities and to the springing-up of small independent states.

The great asset of the Argentine, however, is the wonderful waterway of the river Plate, with its fertile valleys. The possibilities of this great river are unmeasured. It has a more extensive system of navigation than any in the world, and more miles of open way than all the rivers of Europe combined, or even than the whole Mississippi system. The tide reaches two hundred and sixty miles inland, and vessels of twenty-four feet draught can ply at any time of the year as far inland as one thousand miles, literally steaming right through the cornfields. Vessels of lighter draught can penetrate some three thousand miles, and a moderate expenditure would enable a vessel of four thousand tons to reach even the very heart of Brazil. There are one hundred and ten million sheep (more than in Australia and New Zealand) and twenty-five million cattle, two-thirds of the number in the United States. Despite every drawback, there is no doubt that as a food-producing country the Argentine must occupy a foremost place in the economics of the western hemisphere. Stability of government, the rehabilitation of national finances, and the devotion to public works and communications of part of the money squandered on revolutionary projects would soon restore the fortunes of the country.

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Uruguay was originally a dependency of Brazil, but broke away in 1825. It has an extremely despotic government, and suffers from military cabals and political assassinations.

Brazil is another of these South American countries whose area and possibilities are so vast as to stagger the imagination. Its present population of some fourteen millions is only about 4.5 to the square mile,¹ the coast being practically the only settled region. The presence of the negro element makes Brazil different from her sister republics.

The early Portuguese conquerors of Brazil, amalgamating with the Indians, were remarkable for energy and daring. Their cruel treatment of the natives, however, caused here, as in the West Indies, the extermination of the latter and the consequent scarcity of labor, which led to the introduction of negroes. As the race-line has never been carefully drawn by Portuguese, the black strain is strong in Brazil, but, as is invariable in all Latin-American countries, there is a tendency for the purer-bred inhabitants to constitute an aristocracy. The southern Brazilian, who is the descendant of early colonists and Indians and has little negro blood, is jealous of his position. Geographically, economically, and even racially, he is nearer to the Argentine than to tropical Brazil, and the unity of the country is threatened by these race questions, which are aggravated by

¹ According to the census of 1890, that of 1900 showed a decrease; this, however, is considered to be unreliable.

the presence of considerable bodies of independent German communities, holding aloof from national life. Of these, however, we must speak later.

The Brazilians exhibit great apathy, as a people, on the subject of government, the revolutions being chiefly the work of military cabals. The condition of the country is not unlike that of the Argentine, the extravagance of an irresponsible government having plunged it into financial crises. The public debt is enormous, amounting to some two hundred millions sterling; but the resources of the country are vast and as yet little exploited. This state of affairs, financially, is due to enormous military expenditure, as well as to speculation, reckless guarantees, and other unsound enterprises. Little is spent on education, and communications are in a very inchoate condition. Although there are many schemes, some half-finished, for railways, there is no uniform plan and not even a uniform gauge. Despite all this, trade is bounding forward, and the imports increase rapidly even in the teeth of heavy duties, England being the principal participator. No description, however brief, of the South American states would be complete without a reference to the immense power, both for good and evil, wielded over their destinies by the Roman Catholic Church. In speaking of Central America we have already noted the flexibility of the Church, which has enabled her to retain her hold of the people despite the separation of Church and State.

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This has taken place in all the progressive countries, and in Chili, the Argentine, and Uruguay particularly the result has been most beneficial. There is a higher tone in religious services, better music, more sense of fitness in decoration, and far more purity of doctrine. The educational work instituted by the Jesuits is now, particularly in Chili, under the care of the State, and the Church is called upon to rise to higher levels with the improved intelligence of her children. In the more backward republics, and even in Brazil, with its negro element, the level of religious teaching is extremely low; debasing superstitions are the rule, and at its best the Church is still in the darkness of mediævalism. This criticism, curiously, applies also to Peru. It is doubtful whether any other form of Christianity could supplant the Roman Catholic. The people might be attracted by a simpler form of doctrine, but would be repelled by any lack of ritual, which supplies a real want in their color-loving lives. As a rule, the Spanish-American who lapses from his Mother-Church becomes indifferent to religion, and it is to be feared that any rude interruption of their religious convictions would lead the mass of the people from superstition to disbelief. There is little chance of such an interruption, while the South American states remain independent, but it must be remembered that the Church in those countries would view with distrust any attempt at "Americanization"; any wholesale influx of new or democratic

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ideas; any infusion of that spirit of freedom of thought as well as action which is associated with the United States. Religious toleration is now established in the more progressive countries, but the Roman Catholic Church remains one of the predominant factors in political as well as social life, and that factor is strongly in favor of retaining the ties which bind South America to Europe, and against any Pan-American scheme which would mean the domination of a non-Catholic power.

Chili, the Argentine, and southern Brazil may be considered the most important factors in the southern continent, and of these the Argentine, by reason of its unique resources, and Chili, because of its virile people and military and naval supremacy, are the coming countries. Brazil lacks cohesion, and is, besides, handicapped by a large area of torrid zone and by the negro element.

What are the possibilities of a Pan-American bond which would unite these three great republics with their weaker sisters and their northern neighbor?

In 1826 the first Pan-American congress, inspired by Bolivar, had as its aim the union of the American States and the organization of an army and navy to resist the encroachments of the Holy Alliance and to secure the freedom and independence of the remaining Spanish colonies.

The period ending with the civil war certainly did not encourage the Pan-American movement, including, as it did, the episode of the acquisition

of Texas, the Mexican war (with the spoliation of half its territory), the filibustering expeditions of Walker, the Ostend manifesto, and the constant designs on Cuba.

The development of the United States policy of Pan-Americanism has been subsequent to the civil war, and mainly in the last quarter-century. From the outset the scheme of commercial union, which was the principal feature, broke down, because of the objection to admit sugar free. The question of reciprocity between the United States and South America is now scarcely a practical one. The main products of South America, besides minerals, are food-stuffs—corn, meat, and dairy produce—and these are now competing with the products of the northern continent. In the West Indian markets and those of the neighboring states, Chili, Argentine, and Uruguay are likely to supersede the food-stuffs from the northern continent, and the excellent steam communication with Europe makes it possible for them to compete there also. South American ports are, indeed, in closer touch with Europe than with the United States. Trade with the latter country has, in fact, been somewhat on the decline, and suffers a great disadvantage from the conditions of transportation. European ships, sailing from Liverpool and Antwerp, are able to discharge manufactures at Brazil and in the river Plate, where they load coffee and other produce for the United States, and take thence a cargo for Europe. This sys-

tem, together with a better understanding of the peculiarities of the South American markets on the part of Europe, makes direct trading between New York and Brazil, for instance, difficult. It also removes any pressure which might cause the weaker republics to sigh for commercial union with the United States. They are, therefore, not conscious of any advantage which it would be in her power to offer them. As a matter of fact, reciprocity treaties were actually negotiated between the United States, Brazil, and Spain in Cuba, but were never effective. This is, of course, the merest outline of the economic situation, and it would be incomplete without a mention of the possible changes to be wrought by the canal, which, among other things, will undoubtedly bring the manufacturing cities of the Eastern States into closer touch with the Pacific slopes.¹

¹ "Of the total imports of all South America, 87 per cent. is taken by the countries bordering upon the two oceans, and but 13 per cent. by those bordering upon the Caribbean. Marching down the eastern coast of South America, we find Brazil importing, in 1899, goods to the value of over \$105,000,000, of which the United States supplied about 10 per cent.; Uruguay and Paraguay, \$26,000,000, of which our share was less than 7 per cent.; and Argentina, \$112,000,000, of which about 10 per cent was from the United States; while a tour of the Pacific coast shows importations into Chili of \$38,000,000; Peru, \$8,500,000; Bolivia, \$11,600,000; and Ecuador, \$7,000,000; the proportion from the United States averaging about 10 per cent. Thus the northern coast of South America, fronting on the Caribbean Sea, imports goods to the value of \$36,000,000, of which we supply an average of 25 per cent.; the eastern coast, fronting upon the Atlantic, \$275,000,000, and the Pacific coast, \$60,000,000, of which our proportion is

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Arbitration has always been one of the most cherished goals of Pan-Americanism, and the desire of the United States naturally has been that she, as the head of the American hegemony, should act as arbitrator. This scheme, however, broke down from the very beginning, owing to the jealousies and warlike tendencies of the Latin-American peoples. It is notable that in recent times, in three distinct cases, European powers have been called upon to arbitrate in South America, and that not the slightest disposition has been evinced to appeal to Washington except as a protection against European claims.

There have been altogether four Pan-American conferences. The one initiated by Bolivar at Panama was a complete fiasco, the United States, Chili, Brazil, and Buenos Ayres being unrepresentative

in each case about 10 per cent. In 1868 our sales to the countries lying south of us were 20 per cent. of our total exports; in 1878, a little less than 10 per cent.; in 1888, a fraction above 10 per cent; in 1898, but 7 per cent.; and in 1901 about 9 per cent. of our total exports. An examination of our list of purchases from the Central and South American countries seems to increase the anomaly presented by their small purchases from us. Of Brazil we are by far the largest single customer in her chief articles of export, coffee and rubber, while from Argentina and Chili our purchases of wool and hides are also heavy, and for the tropical products of the other countries of South America—sugar, spices, fruits, dye-woods, cabinet-woods, textiles, and chemicles—the United States offers a constant and rapidly increasing market. From the countries of South America the United States, in 1901, purchased goods valued at \$110,329,667, while her sales to them in that year were but \$44,770,888, less than one-half of her purchases from them.” — BUREAU OF STATISTICS, WASHINGTON.

sented. A sort of offensive and defensive alliance was entered into by the delegates, but only Colombia ratified the agreement. Next year, when the United States delegates did attend a meeting, those from the southern and central republics were too much employed in cutting one another's throats.¹ The next conference was not held till 1883, when a number of delegates from the Spanish-American states assembled at Caracas, and another body at Buenos Ayres, with no practical result. It was in 1889-90 that all the American republics met in conclave at Washington, on the invitation of the United States President. Of their two main objects, commercial union and arbitration, we have already spoken; incidentally, a variety of other subjects came under discussion, but the results were meagre. They included the survey for an intercontinental railway; a monetary commission, which led to the Brussels conference, but to nothing more; and, finally, to the establishment at Washington of a Bureau of American Republics for the collection and dissemination of information concerning those countries. This last is practically the only part of the Pan-American scheme which has yet been carried through. In 1902 the city of Mexico was the scene of a further meeting, at which all the South American republics were represented. Their conclusions are said

¹ Clay upheld the solidarity of the interests of all the American republics, and wished it to assume a concerted form in the congress of Panama.

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to have been "pacific, if not unanimous." The chief result of their deliberations seems to have been an agreement to refer cases affecting private claims to arbitration, while ten of the nineteen nations represented agreed to make arbitration compulsory in controversies which do not "affect their independence or national honor." The United States did not participate in this decision. More practical results were arrived at in the discussion of matters such as extradition, copyright, sanitary laws, and other circumstances affecting international intercourse; and, to insure the effectiveness of all these decisions, it was decided to call another conference in five years' time to consider them in the light of experience.

While it is obviously useful for the young American republics, on the eve of a wide development, to discuss all these questions which have been settled by usage and international law between older nations, yet they cannot be in any way considered as steps in the direction of closer union. Very different estimates of the value of these conferences are held in the Anglo-American and Latin-American countries. While writers in the United States declare that a great advance has been made in republican government, elements so discordant having been brought to agreement on important subjects, a Mexican statesman laments that Spanish-Americans should be thus encouraged in the expression of vague and lofty sentiments when real mutual interests, the bed-rock of united action,

are lacking. It is impossible not to feel, with this distinguished Latin-American, that anything which directs the energies of his people towards academic discussion or oratory is to be deplored.

The interests of the South American republics are above everything commercial, and it is of vital importance to them, in retaining their independence, that they should not only become as far as possible self-supporting, but should be economically independent of any one power. Europe, therefore, with several powers as competitors, is a better field than the United States would be, especially as South America is complementary to Europe, but would be to a great extent an intruder in North American markets. From a variety of causes, moreover, the United States has failed to establish herself as the rival of Europe in South America. Her trade is declining while that of Europe increases. It is remarkable that there is no United States bank in all South America, all the banks being English or German with the exception of a small French one. A certain number of concessions for railways and public works are obtained by Americans, but at a certain stage they almost invariably pass into European hands. Americans, in dealing with South American trade, avoid doing business with the natives, and work entirely through the agency of English, German, Portuguese, or Italian houses. Their objection to the natives is their unbusiness-like habits, and the want of security, but the true

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reason is the characteristic impatience of the United States citizen and his desire to make a fortune at once. He is not prepared to play a waiting game, to give long credit, and to possess his soul during interminable delays. It is therefore not surprising that, while Europe has invested—in government bonds, railroads, banks, gas companies, dock companies, and similar ventures—not less than one billion dollars (two hundred million pounds), the United States capital invested probably does not exceed ten to fifteen million dollars (two to three million pounds sterling). European capital holds the place in South America which United States capital has gained in Mexico and the West Indies, and the general conclusion from all this is that the southern continent must be considered as far from being an open field for American commercial expansion. Intellectually and socially, there is more sympathy with the Old World.

Politically, Pan-Americanism is inextricably interwoven with the Monroe Doctrine, and although we have said that, for Blaine, at least, it meant the political paramountcy of his own country, yet the fine shades which have been read into the pronouncement of the unconscious Monroe deserve some more detailed discussion.

It is important to note, first, that the Monroe Doctrine, however interpreted, is a matter of policy and not of international law. It was originally designed in Europe, but has been used by

all successive American politicians to give authority to whatever policy seemed most likely to secure the ascendancy of the United States and further her prosperity. The fundamental principle underlying every interpretation of Monroe's famous message is the very ancient and trite one that might is right. The United States at a very early period "bluffed" successfully in this matter, and now that her position is really strong and secure she lays the flattering unction to her soul that she is only acting "consistently" in her high-handed attitude. There is nothing new in the history of nations in all this. Britain has frequently made use of similar hypocrisies. Russia is a past-mistress in the art. Diplomacy was invented to make such situations possible without vulgar jars between nations. It is just as well, however, to recognize the truth. "Hands off, Europe!" is the plain meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, and the United States is prepared to back it by force if necessary. She feels strong enough in her position as the wealthiest, most progressive, and rapidly increasing nation in the western hemisphere to maintain herself as practically a sovereign, or, to put it less bluntly, as "the head of the American hegemony."

Although the situation is simple enough in outline, it becomes difficult in detail. We have already seen that such matters as arbitration and commercial union, which should surely be possible without a hegemony, have so far proved im-

practicable. American statesmen repudiate the idea that the United States desires to establish a protectorate of all Latin-American republics, and yet in practice, if the doctrine is carried to its logical conclusion, that is what they are bound to do. The difficult thing about a loosely defined policy of such wide possibilities is its inevitable growth to inconvenient proportions. It began with the mere statement that Europe was not to colonize on the American continent or be permitted to intervene in her affairs. This was enlarged by Polk to mean that not only aggression or intervention by Europe was forbidden, but the transfer of territory, the establishment or acquisition of dominion, even if voluntarily made.¹ The third development, chiefly formulated by Blaine in 1881, went further than fixing the inviolability of the American continents; it abrogated to the United States certain rights over territory of other American peoples—*i.e.*, in the isthmus—and as arbitrator of disputes. The fourth interpretation—undefined, perhaps, as yet, but inferred—is simply the right of the United States to be regarded as paramount in the whole of the western hemisphere, a right which she, believing it to be necessary to her national interests, is prepared to uphold.

The slight sketch we have given of the growth and decline of Pan-Americanism is conclusive of

¹ *The Monroe Doctrine*, 1903, by Whitelaw Reid.

one fact — that, so far as the South - American continent is concerned, this liberal interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine is made by the United States on her own authority. She is, in fact, assuming a position by right of strength which is not accorded her unanimously by her weaker sisters. South America, while ready to invoke her when convenient, is not prepared, by joining an "American hegemony," to forfeit any of her initiative or to loosen the bonds which tie her to Europe, where her republics stand on equal terms with independent powers, in favor of a subordinate position in the family of American States.

From the European point of view the position presents great difficulties. If the United States is determined to spread her mantle over the two continents, what will happen in the event of complications between any Latin-American state and Europe? We have already had an instance of what is likely to happen; but Venezuela cannot be an indefinite precedent, nor is it possible that the Latin-American politicians of the more irresponsible sort can continue to regard the doctrine as a dispensation of Providence to secure immunity for their misdeeds. Mr. Roosevelt has declared that his country has not the slightest wish to assume responsibility for Spanish-American misconduct, and that, in the event of a republic having a misunderstanding with Europe, the quarrel must be settled between them "by

any one of the usual methods.”¹ Unfortunately, power, without responsibility, though an ideal state, is not easily attained in a too-imperfect world. The reference of the Venezuela claims to The Hague tribunal will evoke a far-reaching decision on the subject of “pacific blockade.” The question is whether such action on the part of creditor nations is to constitute a preferential claim on their part. If so, there will obviously be a great temptation to European powers to employ the “pacific blockade” whenever they have a difficulty in collecting their debts, and, when the chronic financial troubles of South American republics are considered, it is evident that a very serious situation may arise. If, however, the “pacific blockade” is not to constitute a preferential claim, by what means are European nations to seek redress for non-recognition by independent states of freely incurred obligations? Whichever way the decision goes the responsibility of the United States seems to be increased; since she stipulated (in 1899) that nothing in The Hague convention is to be construed as implying a relinquishment by her of her traditional attitude towards purely American questions. Therefore, she is either in the position of sanctioning action on the part of Europe which may lead to a direct violation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, or she must assume herself the task of keeping the

¹ *American Ideals*, 1897.

recalcitrant states to the fulfilment of their obligations. In the latter case she must become either a debt collector and board of correction, or an international bankruptcy court.¹

The practical question is, how far south is the United States prepared to follow this doctrine, and in this matter she has to consult merely her real national interests. It is a foolish ebullition of spread-eagleism which insists on the unbounded sovereignty of the United States in the western hemisphere. A great nation is never greater than when it recognizes its true limitations, and the United States has to strain herself to the utmost to be successful in what she has already undertaken. Whatever the fate of Pan-Americanism, it is certain that a complete revolution of prevailing conditions must take place before the United States can occupy the place she claims in the southern continent. Whether she will be wise to pursue the will-o'-the-wisp of an "American hegemony" is a question which deeply affects the future of Greater America.

¹ To obtain an idea of the indebtedness of the South American republics and their financial position, the reader is referred to Appendix B.

CHAPTER X

CANADA AND PAN-AMERICANISM

It is obvious that the expression "Pan-Americanism" will never be more than a *façon de parler* unless the great country of Canada, becoming detached from the British Empire, can be included in a federation of American republics. It is significant that one naturally thinks of federation rather than of annexation, since it is not very long ago that the latter expression was heard freely on both sides of the Atlantic. The growth of imperialism in the mother-country has made it almost impossible to realize the frame of mind in which British statesmen spoke of the annexation of Canada by the United States as inevitable, and at the same time there is a far less certain note among Americans themselves as to their manifest destiny in becoming undisputed masters of the whole northern continent. It is not too much to say that forcible projects have been altogether abandoned, and that the United States relies on an economic conquest and on the growing strength and prosperity of the Dominion, which will cause her to become independent of Britain,

when she will be bound to seek admittance into the American family.

There are two or three main points in the view taken by the United States which must be briefly stated. She is conscious of her own superiority in wealth and progress over Canada, and is convinced that the latter owes her comparative backwardness to the baneful effect of her "colonial" position. An average American is certain that Canada has only to "cut the painter" in order to become in all respects as prosperous as the United States. Incidentally, he is also convinced that independence of Great Britain would mean dependence on the United States, and in this he is probably correct. It is impossible to dissociate these two ideas, so that in no case can the American view be considered disinterested. The potential value of Canada to the American Republic is hardly to be questioned, especially since the opening of the Northwest, but there may well be two opinions as to the advantages to be reaped by Canada from a political, or even a commercial, union with her great neighbor.

Without discussing in detail the relations between Canada and the United States in the past, it is necessary to recall the main features of their intercourse. First we have invasion by the new-born republic and a long period of hostility, in which the religious and racial antipathies of the French of Lower Canada and the Puritans of New England played a great part. After 1812 actual

hostilities ceased, except for the abortive Fenian invasions in 1866 and 1870. The commercial relations, however, were strained in proportion as actual aggression subsided. Until the middle of the nineteenth century the British American colonies had the advantage of British preferential tariffs, which did as much for the timber trade in Canada as for sugar in the West Indies. To this period belongs the activity in Canadian shipyards which is now quite a thing of the past. The adoption of free-trade by the mother-country, followed as it was by a period of great progress and prosperity, which owed much to the discoveries of science and to European conditions, was felt by the Canadians as inimical to their interests. The negotiation of a reciprocity treaty, in 1854, with the United States by Lord Elgin (who was said to have floated it on "seas of champagne") was, however, a great stimulus to the struggling British and French communities, providing, as it did, for a free exchange of the products of river, field, wood, and mine. In the then condition of communications with the mother-country this was most important; but, even so, the desire for protection of Canadian industries led to the formation of a protection association in 1858, and the Galt tariff was framed, despite protests from England. Thus began the local control of tariff conditions. The American civil war, which dislocated commerce in the States, proved a great stimulus to Canada, which enjoyed

a period of prosperity, at first little disturbed by the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty in 1866, since the Canadian tariff, though low, was sufficient for the protection of local interests. But when American industries began their career of phenomenal success and expansion, the Canadians, who had not the same stimulus, felt the need either for more protection or for commercial union. They saw two great streams of economic prosperity, in their mother-land and the neighbor republic, both passing them by. Canada, moreover, was at this time in the throes of political change. Responsible government in 1864 proved ineffective, and was finally succeeded, in 1867, by federation. Public opinion being then for the first time divided less on racial and more on political lines, Canada entered on a more coherent phase of her history. Protection, on the one hand, and reciprocity with the United States, on the other, were keenly discussed, but the doubts entertained by the Conservative party as to the ultimate results of the latter on Canadian nationality led to a protection policy during the whole period of Sir John Macdonald's ministry. In 1891, pressure brought to bear by the Liberals under Mr. (now Sir Wilfrid) Laurier, who made "unrestricted reciprocity" the battle-cry, led to the despatch of a delegation to Washington. The United States, however, declined any terms save those of a common tariff against the world. In 1896 a joint high commission met to discuss a

number of disputed points between Canada and the United States, but the latter declined to consider the question of reciprocity. Rebuffed thus in his efforts to obtain reciprocity, Sir Wilfrid Laurier openly stated in Parliament, "There will be no more delegations to Washington" in search of reciprocity, and the Canadian government forthwith made British preference and the cultivation of the British market the centre of its policy as regards external trade. The results of an independent attitude speak for themselves.

The question of sentiment has been freely canvassed in connection with Canada, and must, of course, play a great part in her relations with Britain. There are, however, several interesting features about this question, and not least is the fact of its very recent development. In the early years of the United States independence the avowed intention of the revolted colonies to take Canada at the point of the sword united the British and French in that country. The settlement of a number of fugitives from all parts of the revolted provinces, the United Empire Loyalists, imparted a spirit of devotion to the flag for which these people had sacrificed their homes and come to a land believed to be in perpetual winter. During the years which followed, the presence of a large French population in Lower Canada had a twofold influence. It largely prevented amalgamation between colonists on either side of the border-line, the religious question

alone being sufficient to do this, and it prevented Canada from attaining within her own borders that homogeneity which is essential to the development of a true national spirit. If Canada remained colonial in spirit, as well as in fact, she owed it to the jealous antipathies of the French Canadians, who, in their anxiety to guard their own idiosyncrasies, effectually barred the way to a wider and fuller national existence. How well they have succeeded is notorious. They have preserved language, traditions, habits of mind and thought, and, above all, the prejudice and superstition of their sturdy northern French forebears. The peasantry are, as a rule, densely ignorant, dominated by their priests, whose influence, if patriarchal, is conservative and opposed to modern education and progress. They are the best of settlers, farmers and agriculturalists, and the upper classes are brilliant in the learned professions and arts; but they are the antithesis of the Anglo-American, and are not likely to rival him in commercial progress. Their sentiments towards Great Britain are the fruit of peculiar circumstances. Under her flag they enjoy the utmost freedom, and they are not discontented, as are some other Canadians, with the economic position of the country as compared with the United States. But, intellectually, their sympathies go rather to the country whose language and literature are theirs, and although they may be loyal to Britain, it is a matter not of sentiment but of interest and

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convenience. As Canadians they are more consistent, desiring the independence of the country and its freedom to work out its own salvation, but above everything they are jealous to preserve their own influence on its affairs. Their loyalty to the Dominion, therefore, need not be questioned, but the imperialist ideal, unless it can be made to appeal to their self-interest, will fall on deaf ears. What do the arguments about the past glories of the empire, the ties of blood, or the common heritage in literature and tradition, mean to a people who are intensely conservative of their French blood and habits?

At the same time it is hard to see what inducements the American Republic could offer which would persuade the French Canadians to come under the Stars and Stripes. The peculiar form of autonomy which they possess would be, to say the least, considerably modified by the Americanization of the Canadian provinces. Their numerical advantages would be lost, their influence outweighed, and, above all, the paramountcy of the Church, which is an extraordinary factor in French-Canadian politics, would be seriously threatened. The liberty accorded to religion in the United States is undeniable, but the spirit of American democracy is wholly opposed to the exercise of priestly authority in political affairs, and the Canadian *curés* are well aware of this. When one remembers the very large proportion of Roman Catholics in Lower Canada, it is impossible

to discount the religious factor in the question of Canadian relations with the United States.

While French immigration to Canada stopped some forty years ago, so that the French population has had a period of crystallization, constant intercourse with the mother-country, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, has introduced new and incongruous elements into Canada. The prevailing type, however, may be generally said to be more akin to the American than the British, which is only natural. The conditions of life approximate far more nearly on the continent on both sides of the border, and climatic and physical conditions are similar.

It becomes increasingly difficult to estimate the exact degree of the sentimental bond between Canada, as a whole, and the mother-country. There are, of course, extremists on both sides—men whose intense loyalty to the crown and capabilities for sacrifice to the cause of imperial unity are their most vital characteristics; and others who declare openly that the old country is played out, that they owe it nothing and can gain nothing by allegiance to an obsolete form of government. Public opinion, too, is of all shades, varying in different parts of the country, but in one respect there has been ever since federation a bond of unity between all sections which grows steadily in strength. This is the sentiment of Canadian patriotism—an increasing pride and be-

lief in their own country and a desire to set her firmly among the nations.

The progress and expansion of the last decade have bred self-confidence. No longer does the Canadian sigh for the crumbs that fall from the United States table. Already he looks forward to a period in which he will be as strong and prosperous as his neighbor; and as the tide of immigration turns steadily towards his vast, unpopulated regions, he feels confident that a few more years will make Canada great not only in size and resources but in population and power. It is not unreasonable that the loyal Canadians should put Canada first and the empire next, and it must be confessed that the policy of the mother-country has sometimes strained their patriotism to the utmost. The important point is to realize, as far as possible, the extent to which Canada will find it to her own interest to remain within the British Empire. Given a sound backbone of tradition and sentiment, what are the practical considerations which will weigh with a Canadian who desires first of all the prosperity of his own country?

They are twofold in character—political and commercial. The former include the consideration of what Canada avoids by being under the British flag. She is spared the full burden of defence, for whatever may be said by the Little Canadians and the opponents of militarism, it would be impossible for Canada, as an independent republic,

to escape from the modern tendency which is arming every nation to the teeth. This prevalent tendency is not confined to Europe. Nor could Canada presume on her isolation—isolation at this period of world-history is mythical. It has been recently urged that so far as defence is concerned Canada would be no worse off without the mother-country, this argument being founded on the idea that the only power who would or could attack her is the United States, and that Britain is both unprepared to oppose the United States in any case, and incapable of garrisoning the Canadian frontier. The propounder of this argument forgets that frontiers are not the only points of attack; that naval warfare in the Caribbean decided the fate of Europe, and that trade expansion in modern times must inevitably be defended by a fleet. The United States, Russia, and Germany are all becoming strong naval powers. How could an independent Canada hold her own with them? As an independent nation she might form a defensive alliance with the United States, but she could hardly secure this without taking some of the burden on her own shoulders, and would therefore be launched on that career of "militarism" which she is so anxious to avoid. It must be remembered that the day of isolation, of freedom from European entanglements, is over for North America; and Canada, as part of the British Empire, actually avoids, instead of incurring, the responsibilities which international relations im-

pose. That she is anxious to control more fully her own foreign relations is perhaps not unnatural when we remember the mistaken policy of the past. That some people even desire to make their own treaties, looking to Britain to enforce them, is, perhaps, a sign of the times; but the true statesmanship of the country sees the inconsistency of the attitude, and will concentrate its efforts rather on the building up of a genuine imperial policy and securing adequate colonial representation in all cases.

To turn to the commercial aspect of the situation, it may be premised that whatever may be the arguments for or against commercial union with the United States, it must not be concluded that consolidation of interests is always an un-mixed blessing. In national as well as in business affairs the Trust may become a power for evil. This would apply with equal force to commercial union with the mother-country were it not that her geographical circumstances and her extraordinarily diversified interests make a monopolistic policy impossible to her. So far the failure to obtain reciprocity with the United States has decided Canada to develop her trade on independent lines, with the result that it has more than doubled in the last seven years. But owing to the proximity of the United States and the facilities of transportation afforded by the railways across the border, converging on American ports, and to the neglect of Canada and the

mother-land to open the country and settle it up, the balance of trade is greatly in favor of the United States. While the exports to that country are seventy million dollars and the imports over one hundred and twenty millions, the exports to Great Britain are one hundred and five million dollars and the imports only forty-nine millions. The exports to Great Britain form 57 per cent. of the total, against 34 per cent. to the United States, while the imports are respectively only 24 against 60 per cent. There is, therefore, a credit, as regards British trade, in favor of Canada of fifty-six million dollars annually, while, on the contrary, in the United States trade the credit is against Canada to the extent of fifty million dollars annually. It is significant that the United States trade with Canada's population of six millions is greater than with the fifty-four millions in Mexico and Central and South America. It is, therefore, obvious that whatever may be the inducements towards a commercial union with the United States, they cannot at present outweigh those in favor of retaining and expanding the trade with the mother-country. Later on we must return to the subject with a view to its effect on Canadian development.

The advantage of unrestricted trade with the mother-country Canada has hitherto shared with other nations, but the turning-point in Britain's commercial history has now arrived, and in the near future we may be able to point to a distinct

and tangible advantage which our colonies will possess over their rivals in our markets. The immense revolution in public opinion in Great Britain as regards the self-governing dependencies has certainly knit closer the bonds of empire, and those bonds are not altogether sentimental ones. It is to our interest to retain the colonies, though we have been some time in realizing it, but it is to their interest to stay with us, and we are powerful enough to make that interest still stronger.

As has been said already, recent years have witnessed a remarkable growth of what is known as the Imperialist spirit. There is still a good deal of misapprehension on this subject, and it would be well if we could clear away the idea that Imperialism is founded entirely on sentiment. Sentiment plays a part in practice, but it is just as well to reckon without it in theory; then one is on the safe side. The modern school of Imperialism owns as its adherents some hard-headed business-men, and is, in fact, founded on the solid rock of self-interest and self-preservation. We of the motherland do not ask any sacrifices of our colonies in aid of Imperialism; we have exacted them before, and even recently, but they have been the fruit of an essentially non-imperial policy. We do not desire to drag them into European wars, nor to restrict their autonomy, nor to sap their independence in any way. None of these measures would, in our opinion, be advantageous either to them or to us, since their prosperity, progress, and contentment

are as essential in our eyes as in their own. It is merely a question of the long and the short view, and just as the keenest business-man is he who can look farthest, the best Imperialist is he who looks to the future and permanent prosperity of every part of Greater Britain rather than to a temporary advantage for one or other section. Young countries—little versed in world affairs, inexperienced, often slaves of a democracy which cannot see beyond its own nose—find a difficulty in taking this view of their affairs; but in the case of Canada the alternative to Imperialism is so plain that a decision is forced on her. Great Britain has a great part to play in this matter, and in the fervor of her new Imperialism she may play it well. If Britons had only the sturdy self-confidence and belief in their own destiny which animate the citizens of the United States they would not contemplate the secession of Canada for one moment.

We believe that with our help Canada can become, if not economically independent of the United States, at all events so placed that she can obtain advantageous terms with that country. She will be enabled to hold her own without becoming a part of the hegemony of the North American continent—a hegemony in which she could only play a subordinate part. There is naturally a strong objection held in Canada to the Monroe Doctrine in its extreme form. If the doctrine is to mean merely that there is to be

no new territorial acquisition in America by any European power, then there can be no objection. That is a protection to Canada. But should an attempt be made to exercise control or authority in the hemisphere over countries independent of the United States, the doctrine would then become intolerable.

We have seen how the expansion of the United States, while bringing the advantages of a superior civilization to tropical countries, has superimposed the problems of a modern democracy on those of a less advanced stage of social evolution. It has also introduced alien problems into the home government; and, in effect, we see a country, nominally under the most simple and direct form of government—the will of the people—in reality manipulated by the most complex and expensive machine in existence. Canadians, though enjoying to the full every right of local autonomy and citizenship, have so far been spared many of the undesirable sides of American political life—the recklessness in expenditure, the terrible corruption, the Spoils System, and the complications of the “machine.” They are spared much of the interference with labor conditions, which is one of the gravest problems in the United States; they are spared the evils of the elective judicial system; and, being assured of fairness and impartiality in their courts and a less procrastinating method of procedure, they do not resort to lynch law. They have, moreover, the advantage of more uniform

codes, which obviate the disorder and inconvenience arising from a multiplicity and variety of State laws. A permanent Civil Service maintains a regular and able administration. Under a monarchical form they are able, in fact, to control their own government absolutely. In the United States the election of a President practically settles the policy of the country, not merely on great but on small matters also, for four years. The Canadian government can be overthrown and replaced in forty-eight hours, and holds office practically only so long as it has the confidence of the people. As for the direction of foreign affairs and relations, those prerogatives are, in truth, as much under popular control in the one country as in the other. The Canadians would not gain any real and practical accession of liberty by changing their flag. They are free also from foreign entanglements and race problems, in all of which the British Empire bears its burden without assistance from Canada, save what she chooses to give at critical times. An inclusion in, or federation with, the Union would necessitate a full share in all continental and even some over-sea problems. There is a great repugnance in Canada to a country with a vast black problem—blacks *with* votes, to balance theirs—instead of, as now within the empire, blacks *without* votes. To leave the British Empire for the American federal empire would, therefore, be not altogether a change for the better; and although a time may

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arrive when Canada is strong enough to be independent of either the United States or Great Britain, she has certainly not yet arrived at that stage.

But, although the Americanization of Canada may seem neither imminent nor desirable to us, it may appear quite otherwise to men born and bred under the Stars and Stripes who are now pouring over the border into the Dominion. This immigration from the United States has amounted to one hundred and twenty thousand in the last few years, and equalled last year that from Great Britain. Of these immigrants, however, some were returning Canadians, or children of Canadians, while others were recent emigrants to the United States of alien origin. Over seventy per cent. become naturalized, that being necessary for the holding of government lands. The simple reason for this immigration is the cheapness and fertility of land in the Canadian northwest and the fact that most of the good United States lands have been taken up. So much is this the case that artificial irrigation is already widely applied over considerable areas and will be greatly extended as the land pressure increases.

Canada has three hundred and twenty million acres still available in the northwest, and, besides, an enormous territory in British Columbia and the east, the extent of which cannot at present be estimated, all within the zone of wheat. At a moderate estimate the Dominion could support a

population of at least a hundred millions; but it is quality and not quantity which should be the desideratum.

Unless these wheat-growing lands are to be pre-empted by the United States, we must be prepared to increase the tide of immigration from Britain. The United States immigrants are, of course, given a strong handicap from the first. They are accustomed to the sort of life they will lead in their new home, being largely of pioneer stock, and they have no sea journey or uprooting from age-long traditions to face. The British immigrant has other disqualifications. He is too often city-bred, for the agricultural population of Britain has dwindled to a point when laborers are at a premium; and, therefore, it is the overcrowded urban centres which need to be depleted. The promoter of British immigration has, therefore, to expect a certain percentage of failure, but there has been a distinct improvement lately in this respect. Of the steady stream which has been, for years, pouring overseas, too large a part used to be absorbed in the United States. The tide has now turned in favor of Canada; an improvement in the quality of immigrants is rendered possible by the prospects afforded in the Canadian northwest, and, despite the influx of American farmers, there is a hopeful prospect of maintaining the ties of blood with the mother-country.

This is the situation at a time when Great

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Britain is asked, not to reverse her whole commercial policy, as is sometimes stated, but to reconsider it in detail. The bearing of this momentous question on Pan-Americanism in the northern continent may not be clear to some people, who deny either the necessity for action or the efficacy of the measures proposed. The writer has tried to make plain the grounds on which he founds his belief that action of some kind, both to stimulate Canada's progress and to knit her closer to us, is of urgent necessity. Upon our relations with Canada in the present depends the trend of her future development. Upon the amount of influence with her which we retain depends that to be exercised by the United States. This is not the place in which fiscal policy can be discussed, but there is an aspect of the question which must be considered. Canada must have reciprocity either with us or with the United States. The latter has hitherto refused it, apparently on the principle of all or none; but her attitude as to tariffs must in any case undergo a modification before long, and, far from being inclined to retaliate upon Britain, should the latter embark upon a system of preference, she is far more likely to make the best of the situation and come to terms. If Great Britain persists in her present commercial policy, however, she will see a reciprocity treaty between Canada and the United States, obtained by the sacrifice of purely British interests in the Dominion, and the consequence would be not only

closer commercial union but the beginnings of political assimilation. When two countries, so closely united by propinquity and by many points of character as Canada and the United States, become one for purposes of commerce, the result is inevitable. It has been said already that this would not be, in the writer's opinion, for the truest interests of Canada, nor desired by loyal Canadians, but the strengthening of the commercial bond would mean the constant increase of the American stake in the country,¹ the exploitation of its resources by people politically non-British, and the swamping of the Canadian by his wealthier and more powerful cousins across the border.

It is said by some opponents of fiscal reform that Canada cannot afford to put any restrictions on her trade with the United States, since the latter could crush her by retaliation. As the Canadians take far more from the United States than they send to her, this is not a very conclusive argument; but the strongest point in the case for closer commercial union with Great Britain is the fact that the British Empire is an unrivalled market for Canadian produce.

¹ The amount of American capital invested in Canada cannot be estimated with any approach to accuracy. It is found in large amounts, stretching across the continent from Cape Breton to Vancouver or to Alaska, and would, according to a good authority, "run into the hundreds of millions" (dollars). A considerable portion is invested originally for the purpose of bringing enterprises to such a stage of development as will induce British capitalists to buy at an enhanced price.

The actual attitude of Canadians towards the reciprocity question is hardly less involved than that of their sentiment for Great Britain, with which, of course, it is closely connected. Generally speaking, it may be said that the manufacturing interest is solidly in favor of reciprocity with Great Britain. As Britain would aim particularly at the protection of agricultural industries, the food-supply question being the basis of any rearrangement of her fiscal system, there is every reason to believe that the scheme will appeal to a wide circle of Canadians. The northwest, at present cut off from communications except southward, and with a large element of American citizens as a make-weight, is, perhaps, inclined to favor American reciprocity; and a section in the northeast, whose trade is largely with New England, shares these views. The French element is uncertain, inclined to oppose anything which strengthens the ties with Britain, but more averse still to the increase of United States influence. Taking all these diverse views and interests into consideration, it is clear that, at present, the country as a whole still looks to Great Britain for that support which will enable her to continue the work of self-development.

There is one agency at work, silently, unobtrusively, which is tending to strengthen American influence in Canada—namely, the dependence of the Dominion on the American press, supplemented by the service supplied by the cable

agencies. These naturally supply news dealing with American topics and tinged with American ideas, for the cabled news is prepared primarily for consumption in the United States. It is difficult, no doubt, to combat this influence, in view of the capital and enterprise of the American press and news agencies, but a direct service of news, dealing with affairs from the British stand-point, is one of the measures which would help to develop the Dominion on British lines. There should also be a more enlightened policy on the part of the British post-office, which actually puts such a tax on English periodicals sent to Canada that the Canadian market is supplied with *American* editions of the English illustrated papers and magazines, all crammed, of course with American advertisements.


In this work the matter of communications is of equal importance with that of commercial union. Is the stream of progress, the route of trade, to flow east and west or north and south? Railways must largely decide this. At present, it must be confessed, the railway system is very greatly dependent on the United States, and closely linked to it. The defective steam communication with Great Britain has been responsible to a great extent for the settlement of so large a proportion of British immigrants on United States soil. Not merely has the superiority of the lines to New York and Boston drawn great numbers of immigrants to settle in the United States, but many


intending to go to Canada have been diverted by the railway companies on landing at the American ports. With improved lines of fast steamers and increased activity on the part of Canadian emigration agents in Britain, we may expect to see a steady increase in the stream which has set in from the old country direct to Canada.

It is, perhaps, of even greater importance to be able to convey immigrants, on landing, straight to the new lands which await them. Too often they drift into the large cities or towns, and a good settler is lost. Eastern Canada is now in process of development as a manufacturing centre, and its interests are widely different from those of the centre, northwest, and west, which are essentially agricultural, mineral, and forest lands. The Canadian Pacific Railway has done something to tie together the different sections, but it deals only with a comparatively narrow belt, and in such a vast territory a single line is altogether inadequate. The "Inter-Colonial" line (one thousand, three hundred, and thirty-three miles in length), built to bind together the outlying Atlantic provinces to the rest of the Dominion, has accomplished the business for which it was built. Confederation could never have been carried through without it. There has often—but not always—been a deficiency of earnings; but that is because it has been worked as a State railway for national ends. The results have been worth ten times the sacrifice. The principal proposals for opening up the Dominion

are those for the Canadian Northern, the Grand Trunk Pacific, and the Trans-Canada railways. The directions of these may be best seen by a reference to the sketch map. Of the three only one is at present in active construction—the Canadian Northern, of which one thousand, four hundred miles are completed. A bill has now, however, passed the federal Parliament for the second, and this line, which will be nearly four thousand miles long, gives an important alternative transcontinental line. The most far-reaching of these projects is, however, the Trans-Canada line, which, stupendous as it may seem, running to a large extent through territory now unpopulated, would undoubtedly possess the greatest economic and strategic value; tapping, as it would, that great northwest to which the future of Canada so largely belongs, providing a route at a safe distance from the international boundary, and encountering few engineering difficulties, except in crossing the Rockies. In these days of rapid construction such an enterprise, even preceding settlement, is not so fantastic as it may seem. Until, by means of such lines as these, Canada is really opened to immigration from the east as well as the south, and her prosperity insured by bringing her produce within reach of the European markets, there will undoubtedly be a critical period in Canadian history. For the opening of communications from east to west, Canada enjoys a great advantage over her neighbor republic in the possession of fine

ports both on the Atlantic and Pacific, and splendid coal supplies on either seaboard; still more in her wonderful system of water-communication—the finest in the continent—the St. Lawrence, with the Great Lakes, and possible canals to complete the efficiency and cheapness of these lines of transport. American wheat traffic is already beginning to be deflected to Montreal, and improvements will increase the tendency. The conflicting elements in Canadian affairs seem to be summed up in this matter of north and south *versus* east and west. It is generally assumed that Canada is fighting against nature in the effort to develop on latitudinal lines. There are, however, two strong magnets drawing Canadian trade from east to west. One is the recently opened and rapidly developing Pacific region, with the Orient and Australasia. Canada possesses admirable ports on the Pacific coast, an advantage over the United States, which has none farther south than Puget Sound, save San Francisco. On the other hand is the magnet of the European market, which is complementary to Canada, whereas the United States is to a great extent her competitor. The different sections of Canada are precisely similar in conditions to the corresponding States just across the frontier. Ontario differs from Manitoba, but is similar in products to New York. Manitoba is different from British Columbia, but resembles Dakota and Minnesota, while Washington and Oregon resemble British Columbia. To de-





stroy the frontier-line would be to concentrate trade in the older and better-established American cities and to deplete the rising Canadian ones.

As it is, the United States farmer will probably emigrate in larger numbers to this virgin soil; the capitalist will continue his attempt to gain control of industries and communications; and propinquity may even prove too strong a factor for the young Canadian nationality to resist. But, as Canada has successfully escaped assimilation during her lean years, when the amazing prosperity of her neighbor was balanced against her own poverty and the indifferent attitude of the mother-country, there is ground for confidence in the breasts of loyal Canadians now that she is herself on the crest of the wave and now that Great Britain is at last awakening to the true Imperialism.

What, therefore, are the chances for Pan-Americanism on the northern continent? It is a difficult question to answer, depending as it does on so many alternatives. The main point, however, is the strength of Canadian sentiment—not what is usually called loyalty, but the honest determination of Canadians to work out their salvation on their own lines. They have far more chance of doing so under the wing of Great Britain than as a younger sister of the United States, and it is the loyalty of Canadians to their own country, the growth of a Canadian nationality, which should preserve the Dominion for

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a glorious future as part of a Federated Greater Britain.

When one remembers the size to which the American Republic has already grown, the rapid growth of "problems" which it has to face, and the probability that it will be drawn still farther into the arena of world politics, it seems far better for Canada (and for the United States also) that she should become a prosperous and independent nation, bound by links of blood and interest, but not by political ties, to her great neighbor, and destined, perhaps, to be one day a partner in a great federation of the English-speaking peoples—the mightiest union the world has ever seen.

CHAPTER XI

HOW GREATER AMERICA IS GOVERNED

THE term "United States of America" has ceased to be an accurate description of the countries over which the Stars and Stripes float. Like "United Kingdom," it applies merely to the central and dominating body, the seat of empire; and Greater America comprises almost as wide a range of governments as Greater Britain itself.

Broadly speaking, the American empire is composed of States, Territories, dependencies, and protectorates, but there is no uniform plan even within these limits. The two main features which distinguish each is the differing degree in which they enjoy control of their domestic affairs and the nature of their relations to the federal government. All States, being entitled to two Senators each, and representation in the House in proportion to their population, are on equal terms. Their relations to the federal government are somewhat difficult to define. To an American they are so much a matter of course that he does not pause to consider them, while a Briton tries in vain to find for them an analogy in his own experience. States are far more than English

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counties, and yet far less than sovereign bodies. Their independence is based on the Constitution, which was framed with the express purpose of reconciling them to a federal form of government, and yet, as Hamilton foresaw, the tendency has been, while retaining the letter of independence, to forfeit the spirit.

According to the Constitution, the government consists of three separate authorities—the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. The executive power is vested in the President, holding office for a term of four years, elected not by the qualified voters, but by a number of electors appointed by each State. The two elective legislative bodies, the Senate and the House of Representatives, which constitute the Congress, were created with the express purpose of drawing the States together. The Senators, elected by the legislatures of the States, without reference to the number of voters, hold office for six years, one-third going out every two years. They can hardly, therefore, be regarded as a popular body. Their influence was expected to bring about a fusion of State into national interests (which it has actually accomplished), and a continuity of policy which would have been impossible with a more popular, easily swayed, and often - changed body. The office of Senator is one that is much sought after for various reasons, and carries with it a certain position, despite the general contempt of better-class Americans for any form of political life. The

House of Representatives numbers at present three hundred and eighty-six, elected for terms of two years. Electors selected in each State meet on a certain day and vote for the President and Vice-President, but each elector is pledged in advance to support the candidates selected by the party. The form of casting votes is, therefore, a farce. A majority of the electors elects the President, not a majority of the popular votes. The prevalent idea in Europe that the President is elected by a plebiscite is about as far from the truth as possible.¹ The creation of a body of selected electors to vote for the President was intended to remove that function from popular influence and insure that the choice should be made by men qualified to judge. In practice it has merely strengthened the hands of parties working the machine.

The functions of the federal government are so carefully laid down and so distinct from those of the States that since the civil war, which turned far more on a question of State privileges than on the actual point of slavery or non-slavery, there has been little friction. The States have the most complete control of their domestic concerns, and

¹ This description of elections in the United States is, of course, elementary. The British reader can find in more detailed works a full account of a most complicated system, the American reader knows all that is necessary of it. It is hardly possible for any one not a professional politician to follow the actual working of each part of the "machine" and appreciate their relation to one another.

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are legally empowered even to misgovern themselves, if they desire, with the simple proviso that they may not discriminate in tariffs against other States and that the federal government has the power to interfere in cases of riot or disorder. Police and judiciary are distinct in each State, a fact which is answerable for many anomalies in social conditions. The English reader, who is shocked at outbreaks of lynching, at the escape of a murderer from justice because of his high position in the State, and at other circumstances which, if they occurred in Europe, would argue a rotten condition of the entire judicial and police system of the country, must understand that these blemishes are due chiefly to local conditions, and that, deplorable as they are, they must not be taken as indicative of the whole tone of American society. A very serious drawback to true progress and a higher form of civilization is, however, found in the differences which exist between the constitutions of the various States.¹ Some are merely inconvenient; others are distinctly vicious in their influence; and all should by degrees disappear under a broader and more national system. They are the more anachronis-

¹ Examples of the differences in laws between the States are found in those relating to marriage, aliens, the ballot, census, constitutions, corporations, courts and judges, duelling, education, Governorships, salaries of State officials, divorce, insolvency, libel and liberty of the press, statutes of limitations, and other minor matters. The tenure of office varies greatly.

tic because, despite these attempts to maintain State individuality, there is, in fact, little of the real spirit of State patriotism. A sentiment which would inspire a man to labor for the better administration, or the social and educational progress, of his own State is far less common than it might be, and is chiefly replaced by a desire to make the most out of the State by obtaining those privileges and preferments which it is within her right to bestow. State politics have dwindled—the average man feels little interest in them; like every other branch of political life, they have been delegated to the professional, and so engulfed in the huge machine of party government. State elections are fought, not on State platforms, which might secure candidates pledged to local reforms, but on the wider national issues, and more particularly in the interests of the next Presidential election. This decay of the State is due to two causes—first, the awakening after the civil war of a more truly national spirit, fostered by freer communication and approximation of interests; secondly, the increase of national questions, and more particularly the oversea expansion of the past decade, which has inevitably strengthened this. Americans were a long time emerging from their colonial period—many of the States are little more than colonies even yet; but the assumption of imperial functions has had a wonderful effect in uniting the people of all sections; and the focus of their attention has become, not the local ar-

biter of provincial concerns, but the great federal power, which derives from themselves, and which they feel is playing a grand part in affairs of wider importance and more vital interest. Coincident with this growing sentiment of nationality has been, by a curious anomaly, the growth of the party system. The Constitution precludes the working of parties in Congress in the method to which Britons are accustomed. It was not intended that any group of men in the federal government should be able to rule the others, and yet the party system, on one basis or another, was inevitable. It has assumed in the United States the most insidious form—that of patronage.

As early as 1835, when De Tocqueville visited the country, there was evident that apathy as regards public affairs which has become so striking a feature of American life. With the modern phase of industrialism this is even more marked. The earlier stages of American history found people too busy to devote time to public affairs, and so professional politicians began their work. We have already seen how constant immigration tended to keep up this aloofness, on the one hand, and to supply ready-made politicians, on the other.¹ In the later stages we find America saddled with the results of this movement, in the shape of a huge monopolistic machine, through

¹ *The American People*, chapter i.

whose instrumentality the whole body politic is kept in motion, and whose levers are vested interests and patronage. Aloofness of the better-class citizens has become a habit accentuated by dislike and contempt for the methods of the "machine."

All nominations are made by and through the "machine"; all appointments are held for the term only during which a certain party can maintain its majority in the electoral college. Party, which to all outside observers seems singularly unobtrusive in Congress, has in reality secured a control which is all but absolute; and as there are practically only two parties—Republican and Democratic—it is obvious that a host of minor points of disagreement must be sacrificed to attain party unity. The work of legislation for so vast a territory as the United States alone, and the adequate protection of all the interests involved, are enough to absorb the time of the most carefully organized Congress. That body, however, was originally almost unorganized. It was devoid of the parliamentary machinery for introducing, forwarding, and despatching business which is provided in Britain by a ministry, with departments of specialized information under its control. No member of the executive sits in Congress, and, therefore, no one responsible for the carrying-out of the laws enacted is in a position either to initiate them directly or to criticise them when under discussion. The President alone can, and at times does, reject or veto them.

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Under a system by which all bills are practically private members' bills, and there is no guarantee for their responsibility or importance, it was necessary, even from the point of view of time, to provide some method of sifting them. Accordingly the practice of committees began, and is constantly increased. Many of them, of course, deal with subjects that overlap; all have by degrees become more and more subservient to party needs. Committees in the Senate are nominated by chairmen, each of whom, although nominally elected by vote in the open Senate, is in reality chosen in secret party conclave, and, as the party majority will not split its vote, the result is certain. The Speaker nominates the committees of the House of Representatives, and the member first named becomes chairman. Enormous power, therefore, rests with the Speaker, who also owes his election to a party majority.

This is no place in which to discuss at length the merits or demerits of the committee system. All that need be said is that government by committee is not popular government. The sense of the nation is not represented by a small group of men, arbitrarily selected, often for the direct purpose of either putting through some particular measure or of quashing the business in hand. Although the committees only advise, they have it practically in their hands to decide the fate of a bill, if not by a directly adverse report, by one or other

of the many tactics familiar in political life. But while they assume this position, they are not held responsible. It is the irresponsibility, as well as the inevitable privacy and consequent tendency to corruption, which makes the committee system a good servant but a bad master. Committees, it must be remembered, take the place of the ministries in other countries in supervising and checking the departments. They can summon departmental heads before them and demand minute reports. Nevertheless, it is notorious that they have frequently failed to detect the grossest cases of peculation and fraud; and this is, perhaps, not surprising when one recollects the methods on which they are constituted and the interests they are expected to guard.

In this brief and meagre description of the governmental system of the United States little has hitherto been said of the President, who is the head of this system. Very great difference of opinion prevails as to the exact extent of power wielded by the first citizen of the United States. In attempting to discriminate it is well to remember that written or constituted authority by no means exhausts the possibilities of the case, as has frequently been shown in the history of rulers of every kind. Much may depend on usage, much more on the temper of the people ruled and the circumstances of the moment, but most on the character of the man himself. Therefore, though the President may not *de jure* enjoy powers as

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great as those of a British prime-minister, or even of a colonial or foreign minister (he cannot, for instance, come down to the House with a project for reorganizing the fiscal system and then sweep the country in a grand oratorical campaign), yet he may, in an emergency, exercise powers equal to those of the constitutional monarch and his responsible ministry all rolled into one. He is not, during his term of office, dependent on a party vote for his position, though he must be careful not to alienate his party, especially if he desires re-election. He cannot directly initiate measures, but he can veto them; he can also suggest them in his annual message. He is the head of the army and navy, and, although Congress specially reserves the right to make war, he can, as the head of foreign affairs, precipitate matters to a point where war is inevitable. Presidents, indeed, have not always waited for Congress when they have felt the sense of the nation behind them. In his control of foreign affairs the President is checked by the Senate, which has the right of ratifying, and rejecting, if it will, all treaties (a two-thirds majority being required for ratification), this being a part of senatorial functions which has assumed much importance. Finally, the President is the fountain and head of patronage, and this gives him enormous influence, despite the encroachments on this domain by the Senate, which has not only the right of confirming or rejecting his appointments, but also claims, in the person of

each Senator, a voice in all appointments in their respective States.

It will be seen that the President is so hedged about with restrictive measures that it is quite possible for a weak, or even a malleable, man to be entirely under the thumb of the Senate, and, therefore, of the party majority in that body. But this state of affairs is at once altered if the President be a man of marked ability, high character, and strong convictions. The first generation of Presidents—Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison—were men of this stamp. The second period was remarkable rather for the distinguished character of the men who failed to attain the Presidency—Webster, Clay, Calhoun. Jackson was the last President before the civil war who could lay claim to distinction due to sheer force of character. Later came a long list of mere party-men, Lincoln—the great exception—being elected almost by accident at a period of gravest national crisis. The generality of Presidents since the war have been men of mediocre talents though high personal character, it being the policy of the parties to place the Presidency as far as possible beyond the reach of men with character or initiative. Roosevelt, as is well known, was, with this object in view, made Vice-President, a post which, under ordinary circumstances, would have disqualified him from ever holding office as President.

The point with which we are chiefly concerned,

however, and which could not be approached without a brief summary of political and governmental conditions, is how the United States is qualified to deal with the wide range of Territories and dependencies of which she is now mistress. These variations on the original scheme have, of course, grown up slowly, and each case has been dealt with more or less on its merits, just as in the British colonial empire. No difficulty was experienced in interpreting the Constitution so as to fit in with schemes of territorial expansion, and for a short period it seemed as if Congress was admirably adapted to meet the needs of the situation—to deal with each problem in colonial government as it arose.

Conditions altered gradually as the United States assumed the task of governing people to whom it could not give representation. As soon as it became obvious that certain sections of United States territory would not grow rapidly into States, but must remain under tutelage, there naturally arose a group of governmental problems with which a body like Congress, constantly changing, is fundamentally incapable of dealing adequately. There is, therefore, a tendency to throw the decision of matters on which Congress has no decided views, or shirks responsibility, or is not particularly interested, on to the shoulders of the President; to which category belong a large number of questions vitally important to the dependencies but little appreciated by the federal government.

It must be remembered that this state of affairs prevails even in the North American continent itself. Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma are permitted to send delegates to Washington, but these cannot vote. These three Territories elect their own legislatures, but the Governors and judges are appointed by the President; and Congress retains the power to annul decisions and to legislate direct. The suffrage is granted on varying qualifications, and not on the simple manhood terms as in the States. The elevation of these Territories to the rank of States has been debated for some time past, but is opposed on party grounds, and there seems little chance of a Statehood bill passing on its merits.

Alaska is the extreme example of Territorial government on the American continent. Having a small white population (some thirty thousand), with an equal number of Indians, and being, moreover, remote from the seat of government, it has neither representation nor elective faculties, and is practically ruled as a crown colony by a Governor, appointed by the President, with supreme legislative and executive power. The Indian territory on various reservations, which constitutes another class, has no single government. Each tribe has its own organization, the external relations being governed by treaties, whose interpretation, as well as the administration of justice, are in the hands of the federal courts. Residents are appointed to overlook the reservations, whose

functions somewhat resemble those of residents at the British Indian native courts.

Hawaii, also classed as a "Territory," represents the first effort of the United States at oversea government, and it must be noted that the islands were first taken over as a protectorate over a native monarchy, which became a republic, and, finally, both systems being found impossible, gave way to a form of government resembling that found in many British colonies. A Governor is selected by the President, and he appoints the administrative heads of departments. The government regulates the electoral franchise, an educational test being exacted. Samoa is dealt with even more arbitrarily, being administered by a naval officer deputed by the President, as are also Guam, Wake, and other islands in the Pacific.

Puerto Rico has a government almost exactly like the crown colony of Jamaica. The Governor and executive council of eleven are selected by the President, five of the council being Puerto-Ricans. There is a house of delegates, with thirty-five members; but practically no power rests in the hands of the people, nor are they regarded as United States citizens. The franchise is restricted by a small property qualification and an easy educational test, and there is no representation at Washington except by a resident consul.

The cession of the Philippines to the United States involved her in problems of government far more difficult than any she had yet faced. The

situation was met by conferring on the President powers similar to those vested by Congress in Jefferson in the case of Louisiana, and in Monroe as regards Florida. The exigencies of the case necessitated at first a military government, which was succeeded in 1901 by a civil government, with a head chosen by the President. This will, it is hoped, be changed in time for a government by a popular legislative assembly of Filipinos — at a period not yet determined, but assumed to be within a few years. At present the Governor enjoys supreme authority, being assisted by four departments officered by Americans. The civil commission is formed of the Governor, the four departmental heads, and three Filipinos. Local autonomy, under certain restrictions, has been given; municipalities elect their own presidents, and are practically independent; and the provinces elect, through the presidents, their own Governors, who are answerable only to the Governor at Manila. The finances, however, are controlled, as far as possible, by American treasurers, while the public works are supervised by American engineers. It must be noted that the Filipinos had never before had the franchise.

At the end of the governmental scale, of which Samoa represents one extreme, comes Cuba, now an independent republic in name, but in effect a protectorate. Cuba has adopted a constitution of the usual Latin-American pattern, founded on universal suffrage, a proceeding of doubtful wis-

dom in a country containing such a varied community and so ignorant and unstable a society. The United States controls foreign policy, and reserves the right of intervention under a wide range of conditions, and of securing coaling-stations if she wishes.

It will be seen that the United States government is the head of a group of governmental systems adopted with a view to the needs of peoples alien in the chief conditions of life—in climate, race, religion, and customs. So long as the new territory was continental, so long as the question of race was not raised, there seemed no reason why new acquisitions should not eventually become States. Alaska, for instance, with its great mineral wealth and a small and dwindling native people, may become the centre for a white population large enough some day to claim Statehood. There must always, it is true, be a certain difficulty on account of its isolation, and as a State it may be found difficult to reconcile the interests of Alaska with those of the rest of the Union. The development of the great northwest of Canada, too, cannot fail to affect this Territory, which, with a climate in parts not unlike that of northern Europe, a seaboard of twenty-three thousand miles, and a river navigable in a great semicircle for two thousand miles, is undoubtedly destined to play a conspicuous part in the future. The great need is the improvement of communications, which will yield ready profits by reason

of the immense mineral wealth of the country. For the present, the quasi-military rule now in force is certainly the best for the rude mining communities, which are still mushrooms, but already these communities are beginning to develop, and in the future it is not difficult to foresee a serious problem as to how this isolated region is to be included as an actual State of the Union.

The moment we pass oversea, however, and it becomes a question of tropical countries, fresh difficulties arise. Puerto Rico and Hawaii, as has been said, are governed on the crown-colony plan. It is hardly suggested that there is any possibility of their becoming self-governing or entering the Union as States. Tropical and thickly populated, they can never become true white man's countries. Puerto Rico, for instance, has a population descended from Spaniards, there being some six hundred thousand whites, with very little, if any, Indian blood, but some four hundred thousand black and colored. In religion, dress, and customs all are Spanish. The island most resembling Puerto Rico in the conditions of race, climate, soil, and government is Trinidad when taken over by the British; and similar conditions are found in the republic of San Domingo, on the east side of Hispaniola, with a population of six hundred and ten thousand — mixed, white, and negro. Both had Spanish laws and institutions; in both were a considerable number of negro slaves; in neither

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were there Indians. The former became a British crown colony and the latter an independent state. The contrast between the conditions of these two islands doubtless influenced the United States in their choice of government for Puerto Rico.

It must be remembered that these people have no traditions of self-government, no natural gift for organization, and that their whole history has been an education in governmental abuses. Although the majority are of white descent, they have lived too long in the tropics not to lose some of the characteristics of their forefathers. The success of Latin-Americans in founding republics has been far from signal, even on the continent, where conditions were more favorable; but in small and densely packed islands, with a number of black and colored people in the lower strata of society, it was impossible to evolve anything but class government. The control of white men, of a superior grade, more efficient and enlightened than any native, could only be applied as it has been, as a supreme authority, allowing the people every possible liberty, but reserving such powers as would secure their order and well-being—even without their sanction, if necessary. In Puerto Rico, therefore, we find a paternal government, such as has been given by white men to many colored or tropical races.

While in every dependency different governmental systems have been evolved, in the Philippines alone a new experiment is being tried—that

of presenting the people with an entirely fresh system, founded on principles which are new and foreign to them. The situation was complicated by the fact that an enormous gulf lies between the educated and uneducated Filipino. The former—in a small minority, met chiefly at Manila—is the equal of the average American in many of the superficial elements of civilization. He is probably his superior in artistic perception, oratory, and dialectical skill. He is in many cases only to be distinguished from a southern European by a slenderness of physique and a slight Oriental cast of features. His peasant cousin—they are hardly brothers either in blood or feeling—is, on the contrary, an ignorant, Oriental, tropical semi-savage—the old Malay, a polite savage, perhaps, but with little indigenous civilization, slightly veneered with Christianity and wearing the travesty of a shirt. There are many shades and grades between, and there are tribes which are frankly savage and heathen; others which are Mohammedan, and, therefore, civilized on anti-Christian lines. It is to this heterogeneous population, scattered throughout a maze of islands, that the United States is in the act of extending that political and social system on which her own greatness has been built up.¹

In so doing, she disregards the fact that what

¹ Self-government is not actually being extended, or even promised, to the really uncivilized tribes, and it is difficult to see their place in the present scheme.

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may work well in a country where the conditions of life have from the first had a levelling tendency, and where equality of opportunity has led to a greater equality of position and general efficiency than is found in any other country, may work ill in the tropics. She forgets that a country where the conditions of life made self-help essential to existence, and which was pioneered by the best of northern stocks, cannot be regarded as a fair parallel for a tropical country where life has hitherto been easy and self-help little more than plucking the fruit when it ripens, and where three hundred years of political dependency have still further reduced the initiative of the people as a mass. She forgets that there is no Filipino nation — only a congeries of tribes, no Filipino country — only one thousand seven hundred islands; no common language, no communications, no industries, no manufactures, and only the most elementary agriculture. The Filipino is handicapped by racial traditions, by lack of cohesion, by bad training, by climate, and by poverty—a formidable array of disqualifications; but it must not be supposed that he has any doubts as to his capacity for self-government. Americans believe that he can be made capable of education, and, as the experiment has never yet been tried, they may prove right, if they are willing to prolong their efforts over two or three generations, the very shortest period in which any revolution of character and infusion of energy can be accomplished.

It must be remembered that elsewhere education has not yet proved a panacea—at least, not the ordinary education of American school-life. Otherwise we should not see the negro race retrogressing, as it has done in some ways, under a régime which is turning out excellent white citizens of the republic. Filipinos may not possess the disqualifications which handicap the negro race, but they belong to the least progressive of Oriental peoples, and not least of the difficulties in the way is that invisible, unsurmountable barrier which divides the Oriental from the Occidental mind. Whether a system of government by democracy, presented to them ready-made—given, not gained—and bringing in its train some of the peculiar features of political life in the United States, will prove an unmixed blessing is extremely doubtful. The subject has been discussed more fully elsewhere. Here it is merely necessary to point out that the status of the United States in the Philippines is at present that of a guardian, who protects, disciplines, and educates a child, paying his expenses at the same time, with the declared intention of leaving him to himself at the earliest moment possible, while reserving the right to interfere if necessary. There must naturally be a good deal of difference of opinion as to the “earliest possible moment.” The Filipinos themselves go further in their previsions, fully expecting to rapidly organize themselves and to be received with open arms as a State within

the Union, thus becoming the first Oriental race to form an integral part of a great world-power. There is, of course, another Filipino point of view, in which the United States is to play little part in the future, but the archipelago is to be a second (but a republican) Japan. How far all these visions are from realization must be left to the reader to judge.

The advocates of these views may point to Cuba as an instance of a people who, after a brief period of military government, have been restored to independence. It is, however, clear from the terms on which that independence was granted that Cuba has become a protectorate of the United States. The mark of a protected state is that "it cannot maintain political intercourse with foreign powers except through, or by permission of, the protecting state." Beyond this the United States, as has been noted, retains the right to interfere even in domestic matters, such as the restoration of order and sanitary regulations, and to purchase ports for coaling and strategic purposes when they see fit. There is nothing novel in this relationship between a great power and a small one; it is as old as history, although the term "protectorate" is a comparatively modern invention. It is an arrangement which naturally finds favor with both parties, since the weak one retains the semblance of independence longer than it otherwise might, and the strong one obtains all the advantages of conquest without the expense and

responsibility of governing. At the same time it is a condition which cannot be permanent, and simply marks a transition stage which will be of longer or shorter duration according to circumstances.

There are two principal divisions of protected states. First, civilized states whose independence is guaranteed by treaty, international or otherwise, such as Montenegro. These are generally of a fairly permanent character, though there is at present in Europe a movement towards the absorption of these little independent states in one or other of the great federated powers. The second category includes uncivilized and semi-civilized states, and also those which, like Cuba, are unable to hold their own against the modern civilization of more powerful nations. Their internal weakness is an excuse, but the ambitions of the protector are invariably the prime motive in the relations.¹

¹ A brief survey of examples of existing protectorates shows the wide range of circumstances under which the policy may be adopted. The native Indian states—some spoken of as “feudatory,” “independent and protected,” “mediatized,” or “half sovereign”—afford illustrations of various stages of the relationship, and the Indian princes are said to be “under the suzerainty of the British crown.” Other British protectorates in Asia are the protected chiefs near Aden and Socotra. In Africa we have British Central Africa, East Africa, Uganda, Zanzibar, Somaliland, Basutoland, and British Bechuanaland. There is a group of protected Malay states, in the peninsula and Borneo, while the chartered company of North Borneo is also a protectorate. The territories of all chartered companies must for practical purposes be regarded as pro-

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It is not unusual for the treaty which establishes the protectorate to define the obligations on either side, this being the case with Sarawak, for instance; and the French usually expressly provide for direct interference even with internal affairs. The United States treaty with Cuba is framed rather on the French code, except that the obligations are all on the side of the protected state. This, however, does not diminish the actual responsibilities of the protector, who is bound to act *in loco parentis* as regards her protectorate in any circumstances which may arise — complications with foreign powers, internal disorders, and so forth.

Brief and inadequate as this sketch must necessarily be, it is sufficient to show the essentially imperial character of Greater America. To cope with the varied problems of government involved, there is no other machinery than that originally designed for the control of federal States, all presumably on the same level of civilization, peopled by kindred races, and each possessing a voice in federal affairs. Although the Constitution gave to Congress power to deal with United States

tectorates. Finally, in the Pacific there are groups of islands under the same head.

The French have made considerable use of the protectorate system, their policy being to transform these as rapidly as possible into actual dependencies. Of this Tahiti and Madagascar are examples. Germany has recently begun to adopt a similar policy, all her colonial possessions, whether in Southwest Africa, East Africa, New Guinea, or China, being euphemistically called protectorates.

territory — an “elastic clause” which has been used to cover every phase of expansion—it made no provision for such a situation as has now arisen. It was, indeed, impossible that the statesmen who met at Philadelphia to frame the Constitution should have foreseen a development of their country’s power so remarkable and so rapid as has actually taken place. Whatever may be thought on this subject, it has become increasingly evident that Americans are no more consistent and logical in their government than other people. Democracy is essentially opposed to a system of patronage, yet the Spoils System is the cornerstone of governmental power in the United States. Democracy is equally opposed to any form of colonial government, yet her expansion, which has been no spasmodic effort, but a genuine and logical growth, has placed the United States in a position where such a form of government is imperative.

But these questions of form and ethics are really of less importance than that of actual efficiency. It can hardly be denied that the purely democratic character of the federal government, and, indeed, of American political life generally, has disappeared, if it ever existed. There remains a general desire to approximate as nearly as circumstances will permit to the democratic ideal, and this involves a disinclination to acknowledge the permanence of a colonial empire. What is the result? Not only a lack of machinery

which would secure efficiency in dealing with these problems, but a lack of purpose and continuity in policy as regards dependencies, and a shortsightedness in the view taken of them—a disinclination to speak boldly of their future and prospects. This difficulty has only just begun to assume serious proportions, but it will make itself more and more felt, especially in the Philippines. The people, encouraged by irresponsible politicians, will not settle down comfortably as American dependencies, because they expect a closer union with the United States or complete independence.

It is obvious that, unless the President be a man of exceptional initiative, the appointments of colonial officials will be made on party grounds, and the whole internal government of each dependency, as well as the policy of the federal power towards it, will take its color from party conflicts.¹ The injustice of carrying such conflicts outside the country to whose local conditions they owe their birth is obvious, and for this reason, if for no other, there should be some provision for the control by the federal government of all over-sea or alien dependencies on a basis of permanency, impartiality, and a thorough acquaintance with local conditions.

The key to the situation does not necessarily lie

¹ The Philippine Civil Service, except in the highest posts, has been removed, it is claimed, from the influence of the Spoils System, but the "highest posts" form an important exception.

in an extension of Presidential power. Already, as has been said, the President can control both foreign and colonial policy to a great extent. With so unwieldy a machine as Congress, summoned from the four corners of the continent, there will inevitably arise questions of moment which must be dealt with by the Executive. The Panama affair is a recent instance. Some Presidents would not, perhaps, have shouldered the responsibility of that incident as boldly as Mr. Roosevelt, and certainly few Secretaries of State could have put it through with such *aplomb* as Mr. Hay. The personal equation in this matter was extremely powerful, and cut short a situation which might have puzzled the united wisdom—and divided interests—of Congress for many a month. But, in dealing with the details of government in dependencies, in deciding the many difficult points which arise in connection with their administration and relations to the federal power, it may be equally necessary to have a firm and immediate decision. The threads must be held in Washington and the wires pulled at the right moment. But by whom? The President? This surely puts on his shoulders functions which he is not qualified to fill. He is not chosen for a knowledge of such matters, has no trained advisers,¹ nor has he much

¹ For instance, in the recent Chinese crisis, but for the fact that Mr. Rockhill happened to be in charge of the Bureau of American Republics, there would have been no expert adviser on Far Eastern affairs available in Washington.

opportunity for study. The Senate and House of Representatives are, nominally, the voice of the American people. They must have a voice in all matters of actual policy. But matters of detail cannot be decided without much preliminary knowledge and careful elucidation of the subject, and who is to perform this task?

There is at present only one method of dealing with it—by committees. If the committees were permanent bodies, composed of men chosen for special knowledge or aptitude, they would in time come to have a working acquaintance with their subject and a more or less consistent method of dealing with it; but then they would no longer form a part of the present Congressional system. They would become a body apart. It would be obviously impossible to dedicate entirely to such a task Senators or Representatives who had been elected to fulfil other and more general missions. Representatives, too, change every two years, and Senators every six. There is no man in either House whose position corresponds with that of the British Foreign or Colonial Secretary, and who can, therefore, bring all such questions before the representatives of the nation, or even before the committees. In short, there is an absence of all the machinery which would secure to every country under the Stars and Stripes a fair hearing on matters of colonial or Imperial importance; and, in the lack of authoritative expression in Congress, it is doubly hard for the dependencies or

protectorates to understand their own position and the sentiments of the United States towards them.

In preceding chapters we have already touched on many problems arising out of American expansion. We have seen that in the Pacific, in the Caribbean, and in Latin America the United States has come to occupy a place which makes the government of those regions more or less dependent on Washington. In this chapter we have tried briefly to show what Congress is, under the present system of party management. It is, in theory, the representative body of the American nation—the voice of the people. In practice, it has become an instrument upon which the skilful politician may play at will. Federal authority has been strengthened, but it has ceased to receive its true strength from the popular vote, and is, in fact, the creature of an oligarchy. The President has gained in power also—that is, in potentialities; but he must use that power according to the wish of the oligarchy, or run serious risk. In the teeth of this situation, he has, indeed, become to a certain extent more the representative of the people and the focus of their pride and ambition than Congress. He can appeal to them direct; he may rise superior to considerations of party if he feels the pulse of the nation. This personal loyalty would hardly be possible to a mere party candidate, though it has been the policy of both parties to choose a candidate whose

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private character displays the homely virtues particularly dear to American minds. President Roosevelt, by a concentration of energy, talent, patriotism, and civic virtue in one person, has appealed to the nation in a peculiar way. It appeared possible for him to ignore party and take his authority from the people without jeopardizing his position. He has accordingly exercised his initiative on various occasions, without that reference to party interests which is expected of the party nominee. To the outside world he stands for all that is best in American character; for domestic virtue, public spirit, honesty, fair-play, keen wit, courage, justice, and virility. He has offended one section of his countrymen by an attempt to do justice to a neglected part of the American nation; he has estranged another by his action as regards Panama, which, whatever its ethical aspect, has certainly the merit of being a short cut to a more satisfactory condition in that region. A far more serious offence is, however, his attitude towards vested interests. Whatever the estimate now, the verdict of posterity will be in favor of Roosevelt, and he will rank among the really great Presidents. His name will stand for reform, at a period when reform was as *anathema maranatha* to politicians. He will be remembered as a true leader of men, at a critical period in the history of Greater America; but it is still doubtful whether the American people are to have true leaders, or

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whether they are to follow a mere bell-wether, driven by bosses.

The reformer of American politics has two obstacles to overcome—first, the serried ranks of party, determined not to lose their power or be docked of their privileges; secondly, an extraordinary mixture of apathy and prejudice in the nation—apathy as regards much which to an outsider would seem to touch their pride as well as their pockets, and an invincible prejudice on certain points.

Keeping in mind these difficulties, let us look at another of the main problems which expansion has forced upon the nation.

CHAPTER XII

AMERICANS IN THE TROPICS

LET us summarize briefly some of the conclusions which lead up to the hypothesis that Americans are now called upon to assume the task of government in the tropics. By a process of evolution on logical and consistent lines—if we regard her history in the light of action rather than profession—the United States has become the centre of an empire governing, in a variety of ways, a wide range of dependencies. The apparent inconsistency of this position disappears when we study the history of her expansion and find that, from the very first, she has not hesitated to assume the responsibilities of a sovereign power and to follow her destiny by any path which seemed shortest and surest. She has never been bound by the shibboleths of democracy, and at every critical point in her history she has been able by the elasticity of her Constitution to justify whatever course it seemed politic to take. So long as the government of dependencies was merely a matter of controlling white communities up to the point when they could take the responsibility in their own hands, there was no particular difficulty to

be faced, but the government of alien races in a different stage of civilization, and with widely differing theories and standards, involves a problem of extreme difficulty and intricacy which has been exercising the progressive races since history began.

The situation is a simple one at bottom. The strong man will, and must, rule the weak; the educated man should control the ignorant; the civilized man cannot leave the savage to go his own way. Certain races have got ahead in the march of progress; they are not free from faults, but they have reached a higher standard of efficiency, and in the nature of things they must, when brought in contact with weaker and more backward races, control them—in other words, rule them.

There is no space here to discuss this time-worn subject; it is merely necessary to point out that no people, from the earliest period of history, has ever achieved greatness without coming into contact with, and ultimately assuming control of, people less advanced than themselves. At the present era, when distance is annihilated by the achievements of science and physical barriers are no longer sufficient to preserve isolation, we see that the most progressive powers, those whose virility is as marked as their intellectuality, are expanding rapidly at the expense of all smaller and less advanced political and social organisms. In the case of countries like Finland we see that even advanced civilization and enlightened government cannot save a nation numerically weak from

being absorbed by a strong neighboring power. The day of small, independent states is past. Europe will soon be a group of huge federations; Asia will be partitioned among three or four great powers, as Africa has been; and the world will be made up of a few great powers, each with its group of dependencies.

It is, of course, inevitable that the dominant nations should be of northern stock. The trend of history is too unmistakable to allow any doubts on that head. The tropical races cannot hold their own against people from the temperate zone; and already we see that of the great Oriental states practically only one—Japan not in the tropics—retains more than a nominal independence. It was, therefore, inevitable that the United States, in her course of expansion, should sooner or later be confronted with the problem of the government of alien races. In her dealings with the Indians and negroes she has always had two sides of the problem to contend with; in Hawaii she met a third, in the Caribbean a fourth; in the Philippines she has reached the culminating point in the history of her relations with alien peoples, when she is obliged to assume the government of a tropical country inhabited by seven millions of people.

It is not my purpose in this chapter to discuss the possibility that any of the oversea people now under the Stars and Stripes might eventually be able to govern themselves. At present there is no question as to this, the United States having

adopted in the various dependencies different systems of colonial government, the main feature of all being that the President appoints the governors and that Congress exercises sovereign rights. This condition of affairs must continue for an indefinite period, and meanwhile a large body of American officials are, and will be, employed in the task of governing these alien peoples.

The task was a novel one for men of American birth. Their relations with the two alien races on their own continent had not prepared them in any way for this problem. As a matter of fact, the history of the relations between Americans and the negroes and Indians is a record of mistakes and failures which contrasts ill with their brilliant success in other ways. The United States, as soon as she awoke to the position in which her scarcely perceived evolution had placed her, made a hurried survey of the methods employed by other colonial powers. Unfortunately, there was no country affording a complete analogy to the Spanish colonial possessions when they fell into American hands. The Philippines especially, with three hundred years of nominal Christianity and civilization and an extraordinary mixture of racial peculiarities, had no parallel in history. Even if such a parallel had existed, the United States would not have derived much benefit from the experience of others, being obsessed by the idea that she was destined to inaugurate an entirely new system of dealing with a conquered tropical

people. "We hope to do for them," said Mr. Roosevelt, "what has never before been done for any people of the tropics . . . to make them fit for self-government after the fashion of the really free nations."

Idealism played a large part in the early dealings with the Filipinos and in the conceptions of the men sent to lay the foundations of future government. It is not surprising that many mistakes were made, chiefly through ignorance of the character of all peoples save the Anglo-Saxon, with its clear standards of right and wrong. Brought up on traditions of the ennobling influence of democratic ideas, the sacredness of individual rights, and especially of equality, it was extremely difficult for the American to understand Oriental character. The first mistake was to treat the Filipino as if he were an American with a brown skin, a point of view which is still cherished in face of many disillusionments. This has been the cause of much discontent among the Filipinos, who complain that their conquerors have not acted up to the promises made in the first flush of enthusiasm. The reason is obvious—the promises were made under the delusion that the Filipino could be rapidly changed, and that he was as consistent as if his skin were white and his habitat in a northern latitude.

Unfortunately, fickleness and duplicity (judged by Western standards) are as invariable among tropical peoples as the histrionic and artistic sense

among the Latins. Filipinos inherit both from their mixed ancestry; but their habitat is still the tropics, and they are incapable of rising above the limitations imposed by it. They have not the virility of a people constantly reinforced from a temperate clime, and they enjoy life under physical and climatic conditions peculiarly unsuited for moral development. The strenuous life is impracticable in these beautiful, isolated, enervating islands. The prospect of educating the Filipino up to the point of capacity for self-government (as understood by Anglo-Saxon nations) is by no means promising, but he will doubtless be able in a comparatively short time to satisfy outward requirements by wearing American clothes, drinking iced water, and adapting his own flowery hyperbole to the stump-orator style of his transatlantic brothers. He is extremely imitative, even more so than the Japanese; but he lacks the thoroughness, persistence, and strong national feeling which made Japanese reform a reality and not a sham.

The United States must, therefore, settle down to a considerable period of colonial government, if not a permanent one. The organization of a service to meet the demands of this situation becomes an imperative necessity, and, without discussing here at length the details of such a service and the demerits of the system at present adopted, it is interesting to draw a comparison between the position of the United States and

other powers as regards the question of colonial Civil Service.

So long as the white man is merely called on to govern or organize, in a climate congenial to him, people of similar race and instincts to his own, he needs little more than the ordinary ability and training which would qualify him for any post of authority at home. But when he must adopt a mode of life foreign to his bringing-up, must submit not only to climatic influences but to constant, and perhaps exclusive, association with minds on a different level to his own—when the social atmosphere is as novel as the landscape and there is nothing to keep him up to the mark save the knowledge that is in him, deterioration, not only physical but moral, is a danger which cannot be overlooked. There is no question of American colonization in the Philippines; even were the country not already well populated, the climate forbids it. The Americans, like the British, are not prone to mix their blood with that of the natives, as Portuguese and Spanish have done. The government will, therefore, involve on the part of the governing class a certain degree of exile, only comparable to that endured by British and French officials in their dependencies. The Dutch, in Java, at all events, are on a different footing. The widely scattered nature of British dependencies and their distance from the mother-country have made the task of government peculiarly arduous; but whatever the criticisms of the

system may be, it is generally conceded that Britain has attained greater success than any other power. A great proportion of this success she owes to the high standard of the officials she has employed, and even those who criticise her government of alien races allow that among those races the instruments of that government are held in a repute which makes the "word of an Englishman" a sacred oath. It is also undeniable that the British dependencies have been of the greatest value in providing a training-school for her governing class, and that the colonial and Indian services have a favorable influence in preserving the best traits of national character.

Whether under the Colonial or Foreign offices, the entrance to government service is always by competitive examination on general lines, followed by examinations in native languages. There are many arguments both for and against the competitive system, but its detractors have not been able to devise any other which would be of more all-round usefulness. It is said that the intellectual test is not the best for many of the posts, and that some of the most successful administrators have cut a sorry figure in the examination-room. The system is in its theory democratic, as opposed to patronage or selection, but in practice it is now rather tending the other way, as the tests are so high that an expensive education and special cramming are almost necessary to the candidate. Parents, however, value

the position so much that they make sacrifices out of all proportion to their incomes to give their sons the necessary training, so that the service is by no means confined to the wealthy classes. The best check on the tendency of competitive examination towards exclusiveness is in a judicious element of selection and of variation of tests, and in this somewhat modified form the system is admirably adapted to the United States, where educational opportunities are so widely diffused. The British cadet who has passed successfully through the entrance examinations will serve a long probation in India, China, or one of the colonies before he is intrusted with any direct responsibilities. During that period he must acquire proficiency in the languages and customs of the natives, and sometimes in their laws. The Indian and colonial services attract the best class of British youth, and the careers are considered desirable for young men of position; there is even a large class whose families have been connected with the services for generations, so that there is always an ample supply available.

The careers of a majority of these men will not be brilliant, and the prospects held out do not, on the surface, seem likely to attract clever and ambitious youths. Entrance into the Indian or colonial civil service means exile from home, separation from family, a salary adequate but by no means princely, with slow, if sure, increase. His highest hopes cannot soar beyond a colonial

governorship. When at the zenith of his career he will receive a salary which, although handsome, will have to bear heavy demands in the way of entertainment, and provides no margin. If he marries, his early years will be a struggle to make both ends meet, and his later ones will involve frequent separation from wife and children and a constant effort to maintain two establishments in a manner suitable to his position. Though hard work will be required of him, if he is to pass successfully through the stages of advancement, it will not necessarily accelerate his progress or bring a certain reward, for influence and luck play a considerable part in the matter. It must be explained that the influence will be of a social or family origin, and seldom, if ever, political in its character. Even in the appointment of colonial governors and viceroys, which are made by the government that happens to be in power, there is usually an absence of party motives, and although sometimes regarded in the light of rewards for brilliant services, the party question has little to do with them. As far as pecuniary advantages are concerned, it is well known that only men with large private fortunes can afford to accept many of the highest positions.

The colonial career, therefore, seems to offer little attraction to a young American, who is not driven by force of circumstances to seek his fortune abroad, and who is brought up in the belief that to "get on" is the first duty of man, and his chief pleasure.

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The attractions, from the British point of view, are, first, the social status which undoubtedly attaches to government service. This, unfortunately, is far from being the case in the United States, where a government career neither confers nor confirms a man's social standing—rather the reverse. Nor would such an inducement be a strong one to the best type of American, as it is to the best type of Englishman. Secondly, the element of adventure and the prospect of a wider field of interest in an unknown land have a strong attraction for the dweller in small, overcrowded Britain, and the spirit of his forefathers stirs in many a youth the desire for fresh fields and a wider life, though after-experience too often proves that he merely exchanges the narrow circle at home for a still narrower one abroad. The spirit of adventure might prove as strong an inducement to the American as to the Englishman but for the fact that he does not need to leave his own country in order to gratify it; indeed, in leaving the United States he turns his back on many opportunities and also on a life of risk and excitement, of hard work and quick profits, which appeal peculiarly to his energetic, nervous temperament. The third and most serious consideration to the Englishman is the pension which invariably attaches to government service, and this inducement has proved strong enough in many cases to weigh against more tempting offers of immediate advancement. Rather than

forfeit this small but sure provision for old age, men have been known to refuse good and even brilliant offers. The pension will never, of course, be large enough to support a man and his family in affluence, but if he serves long enough it will make a decent and comfortable provision for his declining years, and, in case of ill-health or breakdown, he will be secured from actual want. The Englishman as a rule looks forward with pleasant anticipations to the time when he can retire to a country-house, and, with the surety of a small but regular income for the rest of his life, can indulge in one of his many hobbies, take a leading part in local politics, and see his sons launched on careers similar to his own in their moderate expectations and honorable position.

Such a provision for old age does not at all appeal to an average young American, who could not contemplate complacently an old age spent in calm retirement on a reduced income. American men do not think of old age in the same way as their English cousins; and if they do, it is merely a spur to them to make a "big pile" as quickly as possible. Death is provided for even more universally than with us by heavy insurances, but no one who has any experience of the United States can fail to have been struck not only by the youthfulness of most men in responsible positions, but by the general assumption that youth and middle age are the only periods of life worth consideration.

The British government pursues a wise policy

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in granting liberal furloughs to all officials, and this must be taken not only as a compensation and inducement, but as a means of rendering the man more efficient. Without the long and regular respite from arduous duties and the renewal of the springs of life afforded by his visits home, the colonial official could hardly keep up, physically, mentally, or morally, to the standard required. The idea of giving long furloughs, on handsome pay, is somewhat opposed to American theories. The rule is "no work, no pay," and the liberality of the United States government does not apply in the matter of official salaries, which are invariably, and even scandalously, inadequate.

The next feature in the life of colonial officialdom which makes it popular with Englishmen is that the work itself is congenial to them. Their whole training has made them self-reliant in the sense that they are prepared to take responsibilities and to act independently. They inherit a sense of justice, scrupulous fairness, and *esprit de corps* which are fostered by public-school training, despite its defects. They are not cowed or depressed by solitude if called upon to dwell far from any of their kind. Boys fresh from school or college go cheerfully to distant frontier districts where, excepting one or two other officials, they may not see a white man for months. After this period of training they often go to a more complete isolation. Such conditions would drive a Frenchman crazy; but, though there are occasional cases

of break-down, some stolid Britons even grow to enjoy their isolation, helped by the natural taciturnity and self-reliance of their race and class.

There is still, even in these days of luxury, a certain element of Spartan discipline in the lives of British boys which makes it far easier for them in after-life to enjoy such careers as these. The little chap who, at eight or nine, leaves his mother's arms for a boarding-school, has to cultivate at that tender age a self-possession, reticence, and decision which become second nature to him and lay the foundations of successful administration in later life. Not only does the rough-and-tumble of his school-days make the boy hard and self-reliant, and develop in him that knowledge of his own powers which will be so valuable to him, but he has, naturally, a capacity and love for ruling. He has no illusions as to the equality of the people he rules; on the contrary, he is firmly imbued with the idea of the superiority of the British race over any other, white or black. At the same time he has no repugnance or dislike for "niggers," regarding them generally with a sort of paternal tolerance. He enjoys the struggle with prejudice and ignorance, and likes to evolve order out of chaos, feeling himself the pivot on which the whole system turns.

It must be remembered that the Indian or colonial officer is almost invariably of gentle birth, and invariably of gentle education—in the best sense of the word a gentleman. This implies, in

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Great Britain, that he is acquainted with the ordinary etiquette of civilized society, that he has been taught the self-control and consideration for others on which that society has its basis, and that he is not uncouth or rough in speech, appearance, or manner. When we remember that he will probably be sent as an interloper into the midst of communities civilized and cultivated in varying degrees, on lines quite different to our own, it is easy to see the value of such an equipment. The Oriental is peculiarly keen to notice any lack of breeding in the European he meets, and, contrary to the general belief, he can appreciate perfectly the difference between men who have and men who have not this quality. It is not necessary to adopt Oriental etiquette, with its endless ramifications; but the Indian, Chinese, or Malay is quick to notice if his European friend is deviating from what he soon learns to recognize as the European standard of good manners. There is an unwritten code of manners which well-bred men all over the world practise and by which they recognize each other.

The desire to rule is not implanted in the American breast. Indeed, he is firmly imbued with principles which make despotic government by one man repugnant to him, and although he is obliged in the relations of daily life to recognize that some must rule and others obey, if the world's work is to go on, he does not wish to acknowledge this or go to an extreme and illustrate the fallacies

of democracy in his own person. Solitude to him is almost an unknown evil. Life in the United States is far more sociable and gregarious than in Great Britain, and it does not occur to a man that a high wall round his grounds is absolutely essential to enjoyment of life. There is also a reluctance, especially among wealthy parents, to submit their children to that Spartan discipline which is enforced on the richest as well as the poorest of British boys, and although this is largely counteracted in later life by the independent spirit which is characteristic of American youths and their enterprise and audacity, yet the general impression they give is that they are less hardy, more sensitive, physically and mentally, less able to endure the peculiar conditions of life in the tropics than their more phlegmatic English cousins.

Besides the illusory theories as to universal equality, which handicap the American at the outset of his life in the tropics (because they involve friction between his ideals and his practice), he has also to contend with a physical repugnance for colored people, which is the result of his home environment. Social equipment has hitherto formed no part of the requirements for public service in America or her dependencies, and it is difficult to see how it can be made to play a part in the matter. In a country where cultivated men not unfrequently assume a roughness of speech and manner quite foreign to them, in order, presumably, to gratify some curious theory of demo-

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cratic equality, it can hardly be required that officials shall be expected to acquire external polish, even to enable them to deal with the polite and evasive Oriental. There is a good deal of unnecessary contempt, not only in the United States but in Great Britain, as to the elaborate and "senseless" ceremony prescribed by Oriental etiquette. There is frequently a great deal of meaning underlying these ceremonies, and the Oriental point of view is that, without these prescribed forms, there is a tendency to relapse into a license which approaches savagery. No one acquainted with Orientals, the Chinese particularly, can fail to be aware that their etiquette is of extreme and practical use in daily life. Any attempts to destroy at one blow this accretion of centuries would have disastrous effects, and the Europeanized Oriental is apt to lapse into the worst excesses of his adopted country. The reaction from an artificial standard of manners and morals to none at all is too great; he is not able to be a law unto himself. It is, therefore, the man whose breeding, natural or acquired, teaches him to respect the laws of etiquette in others, though he may conform to entirely different ones himself, who will be able to influence and eventually control Orientals most effectively. This is peculiarly the case with Mohammedans, but in every case of a people whose religion is inclined to fanaticism, the respect for etiquette, convention, outward forms, and symbols is most important. Such an attitude

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of mind is not to be confounded with mere indifference and tolerance, which are certainly to be found *in excelsis* in the United States. It really involves another abandonment of one of the cherished delusions of the American, for if he is to govern in tropical countries among Oriental peoples, he will have to learn that there, at all events, "manners maketh man."

Neither as a practical career, then, nor as an honorable profession, nor as an interesting and congenial life-work, does the career of a colonial official appeal to the best class of young American. The service must, therefore, be recruited largely from less desirable ranks. There are now, and will continue to be, honorable and distinguished exceptions to this rule, especially among the heads of departments; but in order to improve the rank and file, who, after all, are the main motive-power in the machine, a different system of recruiting must be adopted and far greater inducements held out.

The question as to how the United States can secure an efficient service for her tropical dependencies cannot be dealt with here, but it may be laid down as a principle that nothing can be done in the direction of reform until the greater part, if not the whole, of the colonial service is removed from the baneful influence of the Spoils System.

CHAPTER XIII

PROBLEMS OF EXPANSION—CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

OBVIOUSLY the first problem of expansion is to provide each fresh territory or dependency with the best possible form of government, and to secure harmonious relations with the federal sovereign. Everything must have a beginning; it was not to be expected that systems would spring up fully organized and properly correlated. The matter, however, becomes singularly complicated when the sovereign power, not being quite sure of its position, is continually halting between two opinions; in the same breath assuming despotic powers and assuring its new dependants that they are to govern themselves. To be brief, rigid democratic government in Greater America has proved not only theoretically but practically incapable of dealing with a colonial empire. Where the government has been most successful it has been least democratic. This constant warfare between theory and practice is, however, demoralizing. It is necessary to find some compromise which the American nation can adopt, not, perhaps, as their ideal, but as the best expedient, and one which, therefore, they are not bound to excuse or cloak

under some specious guise. Having gone so far from the principles which democracy had set up (though not from the intentions of the founders of the republic, who were anything but democrats), in the interests of efficiency Americans must desire certain changes in their form of government in order to fit it for the discharge of imperial duties.

First and foremost comes the pressing need for Civil Service reform. Under any circumstances, a pure and efficient Civil Service must be an essential of prosperous government. Americans have such an extraordinary facility for making the best of a bad job that they have tolerated a condition of affairs which would have aroused their phlegmatic cousins to indignation. When land was cheap, work and wages plentiful, and every one participating in a wave of prosperity, corruption in the body politic left the bulk of the nation good-humoredly tolerant. But, although there is no reason to believe that the industrial progress of the United States has received a permanent check, it is certain that she (like ourselves some little time back) has entered on a different phase of her career. Land has mostly been taken up, great inequalities in wealth have arisen, disputes between capital and labor become more and more serious, and the struggle for life generally is taking on a sterner aspect. Civilization in America is no longer in the primitive, or even the secondary, stage; and the more complex it becomes the more it will depend upon government for well-being and

security. The happiest country is said to be that which is least governed, but the saying is founded upon a fallacy, otherwise a savage tribe might be entitled to the eulogium. In reality, we know that the conditions of modern life make it applicable to a people whose government is so highly organized that it works without friction, so that they are not conscious of the extent to which they are governed.

The corner-stone of political and official life in the United States is the system of party patronage. Although a strong reaction has already taken place and a certain amount been accomplished in decreasing the number of appointments affected by this system, there are still about one hundred thousand posts in the United States to be filled through it. The Senators have become the arbiters of patronage in each State, and the whole fabric rests on party influence. It is not only the federal offices which are concerned. The State, Territorial, and especially the municipal appointments are all engineered on the same basis, and the entire country is honey-combed by these pernicious influences.

Apart from the fact that appointments for party reasons are obviously not calculated to secure any fitness in the appointee, it must be remembered that the defeat of his party at the next election will at once throw him out of employment. Americans are extremely adaptable; they seem to have a remarkable ability for touch-

ing pitch without becoming altogether defiled, and many party appointees would in time make good and efficient officials. But insecurity of office does not stimulate devotion to duty; there is little inducement to make a real study of the work and every inducement to keep in with the party machine. One and all must feel the temporary and precarious nature of their employment and the evil influences of a constant subservience to party interests, and the temptations of an official position in such surroundings are very great.

In 1871 the first Civil Service reform act was passed, but remained in abeyance for lack of support until revived in 1883, when open competition was provided for, within certain grades known as the classified list. From the successful competitors, classed as "eligible," appointments are made by the President, with consent of the Senate, upon the basis of the population of the various States and Territories. Non-competitive examinations are also held under the Civil Service board, by which candidates may qualify for certain grades of employment. This attempt, although it is claimed that it "removed a vast number of offices from the spoils system," was only in the nature of an expedient. It has undoubtedly conduced to a higher standard of efficiency and secured in the classified list a selection of good material and an element of permanence. But the actual appointments, as well as dismissals, may still be influenced by party considerations, and

especially does the system confirm the power of Senators in this matter. The essentials of a truly national service are that it should not be restricted or influenced by any personal or party considerations. When one remembers how little real energy or interest is displayed by the nation in State politics it seems not unreasonable that it should be expected to set aside State jealousies in such a matter as this; and were it not for the vital question of patronage, this difficulty would soon disappear. It is a battle against privilege such as was fought and won in Britain many years ago. At the present day we regard it as an undue advantage that our members of Parliament should have enjoyed the privilege of franking letters in the old days. Yet in no country did privilege in the past exercise such a profound and corrupt influence as in England, which makes it the more remarkable that no such prerogatives and perquisites are now permitted to our public men in democratic England. But the American does not object to the exercise of patronage or other privileges on the part of his Senators—they mail their letters free, travel free, and are the dispensers of patronage—surely a striking anomaly in a land where all men claim equality.

The system of patronage has been almost entirely eliminated from the public service in Britain, and so thorough has been the process that we are liable to forget its recent date. Still we offer no opposition to a method of recruiting the services

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which, though through open competition, gives superior opportunities to a certain class. The conditions under which our governmental offices of all kinds are filled are such that a special education—often a university training—is necessary for candidates, and although boys from the poorest classes can, and do, win their way through scholarships and bursaries to high positions, just as privates in the army sometimes rise to commissions and high commands, such men must be of unusual caliber, and will be handicapped through life through the hostility—not of their fellow-officials—but of their equals in birth who have become their inferiors in position. The absence of this ineradicable class-feeling is one of the greatest advantages possessed by America, but it has the defects of its qualities, and one of these is that, as privileged persons and dispensers of patronage may be recruited from any section of society, the nation at large does not perceive how far it is retrograding from the true principles of democracy in sanctioning their existence.

In one way the Americans are certainly entitled to boast that theirs is the truest ideal of democracy. Every man is to have an equal chance of controlling his own fate; this is the bed-rock, and it is sound justice and humanity. Upon this, however, patronage has been grafted. Human nature, it seems, is too lop-sided to maintain an equilibrium. If a man is cleverer or more lucky than his fellows, if he gets to

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the top of the tree, he at once sets about unequalizing the opportunities of others, taking away the chances of his enemies and giving them to his friends. The grave fault in the American democracy is that, in the desire to give every man the length of his tether, this human failing has been encouraged and legalized. So deeply rooted is this canker in the body politic that it would have been a serious menace to society were it not for the conditions which have made political life a thing apart. American society of the best sort to-day prides itself on its aloofness from political affairs,¹ just as in England politics is an indispensable feature and interest in all good circles. The plainest language is used by American statesmen on the subject, and nowhere are its effects more plainly stated than in a recent utterance of Roosevelt's.

"Bribe-giver and bribe-taker are equally guilty; both alike sin against the primary law of the state's safety. A question like this lies at the root of decent and honest government. In the last resort good laws and good government alike must rest on the broad basis of sound public opinion. A dull public conscience and an easy acquiescence in corruption infallibly mean debasement in public life. Such an end means the ruin of free institutions . . . self-government becomes a farce. Freedom is not a gift which can tarry long in the hands of the dishonest or of those so foolish or incompetent as to tolerate the dishonesty of public servants."

¹ Even in De Tocqueville's time this tendency was noted.

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The magnitude of the army of professional politicians who are involved in this system is almost incredible. According to Bryce, a very friendly observer, they number hundreds of thousands, including office-holders and office-seekers.

As this book is concerned with Greater America we need not further consider the question of Civil Service reform on the continent itself, although that lies at the foundation of everything, but must see what is wanted for the oversea empire.

The problems of contiguous expansion are different to those connected with oversea dependencies, and the fact that a certain form of government has worked without detriment in the one case cannot be considered a guarantee for its success in another. If Civil Service reform is necessary at home, how much more is it needed when it affects the happiness and prosperity of alien peoples who have neither the opportunities nor the abilities which enable the American to rise superior to faults in his own system.

The essentials for dealing successfully with alien peoples are, first, a clearly defined and consistent policy; and, second, a high standard among the men intrusted with the task of government.

It is difficult in any form of government not an absolute monarchy to secure a steady and definite policy on any subject, especially on matters of foreign policy, which cannot be trusted to the common-sense or united interests of the people. Foreign affairs in the United States have always,

therefore, been the especial province of the President and his cabinet. Then arrives the point at which foreign merges into colonial policy. Here again the exigencies of the case have tended more and more to give the President the power of initiating. With the assistance of his cabinet and the sanction of Congress, he becomes, in fact, the arbiter of fate to these millions of dependants, and, if strong enough, he may secure to them for a time the broad outlines of a steady policy, with this important exception, that the Senate may act as a check or drag at any moment if he runs against the interests they represent.

But what can his knowledge be of the multiplicity of detail that goes to make up the history of colonial administration? How can he even check and supervise the officers he appoints? His duties in connection with home affairs are already vast; he has to keep the threads of foreign policy clear; and, in addition, he has this burden of administrative detail thrust on him. He has no machinery to help him, save the spasmodic efforts of committees, chosen apparently with little reference to qualifications. Without elaborating any further the self-evident fact that the United States is attempting to rule dependencies without providing adequate machinery for the task, we may as well come at once to the point. There are only two courses open to her. Either she must give self-government to these dependencies, regardless of the consequences, or she must pro-

vide herself with the necessary machinery for governing them.

To follow the first course would be, as all thoughtful men will agree, to deliberately shirk the consequences of her own acts by evading a responsibility she voluntarily assumed, and to put back the hands of civilization. To follow the second need not, as Americans sometimes assume, involve any further derogation from the principles to which they are pledged. Theory and practice are already far apart, and they will suffer no further divorce from a frank recognition of the circumstances and an attempt to adjust them on a basis of common-sense.

It is not to be desired that Americans should adopt wholesale the methods of Europe; indeed, there is no colonial system extant upon which she might not make improvements. She has the advantage, if only she cares to profit by it, of centuries of vicarious experience. She need not pass through the period of ignorance and corruption, followed by sublime indifference, which laid the foundation of many colonial problems in Great Britain to-day. She can see in our history the evils of patronage in a colonial Civil Service and the remedies by which we eradicated it. She need not abandon her cherished ideal of making a true democrat out of each of her alien subjects, but she must recognize that she must show him the strength as well as the beauty of her ideal before she can expect him to adopt it.

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We have dealt already with the subject of the American in the tropics, the difficulties which beset him more, perhaps, than other men, and the desiderata for the foundation of a colonial Civil Service worthy of the United States. The effort already made to place the Philippine Civil Service outside political influence and on a permanent basis is a step in this direction, but, as stated in a previous chapter, the well-meant effort has suffered from the truly American fault of too great haste. No isolated attempts to deal with the problem will, however, be successful, unless the root of the matter is successfully attacked. Until patronage is rooted out at home the Civil Service will never be satisfactory in any quarter, and, until the machinery at Washington is adequate to its task of administration, no amount of work done in the dependencies will be really successful.

For the control of the colonial administration a permanent department is now essential. This would do in Washington what is done in London or Paris; collecting and holding all the threads of government, and, in the light of the fullest information and knowledge of previous circumstances, advising the executive how to act. The functions of a permanent department necessarily become in time more than advisory in the matter of detail, though its policy must on broad lines always be dictated by the chief of the executive. The existence of this permanent body in no way threatens the prerogatives of the popular govern-

ment, but it does secure the people governed from caprice, ignorance, and inconsistency, which are inevitable without it. The broad lines of policy are, after all, what the nation wishes to control; as to the details of administration it is at once ignorant and indifferent.

As for the constitution of the Civil Service, it has already been said that one of the greatest difficulties is the prejudice of Americans against any specialized training. They fear to create a class from which alone civil servants can be recruited, and thus fall under their pet aversion, officialdom. They have already, however, in the army and navy, two branches of service for which special training is exacted, and it is noteworthy that both of these enjoy reputation and popularity among their countrymen. There seems no real reason why a college, on similar lines to West Point or Annapolis, should not serve as a portal to the higher grades, at all events, of a Civil Service destined primarily for work abroad. The army and navy have already established the principles of permanence, steadily progressive pay, and certain pensions, all conditions which, of course, should be indispensable in any government service. Although the high general standard of education in America would help to reduce the work necessary in the Civil Service college, special attention should be paid to the acquisition of languages and to other subjects specially useful to the candidate in the branch for which he is qualifying, but more

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especially in the inculcation of the spirit of self-reliance, coupled with strict obedience and *esprit de corps*, which educationists in America are perhaps inclined to overlook.

It would, in the writer's opinion, have been better had it been possible to keep the Philippine Civil Service on a national basis. It would certainly have attracted a far higher class of American. The desire to include as many natives as possible has led to a sacrifice of efficiency, and this is the more to be regretted because, as the experience of Britain in India shows, it is possible under a small but well-paid and highly trained supervisory staff to govern almost entirely through natives without establishing a purely local Civil Service. To this subject—the employment of natives—which is so serious a problem of expansion, we must shortly turn. It is necessary now to touch briefly on some other branches of American Civil Service which would benefit by being placed on a more permanent footing.

The American consular service (organized under a law of 1856, under conditions which have passed away) is becoming an important body. With the expansion of trade and the extension of influence, especially into Latin America, an immense amount of interest and influence comes to rest in the hands of these men. It is notorious that they are almost invariably inadequate for the tasks involved. Many do not uphold American dignity worthily, though they seldom fail to “spread-

eagle" themselves if occasion offers. They are not valuable as channels of information, and they are not able to forward the interests of their countrymen. The reason is simple. They owe their appointment entirely to party influence; their tenure of office is short and insecure, and their salaries are quite inadequate. The consular service, being devoid of attractions, has become the refuge of disappointed or broken-down politicians and others who are failures. No others would attempt to live in a foreign country (always distasteful to any but the richest Americans) on the wretched pittance given, and the opportunities for usefulness are rendered almost nil by the fact that, as soon as a man has established relations with his new environment, has (in many cases) begun to speak the language and understand the ways of the people, he has to go, unseated in the "general post" which keeps all United States officials forever on the move. The wonder is that, under these conditions, so many men have risen superior to circumstances and have once more illustrated the American capacity for making the best of a bad bargain.

The diplomatic service, despite its almost inevitable dependency on party politics, has always presented an honorable exception to other branches of American public service in that it attracts a high and disinterested class of men. The circumstances are peculiar. The representative of a great country at a foreign court must support the

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dignity of that country, despite the fact that his government is far from lavish in her allowance to him. Diplomatic appointments have not as a rule been possible as "rewards," save to men whose ambitions were of a purely unmercenary character. The careers offered were, therefore, free from the taint which clings to other offices, and were, moreover, likely to attract those to whom association with the best men of other nations, rubbing against foreign culture, and the study of world affairs would outweigh the possibilities of mere money - making in their own country. The proportion of distinguished men who have graced this branch of American service is very high, and compares favorably with that of any other country.

CHAPTER XIV

PROBLEMS OF EXPANSION—THE EMPLOYMENT OF NATIVES

WHEN white people undertake the government of a tropical country, and become responsible for its peace and well-being, one of the first problems presented to them is how to find a place for the native leaders in the new state of affairs. The enlistment of prominent men among the natives on the side of the conquerors is a step of the greatest importance and usefulness. Unless something of the sort can be effected it will be necessary to keep the country permanently under a strict military rule, with an immense official staff to administer the laws and keep order. In a further stage of pacification it becomes desirable to turn the warlike energies which are found in every community, civilized or otherwise, into a profitable channel by the formation of native troops or police, whose loyalty to their foreign commanders, however, must be secured in various ways. These two measures—the employment of the intelligent and leading natives in civil capacities and the enlistment of the restless and warlike section of the community

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as troops and police—are, perhaps, the most important steps to be taken in organizing the government of tropical countries, and upon the tact and skill with which they are accomplished depend largely not only the success of the foreign ruler but the welfare of the tropical people themselves. The great danger in organizing a newly conquered territory is that much discomfort, much misunderstanding and trouble may be caused by the wholesale importation of raw officials. In Oriental countries, particularly, it is impossible for an Occidental to acquire, save through long experience, the power of dealing sympathetically and successfully with natives. A native official may not be as enlightened, but he will at least be unlikely to wound the susceptibilities or prejudices of his people.

It would seem natural that in dealing with alien races in the tropics the United States should study the work accomplished by Great Britain. It is to be feared, however, that a fundamental difference in the point of view of the two great Anglo-Saxon nations has led the younger one to rash and hasty conclusions as to the elder, which prevent the useful experience accumulated in India and elsewhere from being of assistance to the United States in her new departure in the Pacific. An extraordinary amount of misconception, founded chiefly on ignorance of past history, prevails in the United States—and, indeed, in our own country—as to British rule in India. There is a gen-

eral impression that we won our Indian Empire ruthlessly by the sword, dispossessed the "native princes" either by force or fraud, and are now engaged in governing arbitrarily a subjugated nation. This broad outline of our relations with India is sufficiently justified to gain acceptance for that most dangerous kind of generalization—the half-truth. Filled in by a vivid imagination, it may assume forms which are a gross libel, and it is the distortion of the main facts which has led so many, and not merely thoughtless, Americans to dismiss British methods as contrary to the spirit of true liberty and democracy, and, therefore, as of little value for the United States.

In many aspects of the situation, however, there is a striking likeness between the problem in the Pacific, and that faced by the British in India. The inhabitants of the Philippine islands, known as Filipinos, are, as already said, not in reality a nation or a people, but a congeries of races speaking several different languages and innumerable dialects, and scattered through a number of islands often difficult of access. They had, when the Spaniards finally left the islands, no settled form of government, no unity of religion or customs, no allegiance to a central authority. In Spanish days many islands even maintained a savage independence. They had no hereditary aristocracy to whom the mass of the people owed unquestioned obedience, and among the wilder people the tribal organization lingered, but the Spaniards had done

their best to eradicate it for three hundred years. The upper class—which took the place of an aristocracy—was exclusively formed of half-breeds, who are to this day almost foreigners in traditions, manners, and appearance, and have no real hold on the affections or allegiance of the people. In the Mohammedan islands of the south the government of hereditary chiefs survived, fostered by religious traditions, but the problem was complicated by other conditions of life which are an essential part of a Mussulman state.

It may surprise some people to learn that all these difficulties, in an aggravated form, had to be met in organizing a stable government for India. The enormous empire which bears that name offered physical difficulties far greater, at the time of conquest, than any encountered in the Philippines. The peoples of that country are more diversified in race, religion, and customs than the inhabitants of the archipelago can possibly be. It is not too much to say that the natives of India offer more startling contrasts in these respects than the inhabitants of Europe, and the nature of the country and climate is equally varied.

To suppose that Great Britain conquered this vast empire by force of arms or fraud, deposing native governments as she went along, is to pay a compliment to her resources and endurance which is not deserved. There was no stable government in the country generally or among the innumerable states of which it was made up.

The Great Mogul emperors, themselves aliens and conquerors, had gathered a large portion of the country together into a vast empire, governing, as is the Oriental manner, in the loosest way and merely enforcing the payment of a rigorous taxation on the people. When this empire decayed there was a general scramble for the pieces, and the East India Company and France were the keenest competitors. The Mohammedan invasion had placed on the thrones of many of the native states men who in race and religion were as much foreigners to the people they ruled as were the Europeans. Nothing resembling a wholesale deposition of native rulers was attempted, and many of these Mohammedan governments were even bolstered up, while the British intervention saved the last remnants of the really ancient native states, whose hereditary institutions go back to a period of probably over a thousand years. It is not possible here to give any adequate description of the means employed to weld this heterogeneous mass into an empire under one rule. In the process there have been mistakes innumerable, and even to-day there is much to be desired in the system which has been gradually evolved. It cannot, however, be too strongly insisted on that, whatever may have been her original motives, Britain has for a considerable period devoted her energies with a single eye to the betterment of the conditions of life in the vast territory under her control. Without the strong

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hand with which she keeps in check the different races, anarchy and bloodshed would spread themselves over the land. To quote a distinguished Mohammedan of northern India: "This thing"—the question as to who after the departure of the English would be conquerors—"would rest on the will of God. But until one nation had conquered another (the Hindoos and Mohammedans) and made it obedient, peace could not reign in the land."

The subject with which we are at present concerned is, however, not the right or necessity which takes the Occidental into Oriental countries, but the methods of dealing with the native population. We have seen that in India, as compared with the Philippines, administrators had a more complicated problem to solve because the methods and traditions of government varied more widely there than in the archipelago, as did also the character of the races, religions, and conditions of life. Any attempt to establish at once a uniform and settled mode of government would have involved not only an overwhelming force of military and officials to back it, but a great amount of injustice to the people. The general policy may be said to have been that of dealing with each state on its merits, and of interfering as little as possible. In some cases the desire to retain as far as practicable the outward forms of government to which the people were accustomed led, indeed, to the prolongation of a

system of tyranny and misrule which might have been avoided by more drastic measures. Up to the last few years there have been native rulers under British protection whose practices could not be permanently tolerated, and who, persisting in their evil ways, despite the advice of their Residents, have been deprived of their positions, thus affording the critics of Britain another opportunity to denounce her grasping, unscrupulous ambition.

There is, of course, a difference in the position of the various protected native states which still enjoy a varying degree of independence, but all acknowledge the paramount power of Britain and her right to interfere in, for instance, a case of civil war or of injustice and tyranny. None can maintain a larger military establishment than is approved by the British government, nor enter into negotiations with another state or a foreign power.

There is a large section of India—about four-sevenths of the whole area—not comprised in these native, semi-independent states, which was placed at first under military rule and then organized under the direct rule of the government. Part of British India, as it is called, was undoubtedly taken by force, from those who had, however, previously conquered it. In this territory the only way in which any native can obtain a position of authority is by entering the Civil Service and becoming a servant of the British crown.

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The conditions under which he may do this have been altered and revised within recent years, and at the present moment a very wide range of opportunities presents itself.

The Civil Service is divided into two sections, for the management of the higher branches of the executive and judicial administration. The first is an Imperial service, a select body recruited by competition in England, but open to any British subject—European, colonial, or native. The high class of men attracted by this service, the reason for its popularity, and its general efficiency have been noted elsewhere. From this service the majority of the highest civil offices are filled, as well as a number of less important posts in which the younger men get their training. The second service is a provincial one, a huge body recruited in the chief Indian provinces, and consisting almost entirely of natives. The detailed civil administration of the country is, therefore, carried on almost entirely by natives, under the supervision of a small handful of white men—actually eight hundred in number, or one official to every three hundred thousand of native population and each one thousand two hundred square miles of territory. The general principle now followed in the employment of natives is that no post save the very highest shall be closed to natives of proved ability and probity; but in practice there is little chance that a native will rise to the chief executive and administrative posts. These are reserved for

men recruited in England; and without the training of an English school or university—not a mere literary training, be it observed—it is not thought that the native can attain to the standard required for such offices. Few are likely to pass this test successfully. In the judicial branch the native has practically an open field, and makes an excellent use of the opportunities offered him. The standard of morality among the native officials has improved surely, if slowly, and in some departments is very high. Three factors have contributed to this—better education, the example of Europeans, and the removal of temptation by granting salaries on a very liberal scale. With regard to the latter point there is no country in Europe—save, perhaps, Britain—where officials are so well paid as are those of the native Civil Service in India. They are infinitely better paid than American officials in the Philippines. Besides the civil, judicial, and executive services, there are other departments in India—the Public Works, Forestry, Telegraph, Police, and Education—all organized on much the same lines, by which the majority of posts are filled by men educated and recruited in India, and the minority by open competition in England. This competition is, in the education department, superseded by selection, and a certain degree of selection influences all the services.

It may seem to an American unjust that any restriction should be placed on the careers of

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natives who are able to pass the necessary educational tests, but it must be remembered that in India, as in all countries, but more especially Oriental ones, the educational test is far from perfection in bringing the best men to the fore. This is true in Britain, where the growing dislike of patronage has made the competitive examination almost the only door to a government career, and has, therefore, undoubtedly excluded a number of men who are excellently qualified in character for such careers. Still, no superior system can be devised, and the material available is of such good quality and the traditions of the service have become so strongly rooted that there is little chance of deterioration in the general standard. But in Oriental countries—and in some others which are not Oriental—circumstances have made politics and government more of a trade than a profession. This is aggravated in India by the caste system, and we find there that the men of strongest character, belonging to the purest races and representing the cream of native life, would not only be beaten in any competitive test by a quicker, brighter, but far less reliable race, but could hardly be persuaded to submit to such a test and enter upon a struggle which would involve a loss of their dignity and racial pride.

It is the Bengali—the intellectual but shifty, restless, intriguing element, useless in time of war—who fills the government offices. Apart from his defects, it would be absolutely impossible to

open to him posts which would make him practical ruler of races which are deeply antagonistic to him, and which in essentials of command are his superior. These submit to the Englishman, respecting, if they do not love him; but to another "native," of a race they despise and hate, they would give neither obedience nor respect.

This problem, in a modified form, is one that meets the white man in the tropics wherever he goes. Before he gives any native power over others he must be sure of a good many things, about which it will be exceedingly difficult to get information. It may be argued, therefore, that the best way is to allow the natives to select their own rulers, and to this alternative we must return later. Meanwhile, it may be useful to sum up the principal features in the employment of natives by Great Britain in India.

First, the system has been gradually evolved, and every effort consistent with the preservation of British supremacy has been made to preserve to the aristocracy of the country their position and privileges. Religious customs have not only been tolerated but protected, except in such matters as involve breaches of the laws of life and property. Racial prejudices have been respected. Secondly, a wide range of careers has been opened to natives, always as the paid servants of the government. Thirdly, both European and native officials receive salaries which should place them above the temptation to corruption. These sal-

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aries are calculated on the basis of the actual expenses of life in India, and are not regulated by European custom. Fourthly, it is recognized that Britons are, after all, foreigners in India, and that they rule alien races who would probably prefer to misrule themselves. It is also premised that British rule is unquestionably the best, and that the best and highest British education is necessary to manufacture British rulers, so that the most important posts must be filled by men with this important qualification. Fifthly, this *corps d'élite* must be spread over the country, thinly but evenly, to secure a thorough oversight of all its affairs. Finally, the government is centralized, but not over-centralized, and its supreme control lies in the hands of a British viceroy, who is answerable to the Parliament and the crown, through a Secretary of State (a member of the cabinet), directing a department known as the India Office, assisted by the advice of a body called the Indian Council, drawn from men of Indian experience.

Municipal government in British India is largely carried on by natives, there being as many as seven hundred and fifty towns with a municipal organization, elected chiefly by the tax-payers and dealing with matters of local interest, such as water supply, sanitation, roads, and markets. It is very doubtful to what extent this municipal freedom has been a benefit to the people, and, despite optimistic official reports, there is a general

opinion that, even with the considerable influence brought to bear by British officials, a good deal of abuse has crept into the working of the system, especially in all matters connected with finance or patronage. Uninfluenced and uncontrolled, there can be little doubt what the result would be.

There is, in fact, considerable discrepancy in the views expressed regarding the success generally of the British *raj* in India. Those who hold an unfavorable opinion must, however, be prepared to be asked by what standard they are judging—whether they have any clear conception of what India was like before the British took it in hand; what would be its condition were they to abandon control. It must be remembered that among the incontestable benefits bestowed on the many races of the countries known as India must be counted a law and order which it had never known before, the opening-up of communications, and the establishment of native colleges, where education of a far wider range is given and infinitely wider opportunities than any native possessed before.

As regards the efficiency and high character of the Indian services, it is often forgotten in Britain, and is little known in the United States, that the present condition was only achieved within recent years, and that a long process of evolution was necessary to organize the branches of a government so wide and varied in its operations. As an instance of the slowness of development which has been found essential owing to the complicated

problems to be faced, it may be mentioned that the penal code, now allowed to be at once the simplest and most efficient ever devised, was draughted forty years before it passed into law, and was during that period constantly revised by the ablest jurists.

This brief description of the British *raj* in India is, perhaps, rather in the nature of a digression in a book dealing with Greater America. It has been written, however, with a view to dispel a few illusions in the mind of the American reader, and as affording a valuable analogy to American expansion in the Pacific.

At first sight, it is rather the points of contrast than those of similarity which strike us. Our own expansion has taken place openly and avowedly for purposes of trade. As a rule, we have postponed the problem of providing a permanent government for our dependencies as long as possible. The Englishman has never been the apostle of a political theory. American expansion, on the contrary, has cloaked itself continually in the garb of a mission of liberty. In reality a hard-headed, practical people, not likely to go into any enterprise without a sound commercial basis—driven, moreover, in late years by industrial expansion—the United States of America has, nevertheless, constantly held up the idealistic point of view of their own actions. Readers of this book will know that the writer does not share this view. To him the expansion of America does

not appear either capricious or altruistic. It has been the logical, determined progress of a strong people, who, if they lack, as Bryce declares, the "earth-hunger" which has inspired other nations, have certainly managed to disguise their true sentiments.

In the Philippines, however, they were forced to take a step which has a very plausible semblance of disinterestedness. Regarded as an isolated act, their occupation of the archipelago has even a quixotic aspect. It is, therefore, excusable that this point of view should have been taken by many people, and certainly no Briton can afford to scoff at their attitude.

When the perspective of time restores to their true places in history these recent happenings in the Pacific, it will, however, become plain that in following out the destiny she had marked out for herself, in breaking up the Spanish colonial empire, and in providing for the development of her Pacific coast, America went but little, if at all, out of her way when Dewey steamed into Manila Bay. Once there, she was equally bound to stay. No Power with her aspirations could have left the islands; to do so would have been a retrograde step not only in the eyes of the world, but in actual progress towards that goal which no American disclaims.

Having found her India rather suddenly, however, America is disposed to regard it as a white elephant. The British view of his Indian Empire

is an eminently sane one, and does not really clash with any American ideals; but the American does not yet know quite what to think about the Philippines. India to the Briton does not now mean, as some Americans still imagine, a source of infinite wealth. We trade with our empire, but we have sunk a good deal of money in it, for which we are not getting an excessive return. Far from being an actual source of wealth, we still spend a good deal on the equipment of her civil service. She pays her own expenses, and is inclined to grumble that we force on her a policy of defence which is very costly. This is the Imperial burden, which some of our colonies are inclined to shirk. India, however, is paying for immunity from invasion which can only be secured by strong defence.

To the Briton India means the prestige of his country, a training-ground of character for his race, a field of wide and interesting work, both on his own account and in the interests of the native peoples. Incidentally, the Briton's view includes also the desire, born of his innate sense of justice, that the natives should be allowed every privilege consonant with their own welfare. He regards their welfare as of extreme importance, though not, perhaps, for any very altruistic motives. To take a broad view, it is as a field for his energies that he chiefly regards the empire which tradition and the heroic exploits of his forefathers have also invested with a glow of

sentiment. Enough has been said to show that his energies have by no means flowed in purely selfish channels.

Why should not the American adopt a similar view of the Philippines? Partly because of reasons set forth in a previous chapter,¹ partly because he feels bound to consider the natives as individuals with rights; and also partly because, thanks to the demagogues, fanatics, and cranks of his own country, he is still wavering under the impression that he is wronging both the Filipino and himself by his action in retaining control of the archipelago. In any case, he feels bound to show by his actions that in occupying the Philippines he was actuated by the highest motives. These sentiments may have little relation to real facts; they may blind men to their own logical position and may create false hopes, but they are genuine in their way and have their origin in the fundamental principles of life. The enlightened British view of dependencies is to make them prosperous and give them the best government possible. The American view is to give them the power of governing themselves; and that then all these things will be added unto them. This divergence of ideals would apparently make any approximation of the American to the British view impossible. It will lead the American who has read the foregoing pages, as a justification of our work in India, to

¹ "Americans in the Tropics,"

reply: "Yes; you may be doing your best, and your best may be very good after your lights; but we are bound to act up to ours, and they are very different lights, indeed."

Taking this rational objection into consideration, and remembering the lofty ideal which, despite everything, has undoubtedly had its place in the American attempt to deal with the Filipinos, we are bound to be somewhat disappointed with the results so far as we can trace them. It must be noted that methods very similar to those of Britain have been adopted, most successfully, in Puerto Rico. Up to the point of evacuation there was more common-sense than idealism displayed in Cuba. In the Caribbean, therefore, the apostles of liberty have not sacrificed efficiency to theory. There has been no question of placing Puerto-Ricans among the "really free peoples"; they are even denied a position among free Americans. We need not enlarge here on the subject of Cuba.

The Filipinos apparently presented themselves as better material—there are more of them, to be sure—and the idea of converting tribes to the number of seven million into a free, self-governing "nation" was a fascinating one, and by its very size appealed to the American mind. One of the first discoveries of the conquerors, however, was that their task was much more complicated than they thought. One of its most difficult features was that which has exercised Britons in India so greatly, and has only recently been placed on a

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fairly sound basis. The employment of natives in the government of their own country was complicated in the Philippines by a general ignorance lit up with flashes of precocious ability. At first the governmental structure was piled together in an arbitrary and hap-hazard way, but the necessity for a more orderly system, and, above all, the desire of all honest men concerned to place the Philippine officials out of the influence of the Spoils System, precipitated matters, and in the autumn of 1900 the scheme was already fully developed and a Civil Service board began work. It is necessary to describe in some detail the working of this board, since it presumably embodies the result of American studies of existing systems, modified by the enlightened principles of democracy. One may reasonably expect it, if far from perfect in detail, to be informed by the spirit of wide justice and foresight, full of provisions to insure, as the act says, "an honest and efficient Civil Service for the Philippines."

The Civil Service board is the root of the whole matter. Upon it the whole structure, in fact, depends for its success.

It is composed of three men appointed by the Philippine commission, and, although the composition has varied, always includes one Filipino. The functions of this board are not comparable to that of any body in the British system. Primarily an examining board, it has also been intrusted with the preparation of reports on such subjects

as salaries, and is also a sort of reference committee to which the heads of departments must report, and which has a voice in all matters relating to personnel "which do not affect the internal administration of departments." It is a little difficult to imagine the exact nature of the latter circumstances.

The method of procedure, so far as can be gathered from the not very lucid reports, is to hold examinations in every subject of which a knowledge is required in the various branches of government service. A certain amount of confusion was inevitable from the fact that many posts were already filled, but this has been partly obviated by examination of the acting employés. Every bureau or department, the provincial services, and the municipality of Manila are now closed to all save candidates who have passed the prescribed tests. Examinations are held in Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu, and also in the United States. The examinations are in Spanish and English, and while it is to be presumed that English is required of all candidates for the higher positions, it is not clear exactly where the line is drawn. The highest posts—the heads of bureaus, executive secretaries, and officials who require special technical or scientific knowledge—are exempted from this rule. Appointed originally by the civil commission for special aptitude, these officers will be succeeded by men drawn from a class formed of the chief assistants in their offices

and promoted on merit. The specialists are recruited from the lists of the federal classified service, and are transferred for a time to the Philippines. Apparently this was the only way in which efficient officers could be secured.

It is not easy to define the exact relations between the Civil Service board and the heads of departments. The latter furnish the board with lists of vacancies in their offices, and are in return furnished with lists of "eligibles" from which they are allowed to "select." As their choice is limited, by the obligation to prefer a Filipino to an American, and among Americans those who have served in the army or navy; and as, we are told, the lists sometimes contain not more than two names for each post to be filled, it is obvious that the heads of departments are somewhat restricted as to this "selection." It is, in fact, the board which is the appointing authority, and only the strictest impartiality on the part of its members can prevent the recurrence of abuses which it was particularly intended to avoid. The heads of departments may grant leave of absence on a fixed schedule, may vary the salary of the employés within certain limits, and have, of course, the power of reporting adversely on unsatisfactory work. They are, moreover, permitted to select, appoint, and discharge some of their subordinates who are merely laborers or unskilled workmen.

All this would, perhaps, have been an ample provision to lay the foundations of a Civil Service

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and to secure the freedom of action of an executive head if the Philippines were a normally constituted country with an ample supply of material. As it is, the operation of race jealousy, the lack of educated material, the inordinate ambition of the *mestizo* aristocracy make it difficult to work this elaborate Civil Service machine without mistakes and injustice, and it must be remembered that the odium of these descends on the central government. It appears to the writer to be, once more, an over-elaboration of machinery to have created this maze of examinations, appointments, promotions, and reports. The first step should have been to secure an able and permanent body of officials of the higher grades, and to permit them to fill at their own discretion all clerical posts, at all events, holding them responsible for the efficient working of their respective departments. It is difficult to see what good purpose is served by the inclusion in the lists of such functionaries as pipe-fitters, letter-carriers, or *bomberos*, and in practice these are controlled entirely by their departmental heads. They serve to swell the lists of candidates, however, and to increase the technical work of the board, which prides itself on the number of examinations it can hold in one year, and is apparently convinced that "eligible" means "efficient."

Unfortunately, no fixed tenure of service could be settled for officials drafted in from home, and throughout there seems to run a presumption that three years will be the extreme length of service.

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"The matter of return to the United States after a certain lapse of time will always be considered by persons taking service in the Philippines." This is, of course, one of the most serious bars to efficiency. Honesty should be secured by the promotion on merit system, which, it is claimed, is thoroughly carried out in the present service. No provisions, however, can secure this unless both the Civil Service board itself and the chief officials of departments are above suspicion.

As regards the former, it seems unfortunate that the most permanent factor in its composition (which has already suffered several changes) is a Filipino gentleman of extremely checkered political career. The first president was, fortunately, a man of high capacity and integrity, the one Filipino against whom no one had ever alleged anything evil; but there are not many public men in Manila who could even approach this standard. The salary paid to each member of the board (three thousand five hundred dollars) is not sufficient, under the circumstances of life in Manila,¹ to attract able men of the best character from the United States, and the enormous amount of clerical and routine work involved by placing so many posts under the board makes it impossible for that body to superintend every detail in the manner which is essential for accurate and honest examination work. After all, the examination in

¹ The same criticism applies to every American appointment in the Philippines.

fixed subjects of candidates is a very indifferent test of their fitness for all but clerical posts, especially in a case like this, when character must be the determining factor in success. The board, indeed, expresses in its report a doubt as to the completeness of a literary test, and a certain number of posts are exempted from it.

The chief difficulty is to obtain material at all suitable for the work. In the year ending October 1, 1902, only three thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine candidates competed for two thousand posts, and of these only two thousand and forty-four became eligible—a very small margin. The natural desire of the board to meet the demand for “eligibles” must make it difficult to maintain the standard when the supply is running short. There is a provision that temporary employés may be engaged if no “eligibles” are to be had, and, until a steady supply of properly educated and qualified men could be insured, it would have been better to leave the lower grades of the service on a temporary basis. It is much easier not to engage a man than to employ and then dismiss him with all the paraphernalia of government procedure; and the Oriental who has once tasted office is a spoiled man for life, so far as more humble avocations are concerned.

To sum up the principal defects in the Civil Service system of the Philippines. First, a lack of inducements to the best class of Americans, who

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could only be attracted by a permanent service with good pay, regular furloughs, and either a pension or some other provision to compensate for life in the tropics. Secondly, the inclusion in the Civil Service lists of a number of petty posts, altogether unimportant, and practically controlled by the heads of departments, which leads to a multiplication of clerical work and detail until essentials are swamped. Thirdly, the confusion of functions in the Civil Service board, which ought not to combine the duties of examination with those of appointment, reference, and report. Lastly, it is to be regretted that a board which is intrusted with such important functions could not have been composed of a more permanent staff of officials, men of weight and experience, of unimpeachable integrity, and entirely removed from local political influence.

When we compare the Civil Service of the Philippines, as it is now constituted, with the Indian Civil Service, we are not struck, as might have been expected, with the superiority of the former as a training-school for natives. There is an evident attempt to open to natives every rank of service for which they are qualified, but this is equally evident in India, the main difference being that Britain exacts a higher qualification. As a matter of fact, this difference is fundamental. The British regard any phase of governmental work as requiring training, whereas it is the favorite theory of Americans that a good

general education fits a man for any post in life.

The most serious divergence in policy, and one which fills a Briton with misgivings, is the severance of the Philippine Civil Service from that of the mother-country. This may have been necessary to avoid the "Spoils System," but it at once diminishes the efficiency on which so much depends. It has been found necessary hitherto to fill certain posts from the classified lists of the United States in order to obtain the right stamp of man; it might surely be possible, in the Civil Service reforms which are proposed, to provide a branch of the service, specially recruited and trained for a fixed term to be spent in the Philippines, with compensating advantages and without the temporary and uncertain conditions which attach to the present method. Some such provision is necessary to recruit good officers.

No stronger contrast can be found between the American and British methods than in their action as regards judicial reforms. It is true that in this respect the greatest difference existed between the Philippines and any country conquered by Britain. Nowhere has it been our fate to take over, with a very imperfect civilization, a highly developed code and method of judicial procedure. To criticise Spanish law is to involve one's self at once in the most difficult problems. It was founded on one of the most enduring codes in history and has the sanction of high authority.

It may be safely said, however, that, even if properly administered, it had every possibility of clashing with American ideas, and that in the Philippines it was administered extremely badly. Still, the groundwork was there, and there are many who think that it is better to administer justly the laws to which people are accustomed than to suddenly plunge them into a wholly different system. No more difficult task can be imagined than this, to which the civil commission, numbering two distinguished lawyers, applied themselves. No criticism of what they accomplished can be attempted in this book; it would be unfair without an enumeration of their difficulties. What they did *not* accomplish, however, was to secure an upright, incorruptible judiciary. Accustomed to the partialities and venalities of his own State courts, this does not shock the sensitiveness of the American as it might, but he forgets that his own country is happily in a far more settled condition than the archipelago, and that the Filipino does not possess his own nice discrimination in these matters. The fault has been due to that cherished ideal of which we have spoken so often. Rough-and-ready but absolutely upright justice would have been worth more to the Filipinos than years of legislation or acres of bills, and, if any codification was necessary, it should have been too simple to afford any exercise for the wits of the clever Filipino lawyers.

Criticisms and comparisons are, however, of

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very little use at the present stage of affairs. Americans are making their experiment on a grand scale. If it fails they will not be the first people who at the start have muddled the task of governing Orientals, and their natural adaptiveness and ready resource will enable them in the long run to achieve success.

CHAPTER XV

PROBLEMS OF EXPANSION—ARMY AND NAVY

AFTER the campaign of 1812-15, with the exception of the Mexican war (1846-48) and the civil war, which lasted five years, the United States had no experience of war until the collision with Spain in 1898. Americans then awoke to the fact that the old idea of isolation, of freedom from embroilment with foreign powers, was no longer compatible with the new conditions. They rubbed their eyes and began to realize that they ought to have—what they did not possess—an army. Since the disbandment of the improvised volunteer armies of the civil war, the vast majority of the nation had never seen a soldier, and even the great cities had ocular evidence of the existence of a national military force only through the occurrence of an occasional riot—such as those of Pittsburg, in 1877, and Chicago, in 1894—or when some great national celebration afforded the people the spectacle of a military parade.

After the civil war the army was reorganized on a very modest scale from the best of the recently disbanded volunteer regiments. The material was

good. Both officers and men had been trained in war, had learned their profession in the stern school of experience. In many respects they were a striking contrast to the army of ante-bellum days, which, after a long period of peace, had fallen into sleepy ways, and, under the corrupting influence of party patronage, had become thoroughly inefficient and out of date. From the time of reorganization until the Spanish war the American army consisted of some twenty-eight thousand men, mainly engaged in wars on the Indian frontiers or in policing the new districts settled up as the wave of westward migration surged forward. Scattered in small posts, at wide intervals, discipline was difficult to maintain, and any such thing as general or systematic organization was an impossibility. In the course of time, as the country in the West was gradually occupied and at the same time great cities arose, the number of small posts was decreased and the troops were concentrated on certain points, where they would be available in the event of riots or serious disturbances of the peace.

The Spanish war found the United States quite unprepared. The curse of politics was over all. The abuses of patronage had sapped the enthusiasm and spirit of the service. Rivalries between the adjutants-general and the civilian Secretaries of War had brought about utter confusion everywhere—no army, no officers, no staff, no plan—in a word, chaos. Equally unprepared

and equally ready to meet the emergency heroically, the United States set aside the experience of others, trusting to the genius and energy of the race and the illimitable resources of the country to pull her through. The failure to evolve order, and especially the difficulty experienced in moving a small force across to Cuba, was, perhaps, the most striking feature of the general *débâcle*, and was in marked contrast with the powers of perfect organization displayed by the Japanese a few years earlier in the Chino-Japanese war.

Notwithstanding the difficulties arising from this state of affairs, the campaigns both in Cuba and the Philippines were brought to a successful conclusion, though with the inevitable waste of life and treasure involved by the absence of a trained and disciplined army under efficient officers. Both were subalterns' wars; there was no plan of campaign; it was merely jungle-fighting, in scattered bodies, no concerted action being possible. The situation was saved by the pluck of the men, by the adaptability and initiative of the American, with a nucleus of West Point officers, trained men, reared in a school of iron discipline.

The urgency of reform — drastic reform — was forced upon the American government. An army had to be created, and armies are not made in a day. A capable War Minister, courageous and self-reliant, appeared in the person of Mr. Root in 1899. He acted on the principle that the object of an army is "to provide for war," the

very contrary of the theory upon which the entire treatment of the army had been based from the end of the civil war.¹ There had been no organization, no training as a whole, and the service was permeated by the patronage system. This was due to the prevailing impression that war was impossible—at any rate, so remote as to be negligible. Able army officers who had clamored from time to time for reform could get no hearing. Systematic study, preparation of material for war, promotion of officers according to capacity, training of men and officers in large bodies were evidently needed. Four important recommendations were made—the establishment of a war college; the attendance of every officer at this college for a period; officers from the line to serve on the staff for four or five years instead of until retirement; the modification of the seniority system. These reforms were far-reaching, involving as they did a complete change in the whole army organization.

There remained, however, one reform which lies at the very root of the whole question—the elimination of politics from the army.² A practical step in this direction was taken by Mr. Root when, an increase of the army being imminent, he made public the names of the senior officers *already appointed*, nearly all regular officers.

¹ The same discovery seems to have been recently made regarding the British system, judging from the War Office (reconstitution) committee.

² *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1902.

The fury of the politicians may be imagined, but they were powerless in the face of the accomplished fact, at a critical period, too, when the nation took a serious view of the matter. The President, as commander-in-chief of the army, followed this up by an attempt to establish the "merit system" in 1901. "No pressure, political, social, or personal, of any kind" was to be permitted, and the exercise of such pressure, if there were reason to believe it to be instigated by an officer, would militate against him. The army was thus assured the same footing as the classified Civil Service and the navy, by the simple fiat of the President, who has always held the strongest views on the subject of keeping the Civil Service, and the army especially, free from politics. Favoritism and patronage had eaten into the vitals of the army, and it required great courage to attack the system as the President and his Secretary of War did; but in justice it must be remembered that they had the opportunity of acting during a critical time, which previous men had not. Many had been the recommendations, but no one had dared to cut the Gordian knot. It must be noted, however, that the promotions of Leonard Wood and Funston over so many seniors certainly did not seem to the regular officers to be altogether in consonance with the spirit of the new reform.

Among the reforms recently initiated are the creation of a war college, a general service and staff college, a reserve of regulars, and a general

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staff, on the pattern of the most efficient European armies, for which forty-two picked officers have been selected.¹ The office of general commanding (commander-in-chief) has been abolished and in his place there is now a chief of staff with a

¹ The general staff consists of one chief of staff, who has the rank of lieutenant-general, the highest grade in the American army at the present time; two assistants to the chief of staff, not below the grade of brigadier-general; four colonels, six lieutenant-colonels, twelve majors, twenty captains or first lieutenants, all of whom receive the regular pay and allowances of their rank, with the exception of the lieutenants, who when detailed on staff duty have the rank, pay, and allowances of captains mounted. All officers detailed to general staff duty serve for four years unless sooner relieved, and on being relieved they return to the branch of the army in which they hold their permanent commissions, and are not eligible for further staff duty until they have served two years with their regiments or commands, except in case of emergency or time of war. The duties of the general staff, as prescribed in the act, "shall be to prepare plans for the national defence and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the army and its state of preparation for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing and co-ordinating the action of all the different officers who are subject under the terms of this act to the supervision of the chief of staff; and to perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President." The chief of staff under the direction of the President or the Secretary of War is given supervision of all troops of the line, "and of the adjutant-general's, inspector-general's, judge advocate's, quartermaster's, subsistence, medical, pay, and ordnance departments, the corps of engineers, and the signal corps, and shall perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President." The office of general commanding is abolished.

general staff under him. The reform accomplished is, in fact, the solution of the problem which the British government is attempting to solve without creating a general staff. The American Secretary of War is now strictly responsible to the President for the details of military administration, and he operates through the chief of staff. Every effort has been made to minimize routine and red tape. An attempt is being made to evolve something like order out of the chaos of the national guard, militia, and volunteer forces, by defining the obligations and duties of each branch, by altering the militia law, which, according to the President, was "obsolete and worthless," and by an endeavor to make the organization and armament of the national guard identical with that of the regular forces. Some procedure for raising volunteer forces and selection of officers is to be prescribed by law in advance.

Army reform is not a popular cry even in Britain, where we have our little wars, and sometimes a big one, to emphasize the urgent necessity of keeping the army efficient; but in the United States it is even more difficult to sustain the interest of the public in such a movement or to obtain the necessary legislation and appropriations. Beyond this, there is the grave difficulty of reconciling the relative interests and powers of the federal and the State governments, all branches of the forces, except the regular army, being under the latter. The path of reorganization does not,

therefore, promise to be an easy one, and it remains to be seen whether, once the object-lesson begins to fade from the memory, the Americans will be capable of the sustained effort necessary for placing their military forces upon a satisfactory footing.

There is one aspect of the military question which seems to have received little attention as yet—namely, the organization of native troops, on which the successful handling of tropical dependencies like the Philippines must largely depend. Many examples are to be found in the British Indian and colonial empire. A small beginning has been made in the Philippines, where a native force of some five thousand men has been organized and is said to be working fairly well, though the force is gravely handicapped by the want of officers of the right stamp, due to the want of proper inducements and to the very limited field of supply. A good deal might be learned from a study of the British experience in countries like India, Egypt, Burma, and the Malay peninsula, and it is with this object that General Leonard Wood last year visited some of these countries on his way to the Philippines. Not merely there, but in the Caribbean and Central America, the Americans will require to utilize the services of the natives; and a few words regarding the employment of natives as troops and police in India may not be inapplicable here.

Without the co-operation of native auxiliaries

the British *raj* in India would have been an impossibility. Before the mutiny the natives were recruited in three armies, those of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. There was, besides, a strong force of so-called "irregular cavalry" and infantry, raised chiefly from the warlike tribes of the Punjaub. The proportion of Europeans to natives was extremely low—one to every eight or nine—and about one-third of the infantry and all the European artillery were local troops raised by the East India Company for permanent service. Had the whole native armies revolted there would have been an end to British rule. Fortunately, however, when the army of Bengal and part of that of Bombay mutinied, the Madras army remained faithful, and the Punjaub frontier force rendered good service in subduing the mutiny.

In the reorganization which followed, an entirely different system was adopted. Not only was the proportion of Europeans increased to that of one European to two natives, but greater care was exercised in recruiting the native regiments. The general principle adopted has been the mingling of men of different races and religions in the same regiments but in separate companies. All the European troops are part of the imperial army, and only serve part of their time in India; officers may be transferred to native regiments, but the majority are recruited by the appointment of candidates from the Royal Military College at

Sandhurst. These officers of the Indian army are also employed in a large number of civil posts and in the political or diplomatic department. These details are given to show how careful a reorganization of the military system has been accomplished since the mutiny. Other reforms were the provision made for safeguarding the health of the European troops, especially the arrangements for sending each battalion serving in an unhealthy district to the hills for a part of each year. This and other sanitary precautions are valuable in preserving not only the health but the *morale* of the men. The most remarkable change strengthening the military position has been, however, in the direction of improved communications. The conditions prevailing at the time of the mutiny have been radically altered by the creation of a great net-work of roads, railways, and telegraphic communication. Those who take a somewhat ghoulish delight in prophesying another mutiny, and who speak of the British in India as "living over a volcano," must overlook these circumstances if they believe that anything comparable to the outbreak of 1857 is possible to-day.

The police force in India consists entirely of natives, under an English chief, district superintendents and assistants. It is very seldom necessary—not more than once or twice a year, and generally in connection with some religious dispute—to call out even a small body of the military to maintain order, a fact which speaks well for the

efficiency of the police. All Britons who have had experience of native troops or military police in India speak well of their loyalty and courage; and it is no exaggeration to say that in some of the northern regiments the wild fighting tribes who have been organized into regiments have transferred their allegiance with a whole heart to their white officers, and would, like the majority of the Indian native army, follow the *Sahib* anywhere he chose to lead them.

The question of native armies is of peculiar importance in the Philippines, because the Filipino is of that essentially warlike stock — the Malay. Without possessing the qualities which distinguish the warrior tribes of India, he has still a predilection for fighting; and in the special kind of warfare which the physical difficulties of his own islands necessitate he is well versed. The caste distinction which was so grave an obstacle to the Indian organization does not exist here, nor is there the religious difficulty to combat; but at the same time there is, perhaps, a greater degree of untrustworthiness, a lack of *esprit de corps*, a vanity and instability which were not encountered in India after the great initial steps had been accomplished. The more civilized the Filipino the more care needs to be exercised in placing him in any responsible position, and this is peculiarly the case in military and police appointments. It is essential that American supervision should be of the closest kind, and that the American officers

or instructors should be of the highest possible calibre, both as to efficiency and character. A similar lesson was learned in India through many failures and one terrible disaster. The Philippine police service was fortunate in being placed at first under an officer of the right stamp, and the work it has done is a justification of the policy. But there is a tendency to expect too much from any body in the archipelago which is in fair working order, and the police have been, like every other branch of the service, overworked. They have had little time for internal organization or drill, and, it may be mentioned, incidentally, they are the worst-paid body in the service.

A fresh problem in controlling a tropical region will arise in Panama. Without any question of military occupation, there will be needed a strong police force to maintain order. Negroes are the only possible material for such a force, since the country is very unhealthy for white men and the Colombians are unsuitable. There will certainly be a great drain on the negro population of the West Indies both for the work of construction on the canal and for police duties. It would be impossible to utilize the present black cavalry of the United States army, who, with excellent fighting qualities are not suited for civil duties. The negro police may be recruited from the South, but it is doubtful whether they would care for service on the isthmus, and there must be grave doubts as to their amenability to discipline. The

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West Indian negro is not only strong physically, but is docile, willing, and brave when disciplined and led. But he will require different treatment and handling to that usually meted out by Americans to negroes. He understands neither the freedom of manner nor the strong contempt with which his race is treated in America. It is again the question of a high class of officers. In every part of our own empire we have found this to be the case, and it has come to be idiomatic with us that it takes a gentleman to get on with "niggers." This subject has been treated of elsewhere, in the chapters on the Philippines and Americans in the tropics. It narrows itself down again and again to this: America has now to provide inducements to the very best of her sons to serve abroad as police officers, military instructors, civil servants, and so forth. Only by the very best can Greater America be worthily served.

To turn to the other branch of the militant service. There can be no question that naval expansion is the dominant note in world policy to-day.¹ Germany heads the list in the strenuousness of her efforts, and is bent on doubling her fleet in the next decade, and achieving the Herculean task of becoming second only to Great Britain in naval power. Her exertions have forced on Great Britain an unusual activity. We have adopted a policy known as the "two-power standard," by

¹ See Appendix A.

which we must maintain a fleet at least equal to those of any two combined powers. Any decrease in the proportion of our naval strength would be fatal to that supremacy on the sea which our scattered empire makes essential. The present rate of naval expansion is a heavy burden to us, so heavy that it becomes increasingly doubtful whether this country can continue, unaided, to support it. Russia, although essentially a land power, has adopted a naval policy which must sorely puzzle some of her ardent admirers. What can be her object in laying down vessels in all the yards of Europe and America until she is already third on the list in point of numerical strength. She has established herself on the Pacific and has ice-free ports on the China Sea; she still hopes for an outlet on the Persian Gulf, and is working steadily towards the Baltic. With her ambitions we have now little to do. They may, however, be briefly summed up as being chiefly inimical to the United States in that they are essentially monopolistic. Anglo-Saxondom—however it may work, and some of its methods have certainly been rather indirect—is desirous of opening the world for trade, of bringing freedom, civilization, and peace to every part of the globe. Russia, with her programme of territorial expansion, military achievements, closed ports, autocratic government, and non-progressiveness, is a menace to the world. One of the signs of the times is an evident working compact between

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Russia and Germany, and an interesting sidelight is cast on this by the clause included in the Russo-German agreement regarding China,¹ which provides that Russia shall oppose no obstacle to German ambitions in South America and shall give her a free hand in following out her interests and developing the material resources in that country.²

The naval question is, therefore, of even greater importance to a country which, like America, has spread overseas, extended her seaboard, and occupied a number of positions of strategic value, if defended by a strong fleet. The actual efficiency of the United States navy is liable to be over-estimated because of its success in the Spanish war. There was a tendency, not unnatural to people who tasted for the first time in their lives the fruits of victory, to exaggerate their own achievements. Since 1812 the United States had seen no naval warfare, and the present generation, remembering what was done then, and also the part played by their ships in blockading the confederate ports during the civil war, were apt to congratulate themselves on having kept alive the naval tradition.

As a matter of fact, however, the present navy, such as it is, dates only from 1882, at which date

¹ Reinsch, *World Politics*, p. 284.

² In the German Diet, in December, 1903, the president, by a significant slip of the tongue, referred to Russia as "an allied and friendly power."

the ships were all antiquated wooden vessels. The reason for this is simple. Before the civil war America was fairly well provided with ocean shipping, naval and mercantile — the latter, indeed, almost equalled that of Great Britain in tonnage. With the dislocation resulting from the war and the preoccupation of the reconstruction period came the restriction which forbade the purchasing of vessels in foreign countries. Coincidentally, the introduction of iron and steam vessels involved the entire remodelling of existing navies. America did not attempt to cope with this. She had entered on a period in which the urgent character of home problems and the exhaustion of the nation after a fratricidal struggle made warlike preparations, for remote contingencies, extremely distasteful. It is to this period, and not to an earlier one, that she owes the growth of that desire for isolation, that vehement protest against any movement which would bring her in contact with European powers, which has been magnified by some people into a national policy or tradition. Taking a short view, shutting their eyes to the possibilities which their own development would involve, the Americans of the period echoed a parrot-cry which is heard now in another quarter of their continent. "We do not want a navy for defence," they said, "for Europe has neither excuse nor desire to attack us, and if she did it is on land that our defence would be made. We do not want one for offence, because we are

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self-contained in our own continent, and will not meddle with Europe." Then came the era of industrial expansion, and all America was too busy money-making to attend to either army or navy.

In the early eighties, however, oversea expansion, especially in the Pacific, and the consequent broadening of the national outlook, aroused a certain interest in these matters. The mercantile marine had dwindled almost to vanishing-point; the ships-of-war are described as having been almost as inefficient as those of Alcibiades and Hamilcar, certainly as the ships of Tromp and Blake. The first step was the appointment of an advisory board, and from this time the creation of a modern navy went on steadily, if slowly. Not only ships were needed but a trained personnel, and one of the steps which assisted in making the small navy really efficient was the practice of keeping the ships at sea and training the men to gunnery. To this fact was no doubt chiefly due the success in the Spanish war. After the war a complete reorganization of the personnel took place (in 1899), the executive and engineering branches being amalgamated. Of recent years, too, a grand effort has been made to regain the ground lost in the mercantile marine. The shipping subsidy bill of 1901, and the shipping Trust which followed, have been powerful instruments in assisting this, and the result is that last year the mercantile marine tonnage for the first time

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in American history was over six millions gross. Nevertheless, a very large proportion of American trade is still carried in foreign bottoms, and there is practically no carrying-trade with either the Far East or South America.

The stimulus provided by subsidies and Trusts is, of course, more or less artificial, and is on that ground open to criticism, but in these days of forced competition it is impossible without some such measures to establish the necessary lines, which must be provided first and left to justify their existence afterwards. The policy of Germany in this respect has forced the pace on other nations, and it is the experience of Great Britain that even old and well-established lines, paying legitimate dividends, cannot stand against those assisted, as are German lines, by a high degree of organization and heavy subsidies from government.

One of the great difficulties in the way of the American naval and mercantile marine is the costliness of building vessels. America possesses all the requisites, and has, besides, brought the mechanical side of the work to a high pitch of perfection, but the cost of labor, and especially of the skilled labor, necessary for a great deal of such work is a heavy charge. This should not prove an obstacle to a people who seem to find some difficulty in disposing of a yearly surplus; but the American, however rich, desires full value for his money, and he is, perhaps, hardly yet convinced

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that the enormous cost of these vessels represents their actual value to him when built.

An even greater difficulty is that of obtaining a suitable personnel. There is no pressure of population in America, and very little of that sentiment for the sea which is found in an island people. Living on a great continent, many thousands never even see the ocean. Still, there is a vast seaboard, which should furnish a supply of men for the sea, were it not for the fact that neither the Pacific seaboard nor even the southern part of the Atlantic is adequately furnished with harbors. Puget Sound is, perhaps, the finest harbor in the world; but it stands alone. A fishing population is always a valuable recruiting-ground for the navy; but, except in the most northern latitudes—Maine and Oregon—there is but little of this element to be found. Germany has, indeed, proved that by a careful early training a good sailor may be evolved from a peasant from the heart of the country; but it is doubtful whether it would be possible to transplant, even in a modified form, the German system to a country so impatient of discipline as the United States. The mercantile marine of America enjoys, unfortunately, an evil reputation among sailors, and much is needed to improve the status of men both in this and the naval branch of the service. Great Britain suffered in the past from desertion, mutiny, and other drawbacks, which have only been obviated by entire reform—first, in the position

accorded to men on board ship as regards their rights, and, secondly, in the selection and promotion of officers.

It is claimed for the American navy that it is entirely exempt from the baneful effects of patronage; and it is certain that the officers trained at Annapolis have every opportunity of becoming efficient, while they are subjected to a discipline which is essential to men who may be called on in the future to take command and responsibility on a large scale. A navy general staff has recently been proposed in which all the different branches of the service—personnel, fleet, and war plans—should be thoroughly co-ordinated and placed under efficient officers.¹ A naval construction

¹ In his annual report made to the President, Mr. Moody, the Secretary of the Navy, said: "It is asserted by many, both within and without the naval service, that alterations in the organic law governing the administration of naval affairs would result in an increased efficiency and economy. The agitation for a change comes from so many and such respectable quarters that it cannot be denied consideration. It has been pointed out with truth that in the civil war, and, in a very much less degree, in the war with Spain, the organization proved inadequate. . . . It is not my purpose to recommend specifically at this time any of these proposals, but only to bring them forward for the earnest discussion and consideration which their importance deserves. Mere change is not reform, and none should be attempted until it appears clearly that conditions would be bettered thereby. I venture, however, to express the hope that Congress may give to the whole subject of the organization of our naval establishment its best thought and attention. The cost of our naval establishment as well as the importance of the efficiency of the navy would amply warrant all the study which can be given."

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programme, to cover a period of twenty years, with an average expenditure of about thirty million dollars per annum, is now proposed. There is, therefore, the nucleus of an efficient arm, which should be strengthened and equipped in every possible way, not, perhaps, with a view to actual conflict, but to render such conflict unlikely. The machinery has been provided, here as in the army; what is now necessary is the stimulus afforded by national sentiment and intelligent interest. The formation of Navy Leagues, which have proved, both in Germany and Great Britain, of the greatest service in insuring naval efficiency, is a measure which should be initiated in the United States. Under the present system of government such leagues would be extremely useful in influencing public opinion, upon which so much depends.

It will be seen, therefore, that a good deal has been accomplished, and that still more is contemplated, towards placing the military and naval services upon a footing commensurate with the great and growing world interests which it is their duty to defend.

CHAPTER XVI

ASIA IN TRANSFORMATION

AT the risk of appearing to digress slightly from the actual subject-matter of this book, Greater America, it is necessary here to give a brief account of the changes which are taking place in Asia. That these must profoundly affect not only the great powers of Europe (whose fate, indeed, is to a certain extent bound up in them), but must influence America in a high degree, and may have a determining voice in the future of Greater America, may not be obvious at first sight. But no one who seriously contemplates the extraordinary character of Asiatic developments and their unmistakable trend can doubt that this is the case.

The transformation of Asia is synonymous with the expansion of Russia. The Russification of a vast continent has proceeded at a pace so rapid that many of us can remember its infancy—the time when the expression “Mervousness” was laughingly applied to a few people who did not accept Russia’s “assurances” regarding her ambitions in Central Asia.

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Let us take briefly the most salient points in the situation. Asia contains about one-half of the world's population, and its races are unusually prolific. It has resources which are practically unlimited, including an area of food-producing land which is unequalled in any other continent. It is now, not only in the Near but in the Far East, the arena for the great powers of Europe, the European situation being reproduced in both these regions. Into the Oriental arena the United States has been drawn. As the owner of the Philippines she is practically an Asiatic power. But, apart from that, her inevitable evolution as a world-power and her relations with other nations, which are bound to increase in intimacy, compel her to play a part in the international drama in the Far East. It would be hardly consonant with American ambitions or pretensions if that part were a minor one. There is, indeed, no quarter of the globe where the United States has interests in which she can afford to put herself on a level, say, with Belgium.

What are the principal changes in Asia which will bring that continent into touch with America? First, we have the annihilation of distance. From east to west flow the lines of international communication. Already the traveller round the world can choose alternative routes without deviating much from a direct path. Oceans no longer divide; they rather unite. The opening of com-

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munication through Suez brought Europe into close contact with the East; the opening of a trans-isthmian canal will do as much for the greater part of the United States. The Mississippi, the cradle of a great industrial future, in which is the centre of gravity of the United States, is peculiarly situated as regards the isthmus, and the opening of the new route to the East will give the vast Mississippi region, as well as the Atlantic States, a short and direct outlet to markets still unexploited—the Pacific and the Far East.

Asia has been crossed by a continuous railway line, already throwing out branches, and the journey between Europe and the Far East has been reduced to some twenty days. This all-Russian line is only part of a scheme for linking up European Russia with her empire in the Far East of Asia. The centre of the continent is, for the most part, a vast table-land, rising, on the borders of northern India and Tibet, to lofty mountain ranges. Physical difficulties render this region the last stronghold of Oriental exclusiveness; but even now the insistent European is knocking at the gates, and it is not yet certain that he will not find another semi-European warming his hands at the fire when he does break in. Be that as it may, central Asia has already its trunk-line of railway, with feeders running down towards the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, to the borders of Afghanistan and northward to

connect with the Siberian line.¹ Then, through the territories of the 'Sick Man of the East, once prosperous and populated, still full of possibilities, a line is projected which would connect the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf and give yet another alternative route to the East. India is linked up by a railway system of some twenty-seven thousand miles, and Burma has her own railways, to be joined later to those of India. Northern and southern China are being linked by railway lines, foreign built and owned. France is building an extension of her Tonkinese railway through Yunnan to the upper Yangtse; Canton is being connected with the Yangtse at Hankow by an American line, and from that point a Franco-Belgian railway, in active construction, will shortly run to Peking, thus connecting China from south to north. Peking again is joined to the Russian Manchurian railways *via* Tientsin and Newchwang, but a shorter cut is said to be projected, if not actually begun, and still another by which the Chinese capital will be linked up directly with Lake Baikal and the Siberian railway through a line across the so-called "Gobi

¹ The trans-Caspian line, some two thousand three hundred miles in length, starts from Krasnovodsk, on the Caspian, skirts northeast Persia, and runs by Merv, Bokhara, Samarkand, Khokand, and Margilan to Andijan in Fergana. It has a branch north to Tashkend, and thence a line (one thousand two hundred miles) is being constructed to Orenburg, on the borders of European Russia. A branch south to Meshed, in Persia, is under construction, and another, from Merv to Kushk, on the borders of Afghanistan, has been completed.

Desert.' Other Russian lines south of Peking are proposed, while the German's are busy with their lines in Shantung, pushing their way in various directions into the *Hinterland*. Only the British, with various concessions in hand, are supine, the trend of events not encouraging the investment of capital. From every quarter, therefore, the steel lines—pioneers of political aggression rather than civilization and progress—are closing round or thrusting themselves, feeler-like, towards the heart of Asia. That great, inert, Oriental continent is being galvanized into life. The second change in the condition of Asia, to which, of course, the annihilation of distance has largely conduced, is the reproduction, first in the Near and then in the Far East, of the European situation, with all its rivalries, intrigues, and combinations. The centre of gravity of world politics has, as the writer predicted twenty years ago, shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and in that region we find not only Europe but America.

The principal factor in accomplishing this transformation is undoubtedly the great northern Colossus. Russia's marvellous advance, her aims and their significance to the Anglo-Saxon peoples, are spoken of elsewhere. Her position as the owner of more than half Asia and the neighbor of America is in itself sufficient reason to compel American interest in Asiatic affairs. A more intimate aspect of the situation appears, however, in the question of the future of China, and

on this the many changes in Asia have all a more or less direct bearing.

Great Britain can recall the time when she enjoyed an easy supremacy in the affairs of the Far East. Her interests there were purely commercial. Both she and the United States contemplated nothing less than the acquisition of territory in that region. Their energies were bent merely on the opening of obstinately closed doors to their trade. Japan's sudden transformation and the ambitions of certain European powers changed the aspect of affairs. First came the defeat of China by Japan, the eviction of Japan by Russia, Germany, and France, and then the scramble for Chinese territory, in which Russia actually, though not officially, made the first move. The extent of the expansion of Russia in the last half-century can be gathered from a glance at the map, prepared for the purpose; but it is difficult to discern the exact process of growth of Russian power in the Far East. At certain dates we see her annex or acquire great slices of territory—the Amur province, then Primorsk, then Manchuria; we see the steady increase of concessions on the part of China to her friend Russia, and at a certain date, at all events, we know that the foremost Chinese statesman of the day practically became the agent of the Tsar. These are all epoch-making events. But of the slow, persistent, silent diplomacy, the thousand intrigues which made these events possible and which found nothing too small

or too insignificant to be included within their scope—of all this we know very little.¹

Mongolia is valuable to the power which desires to dominate China. Although the general conception of that region is that of a huge, sandy desert, it contains, in fact, the grazing-ground for vast herds of sheep and cattle required for the feeding of a densely packed country like north China. Moreover, it is the breeding-ground for a small and sturdy breed of horses, invaluable for various purposes. If Mongolia is already honey-combed with Russian influence, we know that the same insidious factor has penetrated to the heart of Tibet. In a recent work² Mr. Chirol explains how, through one of the heads of the religious hierarchy who lives at Urga and has come entirely under Russian domination, a hold has been obtained over Lhasa. This personage obtained the admission to the councils of the Dalai lama of

¹ An instance of these hardly perceptible methods, which came to the writer's personal knowledge recently, may be given as an illustration. Some years back inquiries were set on foot at the principal Mongol lamaseries at Peking for men to teach Russians the Mongol language. Some twenty-five or thirty of these men, well equipped with money and clothes, left for certain towns understood to be somewhere on the Russian frontier to teach the Russians there. Their duties, needless to say, were to prepare the way for Russian domination. The Russian officials at the time were in the habit of constantly visiting the head lamas in the Great Lamasery (said to have about one thousand five hundred lamas, the chief lama, or Gensen, being usually a Tibetan), at Peking, well laden with gifts, and of receiving visits from them in return.

² *The Middle-Eastern Question*. 1903.

a Siberian Buriat, and this envoy has been backward and forward several times between Lhasa and St. Petersburg. Russian scientific missions have been busy in Tibet for many years; and in the recent work of Dr. Sven Hedin, recording his observations in the outlying parts of Tibet and his abortive attempt to reach Lhasa, it is significant to note that his two Cossack guards secured for him not only respect and consideration wherever he went, but that the very officials who prevented his progress to the Forbidden City assured him that under no circumstances would they use force, but that he must carry out his project over their dead bodies.¹ One of the professors at the St. Petersburg University, M. Zybikoff, a Buriat by birth, has not only visited but resided in Lhasa as a lama, and he asserts that Buriats, Kalmucks, and Mongols of the Russian dominion receive their priests from Tibet and send their youths to be trained in Lhasa, thus keeping up a constant stream of communication with the city, which is, in fact, "forbidden" only to foreigners who are not Russian subjects. Incidentally, a Japanese and a Hindoo traveller have visited Lhasa without revealing their nationality and have given accounts of the city. If a European Russian has not been openly received at Lhasa it is probably because it has been convenient to Russia to maintain Tibet in her exclusive attitude.

¹ *Central Asia and Tibet.* 1903.

for through her Buddhist subjects she can get all she requires of information and influence.

The British movement into Tibet has its origin no doubt in a desire to force the hand of Russia. It is important to retain Tibet as a real buffer state in central Asia and to prevent Russia from coming into close contact with the protected states on the northern fringe of India. A close connection, based on religion and trade, exists between some of these states and Tibet, and the true interests of the latter lie southward and not north. There is no trade with Russia, and Tibet is cut off by the sand wastes of Turkestan and the deserts of Mongolia on the north and west; east of her lies China, and the main current of national life flows in that direction. Hence her primary importance to Russia. A glance at a map will show how Tibet commands the sources of the Yangtse, and, with France creeping up through Yunnan, it is plain that China might be cut off from the rest of the continent entirely, dominated north and west by Russia and on the south by France.

It is interesting to remember that the seventeenth century, which saw the founding of Boston and the colonies of Rhode Island, Maryland, Carolina, and Pennsylvania, and the first Dutch settlement at the Cape of Good Hope, saw also the foundation of the Russian Empire by Peter the Great, who took his half-savage, half-Oriental, loosely organized kingdom, centring in the ancient khanate at Moscow, and turned it into the nucleus of a

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modern empire. The settlers of the New World began with individual liberty, initiative, and a spirit of independence and fraternity. Russia was founded by a clever, unscrupulous despot, ruling by sheer force of will over a savage, disunited congeries of tribes. He brought from his sojourn in the West some of the features of civilization and introduced them at the point of the sword. The New-World colonists began their lives with all the equipment that the best civilization of the time could give them. It is a singular and interesting contrast, and one that might profitably be followed in the whole history of the two peoples; but we are now concerned more with Russia's future than her past. Great as has been her material progress, she remains to this day a semi-civilized giant. For the handful of highly polished, elegant, French-speaking Russian nobility one meets in the cities there is a vast, illiterate, half-civilized proletariat.¹ Only of late years has there grown up a middle class, which combine the heritage of poverty and labor with a certain degree of education. Whatever the forces warring within her, however, Russia has the enormous advantage in brute force of a great, rapidly growing population, like a vast battering-ram, directed by the highly wrought engine of the governing class, whose

¹ In *All the Russias* Mr. Henry Norman, no captious critic of Russian affairs, says: "Poverty and illiteracy naturally go hand-in-hand. In no other great country of the world is poverty—monotonous, resigned poverty—to so great an extent a national characteristic of the people."

motive power is supplied from St. Petersburg. Russia is the apotheosis of centralization, and should that central brain be paralyzed it is impossible to foresee what might happen to the vast, unwieldy limbs; but, failing such a catastrophe, the giant will continue on his path until he meets a strong organism on which to try his strength. Hitherto, be it observed, he has proceeded against the lower organisms of political life, the weak central Asian khanates, the unorganized Siberian and Buriat tribes, the terrified and unprogressive China. His ambitions towards Constantinople landed him in a war with great powers, since when he has cast covetous eyes but has done nothing but scheme and undermine in that direction.

Side by side with these changes on the Asiatic continent, a process of transformation has been working in the Pacific Ocean. Although this appears to the casual observer to be a modern movement, and although it is only of recent years that modern statesmen have come to understand the part that ocean is to play in world history, yet the early statesmen of America, with a remarkable foresight, had a true conception of the importance of that ocean and laid their plans accordingly. Jefferson, at a time when the mountains still seemed an almost impenetrable barrier, foresaw the development under the American ægis of the whole Pacific slope. Seward, at a later date, while the rest of his world was exhausted with a fratricidal struggle and cared for nothing save

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peace and reconstruction, could look ahead far enough to seize the opportunity of securing for his country Alaska and the Aleutian islands.

During the period which preceded the civil war, America, indeed, had been playing a considerable part in Pacific affairs. The war of 1812 roused in her people that pride in and love of ships which was their heritage. American traders, fishers, and explorers were first in the Pacific. At this time England was engaged, through the East India Company, in a slow, stately, and not altogether remunerative trade with the ports of the Far East. Her ships had to go by the Cape of Good Hope, and a year was not an unreasonable time for the trading venture to occupy. Then America began to send across from her Pacific slope the light, swift vessels for which she was to become famous. The discovery of gold in California in 1847, and in Australia in 1851, gave a stimulus not only to the carrying-trade but to industries and manufactures. The Pacific began to be the arena of a number of ocean highways, and all this made an increase in the world's shipping an imperative necessity. A keen competition for the carrying-trade in the Far East between Britain and America ensued, and the evolution of the American clipper, which was the most beautiful, as well as the fastest ship of the day, gave the New World a supremacy in mercantile marine which she has never since attained.

It is worth while to pause for a moment in our

sketch of Pacific expansion to recall these halcyon days which must surely be forgotten by Americans when they speak of the "newness" of the policy which gives them interests in the Pacific and in eastern Asia. The late Alexander Michie, writing from actual memory of those days, draws the following picture:

"The ocean was the true route to California for emigrants and material, but the voyage was long, and, impatience of intervening space being the ruling temper of gold-seekers, the shortening of the time of transit became a crying want for the living cargoes, and scarcely less for the perishable provisions which the new ships were designed to carry. Speed, comfort, and capacity had, therefore, to be combined in a way which had never before been attempted. The result was the historical American clipper of the middle of the century, beautiful to look on with her cloud of white cotton canvas, covering every ocean highway. These were vessels of large capacity, carrying one-half more dead-weight than their registered tonnage, built and rigged like yachts, and attaining a speed never before reached on the high seas. . . . The Americans not only had the Californian trade practically in their own hands, but were prompt to turn the advantage which that gave them to profitable account in the competition for the trade of China. The ships, when empty, sailed across the Pacific, loading at Canton or Shanghai tea and other produce for London or

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New York. . . . Larger and finer ships were constantly being added to the American fleet until they almost monopolized the trade not only between New York and San Francisco, but also between China and Great Britain. . . . Thus the China Sea became a principal battle-ground whereon the struggle for ascendancy between the ships of Great Britain and the United States was most strenuously fought out.”¹

How the British roused themselves to meet their rivals, the heroic measures adopted, including the abrogation of the Navigation Acts, and the part played in the struggle by the discovery of gold in Australia, by the civil war in America, by the opening of the Suez Canal, and by the invention of iron and steam vessels, is a story which cannot be told here. Sufficient that the energies of Americans were turned for a time into other channels, their shipping declined, the day of the beautiful, white-winged argosies was over and the paths of the Pacific knew them no more.

The second period of American activity in the Pacific has led her back to contend once more, on very different terms, for the markets of the Far East. No longer is Britain practically the only competitor; no longer is that vast region a *terra incognita* waiting only for Occidental enterprise and affording unlimited scope for the merchant adventurer. The transformation of Asia is nowhere

¹ *The Englishman in China.*

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more evident than in the Far Eastern section of that continent, and the main features in that change are the advance of Russia, already described, and the renaissance of Japan.

These two factors—advancing Russia and progressive Japan—are antipathetic. Sooner or later their interests were bound to clash. To Japan the vital question in the Far East is the preservation of China as an Oriental state. She has been plainly shown that she is not to be permitted to exercise authority over her sister nation; indeed, the legitimate fruits of victory were denied her after the Chino-Japanese war. Since that time she has changed her tactics and has done everything in her power to win the confidence of China. She has succeeded well, if we remember the intense contempt with which the Chinese used to regard their Japanese neighbors. But the steady absorbing process to which Russia is subjecting the administrative centre, as well as the outlying provinces of China, are too insidious, and too far advanced to be combated by similar methods on the part of Japan, who, moreover, has not been allowed by the European powers (what each one claims for itself) an actual foothold in the Chinese Empire. It is, therefore, no question as to the independence of Korea alone—vital as that is to the Japanese; Russia is not prepared to fight for that—nor is it a matter of trade interests in Manchuria, though these may be used as a lever. The crux of the situation is whether or no Russia

will give definite assurances in a binding form as to her ambitions in eastern Asia—assurances with ample guarantees that she does not dispute the sovereignty of China. This would form a basis for future operations and would establish an element of permanency which would be undoubtedly used by Japan to strengthen the position of China. That apparently moribund empire would certainly use her independence to make fresh engagements with Western powers as to trade; but in the influence and tutelage of Japan rests the only hope of permanent improvement in her condition.

As for the attitude of Japan at this crisis, it is remarkable for its consistency and firmness, despite many attempts made to deflect the issue, to discredit her by apparent concessions which she could not accept, and by other devices to place her in an unfavorable light before the world. Japan keeps her aims steadily before her, and what those aims are may well be stated in the words of a man who has a life-long knowledge of his subject. Captain Brinkley, in his recent book says: "Japan has risen to the headship of the Far East. Is that the goal of her ambition? One of her favorite sayings is, 'Better be the tail of an ox than the comb of a cock.' She is now the comb of the Oriental cock—that is not enough; she wants to be the tail of the Occidental ox. How is it to be done? Evidently by following the route that has already led her so far. She cannot turn back.

Her destiny forces her on, and there is no mistaking the sign-post set up by her recent experience. She has been taught that fighting capacity is the only sure passport to European esteem"—(Captain Brinkley has already pointed out that until she beat China, Japan's internal progress had won her little recognition in Europe or America)—"and she has also been told again and again, is still perpetually told, that her victory over China proved nothing about her competence to stand in the lists of the West. She will complete the proof, or try to complete it."¹ Incidentally it may be remarked that Japan's position as the "comb of the Oriental cock" would be immediately jeopardized by the break up of China, which would bring several European powers into prominence in the Far East and would certainly mean the ascendancy of Russia. Japan is, therefore, protecting what she has already won, as well as satisfying a legitimate ambition for future greatness.

One of the factors in the situation in China which is hardest to gauge is the *rapprochement* which has taken place between the thinking classes in Japan and China, despite the defeat suffered by a proud people at the hands of a nation they despised, despite the ever-growing web of Russian intrigue and influence. It seemed as though, in her extremity, China had turned to her once-despised

¹ *Japan and China*. 1903.

rival for help against the Western barbarians, and the founding of the East Asiatic League, with an organ at Peking, the despatch of students to Tokio, and the demand for Japanese teachers in many forms of industry and in the army, are signs of good feeling hailed as a happy augury.

The great difficulty in appraising the true value of such signs is to differentiate between the real China and the Manchu government, whose acts represent the Celestial Empire to the outer world. Progress and reform had quite a little vogue in court circles after the return from Singnan-fu. Missionaries were patted on the back by hands steeped in the blood of thousands of native Christians; ladies of legations were wept over, in regret for past misunderstandings, and went away loaded with sweet words and cheap presents; Imperial edicts decreed the reform of education, which, if carried out, would revolutionize the whole fabric of Chinese society; and, simultaneously, a despatch urged the immediate capture and execution of reformers who had been suggesting less drastic measures without the imperial *imprimatur*.

The extraordinary force vested in the Manchu government, and controlled by the Empress Dowager and her immediate relatives, has a peculiar relation to the Chinese people. It has been pointed out by native writers (from the secure vantage-point of a British settlement) that the head of the Manchu dynasty has by Chinese law incurred the punishment of decapitation

by having surrendered territory to a foreigner. Moreover, the bulk of the Chinese neither respect nor love the wonderful old lady at Peking. The vilest stories are in common circulation about her, just as they were about her great supporter, Li-Hung Chang. At the same time, not only the Chinese people at large, but some of the best and most upright of Chinese statesmen, including the Yangtse viceroys, Liu-kun-yi and Chang-chih-tung, were personally loyal to her and saved the empire for the Manchu dynasty at the time when the secession of the Yangtse provinces was strongly urged from without. No adequate explanation can be given of this anomaly, which is the more confusing as one attempts to analyze it. No nation is so badly governed as the Chinese—none, perhaps, enjoys a more complete local autonomy. The paradoxes of China are proverbial. The only suggestion that can be offered as to the continued ascendancy of the Manchus is the fact that were they to fall the vast net-work which emanates from Peking and centres there would be thrown out of gear. There is nothing that could be set up in its place; no rival dynasty. The nepotism of the Manchus has secured them a monopoly of all the best posts near the throne and has precluded the rise of a Chinese aristocracy. The actual organization of society, indeed, precludes any real Chinese aristocracy or ruling class. The Manchus alone have the privileges attaching to an hereditary nobility, and though titles have been be-

stowed on distinguished Chinese, these are, in fact, for foreign consumption only. There is only one Chinese hereditary noble, who derives the dignity from his descent from Confucius. While this is the case, it is obviously difficult to evolve any class combination among the Chinese which could vie with that of the small but powerful Manchu aristocracy which are spread over the land, "eating it," as the phrase goes. The people, in many ways wretched, from the Western point of view, being the victims of official corruption, heavy exactions, and incomplete justice, are far from contented, but yet have not that oneness of aim, that power of combination, which makes masses powerful in the state. Revolutions and rebellions, on small and large scales, are chronic, but no great leader has appeared who could point the way to victory. The Chinese has no aspirations at all after ethical perfection. He wants to be let alone and to have an opportunity for selling what he makes or raises. He has a rooted objection to taxation, and would infinitely rather bribe a tax-gatherer to pass him over than give up his just demand.

Whatever may be the future of this people, it is plain to the most enlightened of their own statesmen that they are not ripe for the introduction, wholesale, of a European civilization. The same consideration probably weighs with many enlightened Chinese in their allegiance to the dynasty. That dynasty represents to the ignorant masses

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what no other power, no representative government, no new form of control can. They can hardly separate the Son of Heaven who rules them from the vague deity of whom there is an image in the breasts of the most ignorant of mankind. Russia was well advised when she began her attack on the Far East at the very heart of empire, and she has now established herself in the minds of the government at Peking as the friend and protector of the dynasty against those clamorous nations which have long been asking for reform—reform—reform! Reform would have to begin with the court itself, and that would not suit either the Empress Dowager or her favorites, so she has flung herself into the arms of the one power which not only does not ask for these inconvenient changes, but is also prepared to use force, if necessary, to back her opinions. The oft-repeated assurances of Great Britain have ceased to be regarded; she is no longer considered as China's friend, and it is thought easy to get the better of her with Russia's aid. An affront, too, was considered to have been put upon China by the British alliance with Japan, which may also have estranged somewhat the two Oriental countries. It was believed by the Chinese to have been aimed against them. "Why did you not come to *us*, make an alliance with *us*?" asked a Chinese statesman of his English friend. Not very reasonably, perhaps, from our point of view, but the Chinese point may well be different, and we

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are too little given to regard it. Under any circumstances, however, it is to be feared that China will see in the present situation only a fresh proof of Russia's superiority of strength and purpose over the Anglo - Saxon powers. Her budding friendship for Japan may not stand such a test. She will comment on the futility of alliance with Europe, and should Japan fail in the attempt to secure her independence, will make the best terms she can with the conqueror, which will mean her own partition under the guise of protectorates. The worst thing that can happen to China, the dismemberment which began on the last occasion of conflict in the Far East, seems, therefore, once more possible, unless Japan is successful in putting a limit to Russian ambitions.

Is China—rich in population and resources, in potentialities, awaiting the master-hand—rapidly degenerating into a Sick Man of the East? Or is there reserved for her another fate, even more inglorious? She is one of the last of Oriental empires. Siam is drifting towards her inevitable fate as a "protectorate" of France. Persia is independent only in name; a fierce battle between Britain and Russia is being silently waged over her moribund body. Afghanistan, Tibet—buffer states—cannot long withstand the dynamic forces pressing upon them. Turkey is upheld merely by the balance of power in Europe—a slender reed. Is Russia to hold the key to China's future? Is the continent of Asia to be divided, giving Russia

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a solid, compact empire, leaving Great Britain the southern excrescences, with a slice or two for France and Germany in the East? This would obviously be a situation very difficult for Britain to maintain, and how much more so if the potentialities of China are to be developed on Slavonic lines.

The actual position of the two Anglo-Saxon powers at this crisis in the history of the Far East, is a little difficult to define. That both have tangible interests which are threatened by Russia cannot be denied, and when we remember the early history of Occidental intercourse with the Far East it seems remarkable that the earliest powers to open and develop that region should even contemplate an attitude of neutrality while so important a chapter in its history is being enacted. Both Britain and America have recently executed treaties with China which practically amount to an assertion of her sovereignty in Manchuria, and it is reported that Russia is willing to convey to those and to the other world powers an assurance that she has no intention to deprive China of that sovereignty. But, in the teeth of similar assurances, she has assumed in that region a position incompatible with China's sovereignty, and to Japan, as to the one power whose whole fate is bound up in this matter, has fallen the unpleasant task of requiring a more definite and binding promise. It is desirable that both Britain and America should keep

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this broad issue in mind, since it is the root of the situation, and certainly affects them both in more than one way. Japan is hardly likely to be mistaken in her estimate of the situation as regards Russia and China, and if her estimate is right the great commercial nations, whose aims are coincident with those of Japan, must view with grave misgivings any development which would cripple the one progressive Oriental nation, destroy the only hope of China for national regeneration, and throw the balance of power into Slavonic hands. Japan, as a naval power, holds that balance true in the Far East, and neither Great Britain, her ally, nor America, her friend, can afford to see the Japanese navy eliminated, or even reduced. There is another side of the question, which arises out of the possibility that Japan might be overcome by sheer weight in any struggle with the northern colossus.

America has always desired to be considered as not only the home of liberty but the centre from which it should stream out into the world. She places more importance on the ethical significance of her own expansion than any other nation has yet done. She is practically pledged to the cause of freedom—even lays claim to quixotry in her dealings with oppressed peoples. Without subscribing to this view, without retracting the statement so frequently made in this book that American expansion has been neither spasmodic nor altruistic, there remains the fact that the American

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people cannot, in the face of their actions elsewhere and their frequent protestations, view without deep concern the extinguishing of progress and liberty in Japan. Neither Britain nor the United States lifted up their voices against the brutal crushing of Finland—it was, perhaps, impossible for them to do so save by an unpardonable breach of international etiquette; but in the case of Japan there are not only sentimental or moral grounds, but more solid ones, which could be made the basis of, at least, remonstrance. It is the conduct of Russia in Manchuria which has brought affairs to a crisis, and Japan, remembering the language held by her Anglo-Saxon friends on this subject, was anxious that the collision which seemed inevitable should occur over a matter in which all the great powers were concerned. Even when disillusioned by a direct warning from America and by an evident disinclination to interfere on the part of Great Britain, Japan has stood firmly in defence not only of her own interests but of those of the whole commercial world.

What course can be suggested which would best serve the interests of Anglo-Saxondom? The worst possible course is to permit Russia to dispose of the one active factor in the way of her domination of the Far East. It must be remembered that, whereas other nations have interests, or even territory, in the Far East, Japan alone, of the active powers, is at home there. All that she has of resources, interests, power, or prestige is

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contained in the north China Sea. Russia has reached that sea by contiguous expansion; and by means of a line, recently derided as of "no strategic use," she has placed this outlying part of her empire in direct and rapid touch with the brain-power at Petersburg. Were her expansion the legitimate expression of internal growth and progress, as has been that of the United States, it would be unreasonable to adopt a hostile attitude towards it. Even from the point of view of ethics the territory hitherto conquered or annexed by Russia is probably better off under her than under half-savage khans. But Russia's expansion is no longer legitimate. She has reached her objective, the Pacific Ocean, and has not paused to develop or organize the vast territories she has occupied; she has in no case laid the foundation of a future of freedom and prosperity for the conquered peoples. She has simply imposed a cast-iron system and planted military colonies to keep things in order. She has no excuse save her own insatiable ambition and land-hunger.

When she comes down to Korea she meets for the first time with a different state of affairs. A determined and civilized people now oppose her progress. She also crosses, not for the first time, the interests of her two great rivals for supremacy not only in the Far East but in world politics. She has the tacit encouragement of her friend Germany, who cannot afford to offend so near and great a neighbor. She can count on the neutrality,

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at all events, of France. At the same time it is notorious that her internal condition gives rise to serious misgivings among the most thoughtful and patriotic of her people. She is losing ground in Europe. She has serious problems in many parts of the empire which may become dangerous. It is the disloyal and disaffected among her subjects who are clamorous for the continuance of her aggressive policy, hoping that she may meet with disaster. Her friends wish that Russia might cease to be hag-ridden by destiny, which she believes, with Oriental fatalism, points her on to the subjection of Asia. They believe that a conflict in the Far East, if disastrous to Japan, may be equally harmful in the long run to the conqueror. The political subjugation of China may be followed by the economic conquest of Russian territory by the Chinese—as indeed is already occurring in eastern Siberia—and other results equally inimical to the ultimate welfare of the Russian people may follow a too successful territorial expansion in the Far East.

The naval question is by no means the least pressing. Greater America and Greater Britain must both view with apprehension the possibility that the one naval power with whom they are entirely in accord as to policy, might be crippled or even destroyed by the fleets of Russia. The immediate result would be to place Russia in the front rank of naval powers.

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The practical question for the Anglo-Saxon nations is whether they can afford to look on while this important act in the drama of "Asia Transformed" is played without reference to their own interests or sentiments.

CHAPTER XVII

FOREIGN RELATIONS

It has been constantly reiterated in this book that in her expansion America has followed a steady and even consistent policy. It therefore follows that, in the opinion of the writer, the Spanish war was not, as is sometimes asserted, the means of breaking down the barrier of isolation which the wisdom of the early Americans had enjoined.¹ Apart from the view of the party politician, who may choose to present facts in a certain light, there is evidence that the isolation of the United States has been more of a condition—and that a temporary one—than a policy. What Washington enjoined, and what has been the aim of every wise statesman in his country, was the avoidance of entangling alliances, or any alliances save temporary ones. "The great rule of conduct for us," he said, "in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible."² It is notorious that to an alliance with

¹ One phase of American foreign policy has been developed more fully in chapter vi.

² Washington added: "We may safely trust to temporary

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France the infant republic owed much of its early success. In modern times it is partly owing to the countenance of Great Britain that she owes her unimpeded expansion in the Pacific — unimpeded, at all events, so far as the great European powers are concerned.

An able American statesman¹ gives as two of the chief features, in an isolation which he regards as now impossible, the Monroe Doctrine and the protective tariffs.

Apart from the fact that a protectionist policy has been adopted by nations who have no desire for isolation, it must be conceded that, if this be really the case, it is well for Americans that destiny has proved too strong for them; and it may be hoped that a commercial policy which was only a temporary expedient, and is becoming adverse to the interests of large numbers of the people, shall pass into the regions of limbo at the same time as that "isolation" of which it is supposed to be an expression. Neither of them had any real place in the true conception of the republic.

The Monroe Doctrine is, of course, the main-sheet of all who believe that America is marked out by Fate for a different destiny to that of any other world-power. It secures to her—so far as she is ready to stand by it—a predominance in her alliances for extraordinary emergencies." Jefferson used the expression "entangling alliances" in his inaugural address in 1801.

¹ Richard Olney, "Growth of Our Foreign Policy." *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1900.

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own hemisphere, and prevents the re-creation of the European situation on American soil, as we now have it in eastern Asia. But, in order to justify this famous doctrine, America has been forced to expand, to annex, to stretch out overseas; she is compelled to contemplate a complete revision of her naval and military scheme; she is obliged to enter herself among the nations prepared for war — and all this would be useless and senseless but for the fact that the very spirit of the doctrine which kept Europe from the American sphere has taken America into the arena of world politics. Whichever way we turn it seems, indeed, quite impossible to reconcile the “isolation” policy with the ambitions of a great and growing nation. How is it possible to put a ring-fence round the ambitions of a people like the Americans?

The policy of the great leaders of the early republic was a cautious one. It might not have occurred to a European statesman to utter the famous warning about entangling alliances, but Washington knew the self-confidence and inexperience of his countrymen. At the same time, the first American diplomacy was engaged in attempting to disturb the balance of power in Europe in a manner favorable to the independence of the new republic. This was the first of a long series of interventions, some trifling, some important (like the crushing of the Barbary pirates), all dictated by self-interest. Nevertheless, it is rather the exception to find the United States

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taking part, as in the Mediterranean, in affairs which were not directly connected with her own hemisphere. That hemisphere, however, provided her with sufficient points of contact with European powers. That European politics were carefully followed and manipulated to her advantage will be evident to any one who studies America's acquisition of Louisiana, the Floridas, Oregon, and other of the older territories, not to mention the more recent annexations. The policy of isolation is now, in fact, a mere farce, unless Americans are prepared to accept its full significance. Europe may accept at present a Monroe Doctrine which cripples her energies in the New World, but the attitude of "Hands off, Europe!" is only possible if America herself is prepared to abstain scrupulously from any interference, intervention, or even expression of interest in cis-Atlantic affairs. This she has never yet done. Apart from the numerous cases of intervention abroad (of which the latest examples are China and Turkey), while she has consistently resented and repelled any suggestion of European interference in America,¹ she has been unable even to resist that tendency so strong in every proud and liberty-

¹ In the New Orleans case the United States insisted that Italy should abide by the decision of the American courts, action that was in striking contrast with the line of conduct adopted towards Chili in 1890, when *ex-parte* evidence was taken in the United States and special rights were set up. Only when a charge of gross injustice was fully established had the United States the right to claim a review of the case.

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loving people to express herself strongly in cases of misgovernment, to use her influence on behalf of oppressed peoples. "There is no reason," says Mr. Olney, "why the United States should not act for the relief of suffering humanity and for the advancement of civilization wherever and whenever such action would be timely." He instances another case, in which a non-active policy would be almost impossible. At the time of the Napoleonic wars, America, compelled by her weakness, maintained a neutrality which was humiliating and degrading in its results. Under similar circumstances—or, it may be presumed, any circumstances in which Britain might be involved in a life-and-death struggle on the ocean—it would be practically impossible now for America to retain her neutrality. This is the view, not of a Briton, be it remembered, or of an irresponsible press writer, but of an American statesman of high standing. He does not profess satisfaction with this condition of affairs, nor does he, in the writer's opinion, give due weight to the mass of historical evidence which can be brought forward to prove that America has never been free from foreign entanglements of some kind. He is rather of the school of American thinkers who would prefer for their country that ideal expansion which would give her all she wants of trade, prestige, territory—what not?—without the corresponding obligations and responsibilities. But his conclusions are so thoroughly in accord with the spirit in

which this book is written that they may well be summarized here. America has expanded. Whatever her foreign relations in the past, she has now come into the European family, and while that does not imply that she must not study her own interests first, it does imply some of the obligations of family life. Finally, if the exigencies of the situation make alliance with one or other power inevitable, America, in choosing Britain, will select the one most formidable as a foe and most effective as a friend, "whose people make with our own but one family, whose internal differences should not prevent a united front as against the world outside, whose influence upon the material and spiritual conditions of the human race has, on the whole, been elevating and beneficent, and whose example and experience cannot help being of the utmost service in our dealing with the difficult problems before us."¹

If any American still cherishes the illusion that a study of European politics is not essential to the statesmen of the New World, he must surely abandon it when he reflects on the nature of American relations with Germany. To ignore the significance of Germany's attitude, to be ignorant of its bearing on the politics of the rest of Europe, means failure to grasp salient features of America's position as a world-power. To give the true proportions to this subject would involve more

¹ Richard Olney, "Growth of Our Foreign Policy." *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1900.

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space than can be afforded in this book, and yet its bearing on Greater America is such that we must endeavor to take a bird's-eye view of it.

The growth of Germany is one of the most striking features of modern Europe. Her population is bounding forward at a rate only equalled in Russia; she has been converted from an agricultural to an industrial and commercial power; she has acquired colonies and strategic points, has built up a fine mercantile marine, and, finally, has embarked on an ambitious naval policy. According to the programme at present laid down, the year 1916 (probably an earlier date) will see Germany second instead of fifth among the nations in sea power. The policy is a very thorough one, and is not confined to the mere laying down of ships, but includes the increase and equipment of dock-yards and the training of a personnel. For the latter Germany has in her hardy coast population excellent material.

Germany's position in Europe is a peculiar one. She lies between two great powers (one, at least, her traditional enemy) which have for some years past been in close alliance. On the south she has the great, unwieldy, disorganized Austria-Hungarian Empire; on the north the little kingdoms of Denmark, Holland, and Belgium.¹ The avowed

¹ By the treaty of London (1831) the neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed by four powers—Austria, Russia, Great Britain, and Prussia; but it was only in 1839 that all the European powers recognized the kingdom of Belgium.

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aspirations of Pan-Germanism are to gather all these fragments into a federated German Empire. Vast as is the scheme, unlikely to be fully realized, it yet has about it an element of possibility and reasonableness. Many portions of Austria-Hungary, for instance, are already German-speaking. They will soon be involved in a counter-struggle against the rival force of Pan-Slavism. Denmark and Holland—especially the latter—are more or less economically dependent on Germany. She has recently completed a canal which, by giving access from her great manufacturing centres to a German port, would enable her, if she wished, to divert some of that traffic which is Holland's principal asset. Denmark is a harder nut to crack. Here, as in Holland, there must be a conflict between loyalty to a national ideal and the desire to share that material prosperity in which small and isolated peoples can no longer hope to participate. It is suggested that Denmark should be neutralized, in her own interests and that of Europe, but it is difficult to see where the guarantee is to come from, in view of the position of Germany and her ambitions.

These contingencies may seem remote, but it must not be forgotten that, by reason of their form of government, Germany and Russia are enabled to take the long view in their foreign policy which is impossible to Britain or America, and, having set a goal before them, press forward steadily towards it. Even at the present stage

we see that Germany was recently within an ace of securing a most important overland line of communication with the East, which might have provided an alternative or a rival route to Suez. Her ambitions in Asia Minor have been for the time checked, but she has already secured a position there which cannot fail to be valuable. It has, incidentally, forced Great Britain to move in a way she would not otherwise have done, and it has — temporarily, at all events — checkmated Russia's designs on the Holy Land and the Persian Gulf.

It is, however, as a naval power that Germany looks to the future. Hitherto it has been believed that her main object was to cripple Great Britain. Her writers have been very outspoken on the subject, and there is no doubt that to offset, if not to outvie, the supremacy of Britain on the ocean is in Germany's opinion a vital part of her own development. But, so far as European politics are concerned, she is no longer in a position to declare herself "with all the continent against England." The *rapprochement* which has recently taken place between France, Italy, and Britain, collectively and individually, is not without its significance. These are all naval powers and the near neighbors of Germany, whose continental ambitions would seriously upset the balance of power which it is to their interest to maintain. The South African war, too, occurring at a time when Germany had not completed her prepara-

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tions, has ended in a manner which seems to eliminate her hopes in that quarter. Her present colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific are far from flourishing. She does not desire to extend them on similar lines, but, rather, to increase her holding of strategic points, even in tropical countries. German ambitions are now taking a turn in which Britain ceases to be the principal obstacle. She desires an extension of power, not so much in territory as in the control, or joint control, of trade routes; in a great central European federation under her own hegemony; in planting commercial colonies in South America and securing a preponderating influence in its affairs. She hopes to obtain a colonial empire without fighting for or buying it. Holland's great East Indian possessions she feels secure of in the course of time. She must have a strong naval power to control so vast an island empire, and to maintain a position where she will be between the United States on the north and Australasia on the south as rivals in the Pacific. She is extremely anxious not to be debarred from another arena of international interests, the Caribbean. It is, perhaps, not very obvious how she can achieve this end in the teeth of the Monroe Doctrine and the fact that not a coral island now remains that is not pre-empted. Holland, however, has a group of islands (Curaçoa) which, although not on a direct trade route from Europe, occupy an important position midway between the Antilles and Panama. Holland, too, is a South

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American power, though the value of Dutch Guiana may be more theoretical than practical. Another European power, Denmark, also has West Indian possessions. St. Thomas has a potentially good harbor and commands the Anegada passage, which is the direct and main route from the isthmus to Europe. It is a matter of common knowledge that America has long been desirous of securing the Danish islands, which are economically decadent and strategically of no value to Denmark. That she has not been able hitherto to accomplish her object has been commonly attributed to Danish sentiment, but is, in reality, the direct result of pressure and influence brought to bear by Germany, as on a recent occasion, through the instrumentality of a personage connected with the court at Copenhagen.

A very interesting question arises in connection with this incident. The Monroe Doctrine may prevent Germany from purchasing, say, a coaling-station at Cartagena, though such an interpretation is straining its terms. The United States, as has already been said, is probably prepared to go to this length and abide the consequence. By no conceivable interpretation, however, can the Monroe Doctrine prevent Danish or Dutch islands from gravitating into the German orbit through a process of federation by their sovereign states. And yet such an eventuality is by no means an impossibility and would be a direct challenge to the position taken up by America.

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Were Germany a great Pacific power the importance of these stations in the Caribbean, once the canal is opened, would, even from a commercial point of view, be at once apparent; and, as a matter of fact, she is already in a minor degree established in the Pacific, owning already part of New Guinea and various groups of islands. She is confident, moreover, of her ultimate domination over the Dutch East Indies, which would bring her at another point—Borneo—into close touch with America in the Philippines. Then there is Samoa, where the two powers are already side by side. Altogether, the question of actual relations with Germany is one to be carefully studied in connection with Greater America.

German ambitions in South and Central America have taken the form of commercial settlements. The German makes a singularly good pioneer trader and settler in a foreign country. He has a curious likeness in this respect to the Chinaman. Both are frugal, industrious, painstaking, insinuating, adaptive, contented with small profits; both retain their own national characteristics, language, ideas, and love of the fatherland, without, however, being in the true sense of the word colonists. Both take little part in domestic politics, which, perhaps, is why they do not become political pioneers for their own countries. They simply accept the government they find and make the best of it.

Some years ago there was a strong impression

that Germany was steadily bent on colonial expansion in South America. The number of German immigrants to southern Brazil, the Argentine, and Uruguay, and the fact that communities of Germans were gaining in strength and maintaining their purely Teutonic character, gave color to this idea. The extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the southern continent puts a new complexion on all this. Any openly expressed designs would, for the present, be out of the question. The fact remains, however, that colonization companies and steamer lines, both highly subsidized, continue to send out German immigrants; and if this stream has declined of late years that is probably due to industrial expansion at home and to the fact that Germany is not yet ready to assert herself. The actual sentiment of German immigrants towards their fatherland is a difficult factor to gauge. The United States has successfully assimilated so large a stream of Teutonic immigration that Americans are naturally sceptical as to the strength of German tradition. It is notable, too, that this assimilation has proceeded in the teeth of a very real affection on the part of Germans for their own language and literature and a pride in the intellectual achievement of the fatherland. Attempts have been made to stimulate this sentiment in the United States in the interests of Pan-Germanism, but it has utterly failed to shake the position of Germans as loyal citizens, and it may be said of those who become naturalized

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that they are intensely American. It must be remembered that, whatever the German's love for his fatherland, he realizes, when he leaves it, the rigidity and tyranny of the government which the militarism and arrogance of the east Prussian element has imposed on a united Germany. The fatherland of to-day may be greater, stronger, more progressive than of old, but by just so much as she succeeds in her fight for commercial and material power she ceases to exercise that hold upon the affections of her people which was founded upon intellectual and æsthetic conquests and the rivalry between schools of thought rather than centres of commerce. The German colonists in Latin America, therefore, may cherish their heritage of language and literature without wishing to be included in the modern German Empire and to come under that rigid militarism on which it is founded. Germans notoriously avoid their own colonies, not altogether for the alleged reason of their unpromising aspect, but because they find themselves dragooned by officials in a manner which recalls unpleasantly their early experiences in the mother-country. It is, for all these reasons, more than possible that the German element in South America will remain neutral, if not hostile, to any scheme of national colonization; but it remains to a great extent homogeneous. There is always, of course, the possibility of an Uitlander question arising similar to the one in South Africa, for the conditions of government are in

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many parts as bad as possible. What course Germany would take in such a case is largely dependent on two things—her own condition of preparedness and that of the United States. German influence would have long ago assumed far more serious proportions but for the undeniable fact that the German immigrant is willing to intermarry with natives in all countries where a white stock is found. Throughout Central, and in some parts of South, America, for instance, communities of several hundred Germans—clerks, merchants, planters, and small traders—are found, very few of whom brought wives from the old country. They intermarry with the Spanish-Americans, and the result, if influenced chiefly by the stronger parental type, is nevertheless a variation on the old German stock, and more bound by ties to the country of birth than to that to which by name, and probably by speech, they belong. In southern Brazil the black element makes intermarriage, to a people like the Germans, far less possible.

Reference has been made to the Venezuela arbitration, which has raised a question of the first importance in international relations — namely, whether the powers which declared the “pacific blockade” are entitled to preferential treatment or not. If the decision be in the affirmative, the tendency will be to appeal to such measures; if not, the use of the “pacific blockade” will stand condemned. In either case, the Monroe Doctrine will be affected.

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It seems probable, taking all these circumstances as far as possible into consideration, that, although actual political colonization by Germany may not be in question, German influence in South America may yet become a serious one. In southern Brazil, for instance, no less than one hundred and fifty million dollars of the foreign capital invested is German. The same process is at work in all parts of the southern hemisphere, Britain being the only serious competitor. American capital, influence, and prestige, despite the Monroe Doctrine and the Pan-American scheme, are rather on the wane. North Americans are antipathetic to South Americans, and the gulf is widened by mutual suspicion and distrust; whereas Germans adapt themselves to the conditions of life and are regarded as useful and harmless by their hosts.

If in all this there is no argument for a close study of German policy in its bearing on Greater America, this book will certainly have failed in its object. German ambitions clash at many points with those of Anglo-Saxondom, and the future may bring this home to the English-speaking peoples and may help to cement the bond of union between them. The attempt made by the Kaiser to win American confidence and to undermine the Anglo-American understanding has been a signal failure. The incidents of Venezuela, Manila Bay, and especially the German attitude at the beginning of the Spanish war, cannot be forgotten.

If friendship between Germany and the United

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States is merely a diplomatic *façon de parler*, it has in the past been a warm sentiment between the American Republic and Russia. This "traditional friendship" rests on the most shadowy basis, but has nevertheless been used with effect on certain occasions.¹ Russia, in fact, was an American power at one time, and was engaged in extending her influence quietly but steadily along the Pacific coast, long before she had actually crossed Asia and established herself on the other side of the ocean. She had, besides the great territory known as Alaska, settlements as far south as California, and in the early part of the nineteenth century she threatened to make the Pacific, north of 51 degrees on the American and 45 degrees on the Asiatic coast, a *mare clausum*. The Monroe Doctrine was, in fact, partly aimed at her, and induced her to withdraw some of her pretensions. The purchase of Alaska, in 1867, put an end to her American possessions, for by that time she was fully occupied with a more promising scheme of contiguous expansion. Russia still remains, however (with the exception of Britain, in Canada), the nearest European power to the American Republic. Although the proposal to unite the Asiatic and American continents by a

¹ The Russian fleet visited the United States during the civil war, an act construed to be one of extreme friendliness at a time when Europe generally was in sympathy with the Confederacy. Dr. Wendell Holmes gave expression to this sentiment in the words, "Who was our friend when the world was our foe?"

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railway line and tunnel under Bering Strait is too chimerical to come into the range of practical considerations, there is no doubt that the development both of Alaska, the Aleutian isles, and the Pacific slope, on the one hand, and the Asiatic littoral, especially Manchuria, on the other, will make commercial relations between America and Russia an important factor. There is something unusually interesting and picturesque in this contact between the two powers which stand in the modern world for the extreme examples of opposing systems. The Russian Empire is almost as young as the young American Republic; she has made a progress in her own way even more remarkable than that of the United States. In one respect she is the superior. She possesses, besides a vast number of subject races, a homogeneous population, which increases with a rapidity unequalled elsewhere. It is estimated that one-sixteenth of the world's population lives under the Russian flag. De Tocqueville, in 1835, expressed the conviction that the Russian and American peoples would one day divide the world. We are not quite so certain now, when we see the stagnancy of the true American population, that the New World is as full of vitality as De Tocqueville believed. Russia, too, despite her phenomenal expansion, has the elements of weakness at her very heart. Nevertheless, the shock between two systems so radically opposed cannot fail to have serious consequences, and if the latent forces

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of the two Titans are ever consciously arrayed against each other the struggle will probably be of a moral nature. Whatever the future may hold, it is certain that relations between Russia and America must become more intimate. The New World cannot afford any longer an attitude of indifference as regards happenings in the Old. The United States has come down into the arena of the Pacific, in which the future of Asia is to be largely determined. She is deeply concerned in that future, which will directly affect the interests not only of her seven or eight million Pacific subjects and of her Pacific coast, but indirectly the whole of Greater America.

The actual relations of America with Oriental countries have been more intimate than is sometimes supposed. America is proud of her claim to be the first to open Japan to the outer world. It was inevitable that this great power, with its thousands of miles of littoral along the Pacific, should stretch across the ocean to that other coast, where an ancient, rich, and picturesque civilization was to be found—a contrast to the bareness of life in the pioneer colonies at home. It would have been turning the back on American aspiration and achievement in the past, as well as shutting the eyes to the menace of the future, had the republic refused to play her part in the Oriental drama. She enjoys also the distinction of being the first power to make a treaty with Korea, and she has recently executed one with China, which

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at the present juncture must be regarded as an important factor in the situation, since it asserts not only American interests in Manchuria, but the sovereign rights of China in that region—the very point for which Japan is contending.

France is a Pacific power, but she is little likely to be brought by reason of this into contact with America. Her departure from Mexico and relinquishment of the Panama canal removed her from the American sphere, but she retains a foothold in the Caribbean, and also off the coast of Newfoundland, and it must not be forgotten that islands like these, of little intrinsic value to their possessors but ardently desired by other nations, may easily become pawns in the game of international politics. France is even a South American power, by reason of her portion of Guiana. She does not love a purely commercial form of colonization, nor is she successful in it. Her stationary population makes the replenishment of tropical colonies an impossibility, and she has, besides, in northern Africa, a far nearer and more congenial sphere for activity. There may, therefore, arise one day the question of some of these scattered remnants of her empire changing hands, and in this way her relations with America may become more cordial, or be strained, according to the circumstances of the moment. Obviously, American statesmen cannot afford to be oblivious of France when they take their survey of affairs which affect their country. The final elimination of Spain from

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the eastern hemisphere and from the Pacific removes her altogether from American affairs, save so far as her kinship with and influence over the Latin-Americans are concerned. The relations of the United States with these ancient outposts of the Spanish Empire have been dealt with elsewhere; Denmark as a Caribbean power has also been treated of; Holland plays her part chiefly as the cat's-paw of Germany. Incidentally, it must be said that one of the sorest spots in German-American relations is the fact that it is certain that Germany would intervene, in the event of the Dutch queen dying without issue, to prevent the establishment of a Netherlands republic. Minor questions in American foreign relations have been raised lately in establishing commercial intercourse with Abyssinia, for which purpose a mission was despatched; and the sending of a squadron to Beirout to protect American interests on a recent occasion is another indication of the activity and catholicity which the interests of Greater America enjoin in her foreign policy.

Last of all, we come to the relations subsisting between the English-speaking peoples. Canada's position has been fully discussed elsewhere.¹ It is, of course, bound up with the relations of the mother-country and her quondam colonies.

As far as national sentiment is concerned, there is no doubt that a great change is visible on either

¹ Chapter x., "Canada and Pan-Americanism."

side of the Atlantic. The soreness of spirit on the one hand and the arrogance and contempt on the other—an American might possibly reverse these terms; he has invariably believed Great Britain to be very sore at the loss of her colonies, and at one period, at all events, he indulged in a national vanity which was quite beyond the normal air of even a Briton's superiority—have given way to a genuine appreciation of each other's good qualities. The American remains, as he was in De Tocqueville's day, more sensitive to criticism than his British cousin. He has not gone through the hardening process to which our continental critics have subjected us. He remains somewhat self-assertive in consequence, and is, therefore, liable to be misunderstood; but there is an interest and sympathy in British affairs among the better educated, and even an excess of Anglophilism in certain circles, to which we have responded with an almost hysterical outburst of admiration for everything American. A far surer foundation, however, for friendship is the growing sense of community of political interests, the intermingling of the two societies, facilitated by improved communications, and also the removal of many points of discussion, if not of dissension. The most serious questions, such as those of Venezuela, the Bering Sea, the trans-isthmian canal, and Alaska, have been amicably settled, and those still remaining, of which the fisheries is the most important, can be disposed of by means

of direct diplomatic negotiation or by reference to The Hague tribunal.¹ One result of American expansion is to make the republic both more interesting and more intelligible to British people. It was the purely local character of the politics—their provincialism, narrow range, and unpicturesque monotony—which made them distasteful to a British observer. America is past the stage of incubation; she has emerged as a full-fledged world-power. We watch with interest and follow with criticism her efforts in fields where we, too, have labored. She, on her part, is able to appreciate and understand far better the circumstances and problems of our national life. In some phases of her expansion she is following in our footsteps, and the difficulties she encounters lead her to a more sympathetic judgment of our past failures and achievements. She cannot hope to expand—nor even to retain—without crossing the paths of other powers as ambitious and progressive as herself, and without shouldering responsibilities heavy to be borne. Whatever our own future may be it should not cross hers. We desire that freedom of political life, of trade, and communications which is her goal also.

The practical question in Anglo-American re-

¹ There seems to be no sufficient justification for a fresh arbitration treaty, which is opposed to the opinions and prejudices of a majority of the American people, and would be bitterly resented by the Senate as infringing their constitutional control of foreign affairs.

GREATER AMERICA

lations is exactly what either people has to gain from alliance—not, perhaps, an actual paper treaty, but a strong and tangible yet unwritten bond, confirmed by small concessions on either side and carried into the realms of diplomacy. Great Britain stands to gain a great deal that is vital to her at this stage of her development. What America stands to gain may be left to the readers of this book to decide.

APPENDIX

A

The following comparative tabular statement indicates the numerical strength of the fleets of the powers named.

BUILT

| | Great Britain | France | Russia | Germany | Italy | United States | Japan |
|------------------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|---------------|-------|
| Battle-ships (1st class)..... | 42 | 19 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 6 |
| Battle-ships (2d class)..... | 4 | 8 | 4 | 4 | — | 1 | 1 |
| Battle-ships (3d class)..... | 2 | 1 | 1 | 12 | 5 | — | — |
| Coast-defence vessels..... | 2 | 14 | 13 | 11 | — | 15 | 2 |
| Cruisers, armored..... | 18 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 6 |
| Cruisers, protected (1st class)... | 21 | 7 | 6 | 1 | — | 3 | — |
| Cruisers, protected (2d class)... | 51* | 16 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 11 | 10 |
| Cruisers, protected (3d class).... | 32† | 17 | — | 10 | 11 | 2 | 8 |
| Cruisers, unprotected..... | 10 | 1 | 3 | 20 | — | 11 | 9 |
| Torpedo vessels..... | 34 | 16 | 9 | 2 | 14 | — | 1 |
| Torpedo-boat destroyers..... | 112 | 14 | 48 | 28 | 11 | 14 | 17 |
| Torpedo boats..... | 85 | 247 | 132 | 93 | 145 | 27 | 67 |
| Submarine torpedo boats..... | 5 | 15 | — | — | 1 | 3 | — |

* Including three partially protected.

† Including one partially protected.

BUILDING

| | Great Britain | France | Russia | Germany | Italy | United States | Japan |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------|-----------------|-------|-----------------|-------|
| Battle-ships (1st class)... | { 12 } { 3* } | 7 | 8 | 8 | 6 | { 9 } { 5* } | { — } |
| Battle-ships (2d class)... | — | 1 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Coast-defence vessels.... | — | — | — | — | — | 1 | — |
| Cruisers, armored..... | { 19 } { 4* } | { 13 } { 1* } | — | { 3 } { 1* } | 1 | 11 | — |
| Cruisers, protected (1st class)..... | — | — | 3 | — | — | — | — |
| Cruisers, protected (2d class)..... | 2 | — | 2 | — | — | 6 | 2 |
| Cruisers, protected (3d class)..... | { 4 } { 3* } | — | — | { 5 } { 2* } | — | — | 1 |
| Scouts | { 4 } { 4* } | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Torpedo-boat destroyers. | { 19 } { 15* } | { 19 } { 4* } | 6 | { 4 } { 6* } | 2 | 6 | 2 |
| Torpedo boats..... | 5 | { 18 } { 25* } | 7 | — | 8 | 4 | 18 |
| Submarine torpedo boats | { 4 } { 10* } | { 25 } { 18* } | 2 | — | 3 | 5 | — |

* To be laid down—1903-1904.

APPENDIX

B

Diagram showing the financial record of the Spanish-American republics during the years 1883-1903 (excepting Brazil and Bolivia). [From *Financial News*, January 23, 1904.]

| | ARGENTINA | CHILI | COLOMBIA | COSTA RICA | ECUADOR | GUATEMALA | HONDURAS | MEXICO | NICARAGUA | PARAGUAY | PERU | SALVADOR | URUGUAY | VENEZUELA | |
|------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|------|----------|---------|-----------|------|
| 1883 | | Working funds in emergency | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1883 |
| 1884 | | Working funds in emergency | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1884 |
| 1885 | | Working funds in emergency | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1885 |
| 1886 | | Working funds in emergency | | Conversion | | | | Conversion | No default | Conversion | | | | | 1886 |
| 1887 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1887 |
| 1888 | | | | | | Conversion | | | | | | | | | 1888 |
| 1889 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1889 |
| 1890 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1890 |
| 1891 | Working funds in emergency | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1891 |
| 1892 | " | | | | Conversion | | | | | | | | | | 1892 |
| 1893 | " | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1893 |
| 1894 | Working funds in emergency | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1894 |
| 1895 | " | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1895 |
| 1896 | " | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1896 |
| 1897 | " | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1897 |
| 1898 | Full interest returned | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1898 |
| 1899 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1899 |
| 1900 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1900 |
| 1901 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1901 |
| 1902 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1902 |
| 1903 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1903 |

NOTE.—The periods of default on external debts are marked by shading. The "conversions" were nearly always arrangements imposed on the bondholders, accompanied by a more or less heavy reduction of their rightful claims.

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


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